

THE END OF
THE WAR

WALTER E. WEYL



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THE END OF THE WAR



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THE END OF THE WAR

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
POSTSCRIPT	1
I THE ELUSIVE VICTORY	17
II PACIFISTS AND PATRIOTS	38
III THE CONVERSION OF AMERICA	50
IV THE WAR AGAINST MILITARISM	73
V SPOILING THE ENEMY	98
VI SACRED EGOISM	121
VII AMERICA AS ARBITER	139
VIII THE TRUE ALIGNMENT	157
IX THE WAR BENEATH THE WAR	174
X IS GERMANY INCORRIGIBLE?	189
XI A CONCLUSIVE PEACE	207
XII GUARANTEES	224
XIII THE GRAND ALLIANCE	232
XIV OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONALISM	248
XV AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE	273
XVI AFTER THE PEACE CONFERENCE	296

POSTSCRIPT

As I write this postscript, which is also an introduction, the fate of the world is being decided upon the fields of Picardy. Hundreds of millions in all the Allied countries are praying for the success of the British, French and American soldiers, who are seeking to stem the tide of German invasion and end for all time the dream of a German world-dominion. While that battle rages all other pre-occupations are thrust from our minds. If, by evil chance, the German arms are crowned with success, the end of the war will be one that we cannot contemplate except with horror. The Allies must hold, must fling back this gigantic onrush, or the power of decision will pass from them and will rest with their German conquerors.

The book to which this is a postscript is based upon the assumption that the Allies can hold their own and can thus exert a decisive influence upon peace and upon the diplomacy that leads to peace. The book is an appeal to America to assume leadership in that diplomacy, to eliminate imperialistic elements from the demands of our Allies, and to attempt a settlement based on internationalism. During the period while the book was being written the chances for such an American leadership were ex-

cellent and the President showed signs of moving in this direction. He made repeated advances, though frequently too late. But at all times he met with obstinate and usually successful resistance. As a consequence less was accomplished than might have been desired.

During the six months from April 1 until October 1, 1917, and even afterwards, the war might have been concluded on the basis of internationalism and democracy. The Germans were discouraged; their U-boat campaign had netted less than had been expected and America's participation promised an eventual victory to the Allies. Russia, although tottering, was still capable of offering resistance; the Italian army, as yet undefeated, stood firm in the Julian Alps; in Germany itself a democratic movement was in full swing. German discontent was stronger than at any previous time, and clamorous demands were being made, as also in Austria, for a democratic peace. It was a golden opportunity.

That opportunity has now been lost. By maladroitness, by diplomatic errors and by a display of callousness and insincerity, our Allies proved that they did not understand and could not act. The Allies revealed an inelasticity, an intolerance of the new Russian democracy and a thinly disguised desire for conquered territories that made diplomacy on a high level impossible. Rather than revise their

imperialistic war aims, they permitted Russia to go down, almost forced her to make a separate peace, and allowed Germany to break her up into a number of smaller states, easy to pit against one another. Italy's desire to gain hasty possession of coveted territory and lack of unity among the Allies led to Italian defeat in the fall of 1917 and to a further strengthening of the autocratic and militaristic classes in Germany. Finally, by permitting, if not encouraging, Japan to invade Siberia, in circumstances which indicated that the proposed intervention was to be a predatory attack, our Allies set upon themselves the stamp of imperialism.

To these short-sighted actions and omissions of our Allies the President of the United States has been steadfastly opposed. Repeatedly he has stood alone for the long-time policy based on principle, while statesmen in the Allied countries clamoured for immediate ends, a profitable victory and a punitive peace. For his own country President Wilson has made no special claims and he has insisted repeatedly that America fights only for democracy. His influence has been cast on the side of a reasonable peace based on internationalism. If hitherto he has failed to bring the Allied governments to his point of view, it may be argued in his defence that the task was difficult and the opposition strong.

It may be conceded, perhaps, that President Wilson's ideals were sometimes left to hang high in the

diplomatic heavens and were not always brought down to solid earth. As in his protests to the belligerents before our entrance into the war, so in his world-addresses since, there have been at times a lack of reality, a failure to put force back of ideas, an unwillingness to use even the pressure of world opinion to compel opponents to accept his conclusions. The crucial defect of his policy has been its detachment. Here was a great man uttering noble sentiments in noble language, yet missing one chance after another to translate those sentiments into decisive action and to force adherence upon unwilling Allies.

It is notoriously easy to judge after the event and notoriously difficult to be fair towards those compelled to make immediate decisions. We cannot reasonably demand that President Wilson should have foreseen all the incalculable events of the world war. He made errors, but he avoided innumerable worse errors, and in his ideals, in his sympathy for democracy, as also in his broad view of the whole situation he proved himself immeasurably superior to the statesmen of our Allies. In the light of subsequent events, however, it now seems obvious that *before* our declaration of war we should have attempted a firm settlement with our Allies. At that time, when we had already broken off negotiations with Germany but had not yet begun hostilities, we already surmised, if we did not actually know, that

our co-belligerents had entered into mutual agreements hostile in spirit to all that we hoped to achieve in this war. Instead of merely insisting upon our individual innocence we should have demanded, as a condition of our belligerency, a general statement of the terms of the Allies. We might quietly have said to their governments: "Either revise your war aims in conformity with principles of internationalism, so as to rob them of all tinge of imperialism and vindictiveness, or we will not join. We will arm and build merchant ships and shall be ready when you have so changed your terms, but until then not a man, nor a ship, nor a dollar. We are willing to fight on your side for world-democracy but not for secret treaties which you may have made among yourselves."

A second opportunity to urge an international peace presented itself when the Russian Republic published its formula of "no annexations and no indemnities." We should immediately have accepted, if not that exact formula, at least one that breathed the same spirit, and should have insisted upon its acceptance by our Allies. We should thus have strengthened the Kerensky Government and retained the allegiance of Russia. The projected Stockholm Conference was another of our failures. Again we were given the chance to invite publicity and again we refused. Like our Allies, we pretended to consider this Conference a mere German subterfuge;

in other words we played the German game. If Allied imperialism had more to fear from open discussion than had German militarism, if we were afraid to risk a clarification and publication of war aims, then our moral position in the war was precarious.

Nor does this end the list of our disastrous omissions. In July, 1917, the majority of the delegates in the German Reichstag offered peace resolutions which for many months President Wilson ignored, although it was obvious, from the President's own speeches, that only by strengthening this inconstant and insecure parliamentary majority could we hope to achieve the peace for which we fought. Similarly, our attitude towards the secret treaties of the Allies, of which the President learned in the late spring of 1917, revealed an uncertain and hesitating diplomacy. It must be remembered that it was the knowledge of these treaties that enabled the German rulers to smother the discontent of their own people; the *Junkers* appealed to German democrats on the plea that the Allies wished to crush Germany. At any time after June, therefore, the President, by calling a public inter-Allied conference, might have forced a denunciation of these treaties and a revision of peace terms. On the other hand, without such action it was impossible, as events proved, to hold Russia to our side. For the Russians, fully acquainted with these secret imperialistic compacts,

entered into by England, France, Italy, Roumania and Japan, firmly believed that the governments of those nations were as grasping as was that of Germany. If America had a different policy, why did she consort with these nations? Why did she not frankly state her opinion concerning those secret agreements, published in Petrograd but not published in the leading journals of London, Paris and New York?

It would be quite unfair to describe this American diplomacy as tepid and timid; and equally unfair to represent Mr. Wilson as a man who is always missing trains. Such general accusations do not justly appraise the moral quality and the intellectual perceptions of the President, who with little forewarning was faced with a new, menacing, complicated, and, above all, a constantly and rapidly changing situation. It was difficult for him (or us) to apply coercion to friends and Allies and ungracious to distrust the aims of nations, whose sacrifices in this war had been larger and their loyalty older than our own, and it was equally difficult to know how far we might trust even the most fair-spoken of our enemies. Moreover, the defect of the President's policy was a defect, in a sense even a function, of its qualities. A policy that aims at internationalism, at mutual confidence among nations, must rely in large measure upon moral forces, must be patient and tolerant, even at the risk of becoming leaden-

footed. It cannot always make quick decisions or summary judgments. Its path is not laid out in advance, and its errors must be judged more lightly than are those of the traditional diplomacy with its narrower and more selfish aims and its more ancient rules of procedure.

Whatever the cause of our inability to influence our Allies, however, it is within the province of fair criticism, even in these dangerous times, to suggest that this failure of ours to act decisively has diminished the moral value of our participation. We have erred on the side of caution and generosity. We have too highly valued the intelligence of Allied statesmen and too sharply discounted our own. Striving for concord within the Alliance, we have feared to speak the truth lest it offend one or another of the nations heroically fighting by our side. But a true concert among allies is attained not when each is promised everything but when all are inspired by a single ideal. We have been silenced by what we were assured was the superior wisdom and the older experience of European statecraft. We have held our peace.

In so doing we have involved ourselves in a grave and general error. We have forced ourselves to believe that we could fight for democracy and maintain the integrity of the Alliance despite secret arrangements violating the principles for which we

fight. We have believed that we could trust to selfishness, enlightened and unenlightened, to overcome the brutal militaristic spirit of Germany. We have fought fire with fire and been burned in the process. We have kept our own skirts clean and not considered whether those of our Allies were clean or filthy. We have believed that an alliance could be half-moral and half-immoral, half-democratic and international and half-imperialistic. We have not faced the problem squarely. By not facing the problem we have allowed the military supremacy to pass temporarily to our enemy and have destroyed for the time being our moral advantage, the greatest source of our strength.

Today the chance for a peace based on internationalism is slimmer than at any time since our entrance into the war. Having handed over Russia to the Germans and isolated and lost Roumania, we now seem likely to force Russia to become a political, as well as an economic ally to Germany. We have created conditions where time no longer fights decisively in our favour and where the pressure of war begins to bear as heavily upon our associates as upon our enemies. We have robbed ourselves of the solace and unifying power of a great ideal, and have made it possible, both in the countries of our Allies and in those of our enemies, for the worst elements in the population to gain control and to

end the war by a compromised imperialist peace. We have failed because we did not have the courage of our convictions.

The opportunity is lost, and yet it may return. If I believed that no chance remained for a peace based upon international principle, I should be loth to publish this book. The chance, though dwindling, still exists. There may again come about, perhaps as a result of the gigantic battle now fought in France, such a balancing of belligerent forces as will permit the United States once more to occupy the favourable moral and strategic position which she held during the months from April to October 1917, and, to a less degree, even until February 1918. If the opportunity again occurs, if we are no longer faced with the naked need of defence against a militaristic Germany entrenched and fortified by our mistakes, we cannot afford to repeat the vital errors which render our present situation so hazardous.

Yet it is exactly these errors which we are again urged to commit. In our present mood of exaggerated depression the claim is made that the policy of reconciliation has failed. But, in truth, it has not failed; it has not been tried. Indeed what has so signally failed has been the exactly contrary policy of fighting imperialism with imperialism and greed with greed. Today we are again exhorted to shut our eyes, to offer no negotiated peace and accept none, to make no distinction among Germans,

all of whom are equally brutal and hypocritical, and not to think of peace until the enemy is prostrate, starved, shattered, beaten to a pulp. Then we may talk terms.

Doubtless this advice is a natural reaction from the new revelation of German militarism vouchsafed to the Russians. The punitive peace inflicted by Germany upon Russia and Roumania has once more proved, what was painfully familiar before, that the Imperial German Government is still heartless, truculent and utterly remote from considerations of common decency and even of larger statesmanship. The *Junkers*, again in the saddle, are the same swaggering brood, unrepentant and exultant. The radical and democratic movement in Germany seems at low ebb, for German liberals are crushed by German victories and are overborne by a rising flood of jingoism.

Yet the task of all democrats opposed to German militarism, though now more difficult, is the same as before. Our aim is to end this menace, to end it once for all, to end it in the only way it can be ended, by the creation of a secure international system. Today we still strengthen German militarism when we threaten Germany with destruction; we still tie German democrats to the *Junker* chariot wheel when we fight for conquests and punitive indemnities instead of for the things that they, as well as we, desire. It will now take longer and more des-

perate fighting to gain our ends than if we had adopted a wiser policy, and we, like our enemies, must pay a heavier toll. At our own great cost we must break down anew the *Junker* prestige, which was sinking in 1917 but has again risen. Unless, however, we fight for a program to which German democrats also can subscribe, unless we fight literally to make the world safe for democracy, for the German as well as the American, British and Russian democracies, all our new expenditure of blood will be futile. We shall accomplish nothing even if after unparelled sacrifices we gain the supreme military victory and our khaki-clad soldiers march in triumph down the silent *Unter den Linden*.

If we and our Allies fight this war as we have fought it for almost four years, for Dalmatia, Constantinople and various Turkish islands, if we fight for a peace in which we at our own will and pleasure are to determine German and Austrian boundaries as Germany now determines those of Russia, the war is lost. Not necessarily, or at least not primarily, in a military, but in a moral sense. We may end the dream of German world dominion but shall not have come nearer to a peace based on internationalism, and shall have incurred the danger of a compromised imperialist peace. The war might have ended in a compromise which would have been a victory had the compromise been based on a new international order. If, however, the compromise

ending the war is nothing but a dividing up of Russia, China and a few other countries by nations too tired to fight, by nations reconciled solely by the privilege of spoiling enemy and ally, then we have an ignoble peace, and the war for democracy is a failure and our high pretensions are a mockery.

The opportunity for a democratic peace may again recur. By pressure upon the Western front, the Allies may force democratic groups in Germany to make overtures for a peace based on internationalism and on a true self-determination of Russia, for a peace free of all taint of spoliation. It will be difficult to do this, however, unless our Allies refrain from giving final sanction to plans of Japanese conquest in Siberia. Once we concede to Japan the right to conquer this territory we shall find it impossible, except by sheer force, to prevent German, Austrian and Turkish aggressions against Russia.

The war for democracy and internationalism will not end, however, with the treaty of peace. The present war is but an incident, disastrous and ghastly, in a larger development, in a struggle between two principles: the principle of autocracy, militarism and nationalistic imperialism, and the principle of democracy. The moment the war ends the struggle will change its form, though not its character. There will be renewed the same conflict which we have witnessed for several generations, the same steady upward push of the masses of all

nations. A victory for Germany would immensely hamper this movement and delay an eventual victory of the democratic principle. It would re-establish the prestige of autocracy. Not even such a catastrophe, however, would end the struggle between democracy and the autocratic principle, though the centre of conflict might shift from Manchester, Roubaix and Pittsburg to Essen and Leipzig.

To a great extent, moreover, the war, even if its outcome be calamitous, will have contributed to the victory of the democratic principle. The war has meant nothing if it has not meant enlightenment. To the peoples of all countries it has shown the lack of prevision and of moral quality of the governments which they have so long obeyed. Not only the autocracy of Germany, but the English, French and Italian rulers as well, have revealed crassly egoistic class motives concealed under pious phrases. The wage-earners of the world and the hundreds of millions who make up the poor and disinherited will have long years in which to reflect upon the lessons of this conflict. They will come to see that back of the struggle between nations lay a more permanent conflict between ideas. They will see the war beneath the war, and will realize that whatever the immediate issue, the victory is to the group in the community that is most conscious of its interests and most insistent upon its rights.

It is this self-revelation of our modern ultra-na-

tionalism and this baring of the nakedness of class pretensions that will constitute in the end one of the great permanent victories of the war. Whatever the outcome, there will remain after the war the same clash within the nations as before. A present victory for internationalism and democracy, however, a present destruction of German militarism, and with it of all other militarisms, is the goal to be achieved in the present war and a step in the direction of an ultimate victory in the years to come.

THE END OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I

THE ELUSIVE VICTORY

IN this fourth year of the war all the world longs for peace. The fever has almost run its course. Much hatred remains, much greed for territory and wealth, much reliance on the strength of armies and navies. Yet the world over men are sickened by the eternal bloodshed. The early optimistic enthusiasm has vanished, and there opens up the vista of an endless prolongation of a senseless slaughter. No longer is there hope of an easy victory over dispirited foes. Instead earnest peace-loving men are asking themselves whether this conflict, like the Thirty Years' War, will not long endure and end only in the utter decivilization of Europe and of the world.

Precisely such a situation as we are now facing was presaged in a remarkable anticipation by an English philosopher in the spring of 1914. "Let a European war break out," wrote Mr. Graham Wallas, "perhaps between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, which so many journalists and poli-

ticians in England and Germany contemplate with criminal levity. If the combatants prove to be equally balanced, it may, after the first battles, smoulder on for thirty years. What will be the population of London, or Manchester, or Chemnitz, or Bremen, or Milan, at the end of it?"¹

A thirty years' war, lasting until 1944, still seems to us impossible. Flesh and blood could not stand the intolerable strain; the war must come to its end earlier. Yet we are as far from a decision as at the beginning. On land the Central Powers are victorious; at sea the Allies; and both are straining their resources and wasting their energies at a speed inconceivable four years ago. The war's contagion has spread, and nations, uninterested in Serbia's fate and other controversies which gave rise to the contest, now marshal their forces, sacrifice their young men and put their whole future to the test. The chances of victory for the one side or the other alter continually, and statesmen and publicists, once possessed of calm judgment, are elated or panic-stricken by the news of successive days. Throughout the nations the gambling spirit is rife, and the fate of the world is the stakes.

From the gigantic battling of more than three years there emerges a sense of the elusiveness of the victory sought. In the beginning, when German armies were rapidly invading France, the

¹ "The Great Society" by Graham Wallas, New York, 1914, p. 12.

Fatherland believed that the present struggle, like those of '66 and '70, was to be "a fresh and merry war," and just before the Marne, and afterwards, France was dismembered in numberless *Kneipes* throughout the German Empire. Similarly in the optimistic spring of 1915, English and French, relying upon the coming Big Push and the Slavic steam-roller, amused themselves by dividing up enemy territories in anticipation of an early decisive victory. Since then, however, much water has flowed under the bridge. Millions of careless boasting boys have been buried deep and other millions are hobbling about on crutches, or, blinded or diseased, are seeking to live out mangled lives until Death comes to this generation and the curtain goes down upon the grotesque tragedy. During all this time amid alarms of defeat there have been exultant shrieks for the victory about to be grasped. The victory has never been grasped. It has always been three months ahead, always needed just one more million deaths, a few billion dollars more. And so, on both sides of that grim fighting line, which has suddenly replaced old political boundaries, men stumble forward, their eyes blinded by the flowing blood, their hearts inspired by an inner ideal, by a primitive, invincible pride and by the persistent hope of a victory that is always to be and never is.

Yet however patriotic, men remain men, and all the obsession of the present cannot deaden the mem-

ory of happier days. Even the Junker, steeled in a philosophy of war, has his moments of regret for the time before sons and brothers died daily in unromantic ways on distant battle-fields, when men might meet present enemies on terms of friendship, and the world was not divided against itself by bulwarks of bayonets, ships and lies. To the common run of unmartial people who form a majority of all nations, the war has become odious. The illusion is gone. It is no "merry war" but a desperate, unhonourable conflict, a war of money, deceit, bribery, murder and ruthlessness both against neutrals and enemies. To what does it lead? What will be the gain in the long years of post-bellum reckoning? Sober people begin to see beyond the conflict to the grey years to come. They still hope for victory, but it is a lesser victory than that once envisaged, a victory in which the victors themselves will be overburdened with debt and the care of the victims who achieved the victory. The hope of adequate indemnities has vanished; the war as a gigantic whole is unprofitable. It does not pay. From a material point of view even a victory will not pay.

Will it pay morally? Will the losses in blood and treasure be made good by permanent gains in ideals?

Here lies the real issue, and it is the affirmative answer to this question which prolongs the war. So universal is the abhorrence of the ceaseless carnage that nothing but the deepest ideals could reconcile

men to the struggle. Millions of us believe, however, that to give over the battle without attaining the war's supreme goal would be to suffer disaster. The war is as odious as ever, cruel, barbaric, vile; and yet there seems no alternative than a submission to enduring evil. Victory will consist in bringing about a new state of the world in which men will be unharassed and free, and in which great nations and small will live together in peace.

Today there has arisen a new attitude toward peace and a larger hope for peace, because of the very conditions which make the present war different from any other in history. In the past wars were limited by the narrow bounds given to political integration, narrow bounds within which all intercourse between the nations took place. And peace was limited by the same conditions. A world peace was impossible in a world divided up into thousands of separate communities unconnected by industrial, social and intellectual bonds. Today the increasingly close integration of the world, which makes wars utterly destructive, makes a world peace conceivable. For the first time there is possibility of a close co-operation among nations, a sense of likeness in aim and destiny. There is a dream of mutual understanding and common concert. There is a propagation of an international faith and of an international allegiance.

This conception, at best merely struggling for ex-

pression, distorted and disfigured in the throes of its birth, this faith in a new world society, in a new unity and a new concert, is the one fact which gives this world conflict a rational and moral base. Destroy that base and nothing remains but the maniac clashing of rival peoples, a war which leads to a senseless peace, which again leads to war. Destroy this faith, and the war is but one of an endless chain of wars. In some manner and to some extent all the warring nations, including even those opposed to us, accept this faith. They cling to it despite many facts which should tend to make them sceptical. It is the vindication of this faith which alone makes the war anything more than a mere grotesque tragedy. It is by this vindication alone that a victory can be won.

But is not this real moral victory itself elusive, and do we not clutch at it ignorantly, and with clumsy hands? It is significant that our enemies, against whom we are fighting for the security of this better world, are themselves fighting for security, so that echoes of our ambitions come to us from across enemy frontiers. Can we attain internationalism, democracy and permanent peace by the mere expedient of fighting? In the beginning, it must be admitted, we envisaged the whole problem too simply. Wrapped up in a sense of the perfect justice of our cause, we believed that our enemy must soon discern and acknowledge that he was fighting

against the light. Many idealists among the Allies expected that in a few months—in a year at most—they would overturn the Imperial German Government and confer upon the un-hated German people the blessings which they themselves enjoyed. Better still, the Germans, perceiving the abyss towards which their dynasts were leading them, would themselves revolt, and stretch out their hands in friendship to their rescuing enemy. None of all this has happened; on the contrary the Germans have made common cause with their rulers, and believe, quite sincerely, that they, and they alone, are fighting for the right, fighting that we and our Allies may not crush, dismember and humiliate the Fatherland. From the beginning they have opposed to us ideals as firmly held as those that we hold.

All our millions of soldiers, our hundreds of warships, our mountains of explosives, have failed to persuade them that we are fighting their cause. We are unable to convince them and to their surprise they are unable to convince us.

The difficulty seems to be that we and our Allies are bringing to this problem a blunt war mind and are seeking a somewhat impalpable solution by excessively palpable instruments. We have tried to hammer the enemy into a confession of sin and into a state of grace, not realizing that for this purpose machine guns and asphyxiating gas are no adequate instruments. Though we cannot win this war with-

out arms, we cannot win it by arms alone. The consequence of our exclusive preoccupation with the war tends to obscure the very purposes for which it is fought, with the result that the ideal victory, which we seek, eludes us.

This is true of our enemies and our allies as of ourselves. The simple faith of 1914 is gone. In Germany millions now perceive that they were enrolled in this conflict by a conscription of lies and that the real objects of their exalted rulers were different from those avowed. They begin to doubt the wisdom and justice of invading Belgium, of submarine warfare and the bombarding of peaceful cities; and a few are wondering whether a German victory might not be a victory *over* Germany. The chains fastened upon Belgium would clank upon German ankles, for foreign aggression means unfreedom at home. Similarly, though in a lesser degree, the Allied peoples are beginning to dread too complete a victory. What advantage will there be in a mere overpowering of Germany? The German menace will be gone, but new menaces will have been created. Crush Germany to place Italy on the East Adriatic and the seeds are sown for a fresh war between Italy and Serbia and their respective allies, a war potentially as destructive as that under which we now live. Dismember Austria, split up that loose aggregation into a larger Balkans, and what is the permanent gain to England or France? Again, what

new wars are to be staged by the Peace Conference in Asia Minor? Everywhere dangers spring up like armed men from the ground. Everywhere victory promises to create new warring nations, young, unwise, over-confident, over-ambitious, ruthless. Such a victory is no victory. Divide all conquered territories according to the clashing desires of the flushed Allies and you have a state of Europe and of the world, no better than that from which men sought to escape in the insane venture of 1914.

Humankind is proverbially disregarding of distant dangers and Europe might be willing to purchase immunity from immediate aggression at the risk of a greater peril fifty years hence. But the menace is far more proximate. In 1912 the Balkan States declared war against Turkey upon the basis of a division of conquered territories more carefully considered than that which today binds the Allies; within a year they were at war among themselves. Can the Allies, in the event of their success, surely hold together in the precarious days of victory, while distributing territories newly acquired? Let Germany lay down her arms—is peace then assured? In a division of spoils there is no true harmony. What Italy wants Serbia wants. We can imagine the ironic laughter of the defeated Central Powers if at the final grand inquest the victorious Allies split upon the rock of clashing expansions, and each courted the aid of the German victim. For unless

some new principle is evoked, other than that of giving to each what has been promised to each, the division will be made according to the strength of the respective victorious nations, according to the Balance of Power *within* the Alliance, and in case of conflict the unsuccessful group may appeal to the victim to redress the balance.

It is a discouraging outlook, a vista of ever new dangers, a dread that the world will escape from the consuming fire of this war only to fall into hotter conflagrations. A real victory, a victory of peace, eludes us. And when we inquire why it eludes us we see that we, the Allied nations, carry into the conflict something of that evil principle against which we fight. The war is against German militarism, aggression and imperialism, but the Allied nations are also militaristic, aggressive and imperialistic. Between Germany and Japan there is little to choose in the matter of imperialistic ambition; between the autocratic Russia that was and the Germany that is there is nothing to choose. The war in its origin was an alignment of aggressive nations against aggressive nations. Moreover, in carrying on the war each combatant group has gained the adhesion of former neutrals by appealing to greed and ambition. The Allies made promises to Italy, Roumania and Greece, as Germany made promises to Bulgaria. The cement of both alliances has been the very thing which caused the war. The Allies, fighting fire with fire,

cannot be depended upon to control their own fire. A war for internationalism has been conducted by expedients opposed to the principle of internationalism.

Small wonder then that the world is disillusioned and war-weary, that the peoples ask themselves if wisdom and justice, moderation and tolerance are not more likely to solve problems than is the clash of brutal armies, let loose by stupid, if astute, diplomats. No wonder that tens of millions are seeking a way out of the banal slaughter to a victory that will not be empty and to a peace that will not be transient.

In this search they are everywhere impeded. They cry "peace, peace," meaning thereby a settlement that is lasting and just, but the echo answers "there is no peace." Those who desire terms which will make for progress and civilization find their efforts frustrated by two groups, by sincere, dogmatic pacifists, who desire immediate peace on any terms, and by equally sincere bitter-enders, *jusqu'à boutistes*, who are either imperialists, conscious or unconscious, or mere instinctive haters, loving the war more than the peace that is to be gained. The first group, if successful, would pluck the fruit before it was ripe; the second would fight on until the fruit was rotten.

To the irreconcilable pacifist the war has brought an endless series of disillusionments. He has an in-

vincible repugnance to warfare, not because he is a coward (on the contrary he is often fanatically brave) but because in him the tribal instinct is weak. He tends to believe in the inherent goodness and reasonableness of men. Often he is a pacifist and a non-resister because he is a Christian; more often he is a rationalist holding fast to reason and distrusting instinct. He is not objective; few extremists are. He is not bound by conclusions drawn from history, for he looks to the future and believes implicitly in the revolutionary conversion of whole peoples. He holds to his dogma that nothing can be gained by war. The nearer the war the less pardonable.

The dogmatic pacifist has seen the ground drift from beneath his feet. In the beginning he hoped that all nations would be reasonable; they were not. He hoped that non-resistance would evoke non-aggression; it did not. He believed that the sober reason as well as the economic and cultural interests of the world would prevent nations from going to war; they did not. Even in the midst of the general conflagration he believed that a semi-isolated nation, like the United States, could remain out of the war, could maintain a solitaire peace; he has discovered that it could not. He has seen great peoples, ardently desiring peace, continue to fight as though driven by an invisible maleficent god.

These disillusionments have confused the judg-

ment, if they have not altered the convictions of the pacifist. Though he at first held that we in America should preserve an oasis of peace, and not add to the universal frenzy, he now discovers, when it comes to a question of ending the war, that peace is more than a mere cessation of fighting. It is a thing of difficult terms and conditions; a thing easier broken than made.

To the militarist also the war has been disillusionizing. In the beginning he thought of it as a mere conflict of arms and as a chance for valour and distinction in the "imminent deadly breach." There was something mystical, romantic and sentimental in his conception. War was utterly different from the dead monotony of industrial life, with its glutinous production of standardized goods, its humdrum collocation of grimy men in grimy factories, its plethoric endless heaping up of commodities. With the outbreak of hostilities all that would be over. To his confusion the war turns out to be nothing but the same industrial process in a different form. He discovers that not armies but factories give the decision. Back of the soldiers stand the same grimy workers. The Brigadier-Generals in their resplendent uniforms are supplanted by manufacturers, merchants, bankers and advertising men, for the war has proved that war is business, and that military efficiency is useless without economic efficiency. Success in war depends upon the

identical men and processes as does success in peace. As a consequence the military man of the old type is disappointed.

Yet though pacifists and warriors are alike disillusioned, the war drags on. Men die on the battlefield and women and children and old people die at home. Food becomes scarce, fuel scarcer and the whole industrial machine creaks. The birth-rate falls; the death rate rises. Tuberculosis spreads through vast sections of the populations and venereal diseases make fearful ravages. Everywhere are sick who cannot be tended, and weak who die unnecessarily. The nations, not comprehending each other, vainly strive for a mutual understanding that will relieve them from this excruciating agony. Then failing to reach any end or attain any concord they listen to the counsel of despair, "Fight on, you peoples; cut your throats, lose your lives and with them your doubts and qualms and hesitations. There is peace in death on the battlefield; there is peace in the insensate struggle itself, in which men cease to think, and mechanically shoot at an unseen enemy; as much automata as are the machine guns under their hands."

It is as though we were driven by an inner impulse to mass suicide. Whoever seeks a rational escape from the slaughter is exposed to a merciless fire from the rear, to appeals to hatred, revenge, nationalistic gain. Constantly we are told not to look

within but outward to the enemy. All the suffering is attributed to the foe and not to the struggle itself. If the loved ones at home starve, the enemy is at fault, not the war. If fathers, husbands, sons die on distant fields, it is the enemy who has killed them, not the war. In each country we forget that war is the opponent and remember only a grinning, contemptuous foe. Those who have something to gain or nothing to lose from the conflict insist on a mere fighting. So also do those who have forsworn thought "for the duration of the war." They urge the nation to grasp that ever-elusive victory, to gain by just a little more effort the balm that is to salve all wounds, to save itself from the last unutterable calamity of destruction. They demand that the nation fight that "these honoured dead shall not have died in vain." Foolish, vainglorious hope. More millions may die and more and more millions, and yet die in vain. For unless the war is rationalized, spiritualized, saved from gross corrupting elements, unless it is fully harmonized with the new spirit struggling to be born, all who die, die in vain. Until then, those who cry for "peace, peace," even though the military victory be won, must be answered "there is no peace."

Could there be a more striking illustration of our tragic incapacity to rise above a fighting clan spirit to a view of humanity in its world relations? The war lasts because we, like our foes, cannot put our-

selves in the enemy's place, cannot view the world from his standpoint, or test our ideals by his needs. We do not concede to him a common humanity or a common rationality, but see in him only the brute and moral idiot. We close our ears to what he has to say, as he closes his ears, and both sides hurl threats across the national boundaries. The loose curses of some unrepresentative Englishman or Frenchman, printed in large type in German papers, shut the mouths and consciences of patriotic Germans, clamouring for a democratic peace. People in Britain or America, who stretch out their hands in the dark to feel the friendly touch of peace-lovers in enemy lands, are struck by a Reventlow or von Tirpitz, and are silenced. In these circumstances there is no peace.

For the peace that is desired, the only peace worthy of the name or worth fighting for, is more than a pact between diplomats coming to the rescue of tired warriors. What is needed is a constructive peace, that will mean the progress of humanity, not a peace of subjugation nor a peace precedent to a new war. To such a true peace all the war irreconcilables of all countries are unitedly opposed. For these Maxses and Barrès and Reventlows, though reviling each other, are true allies. Theirs is a curious unconscious internationalism. Leagued together for war, imperialism and subjection, they are the real censors both of democratic speech and thought.

They keep the flame alive, arousing for ever the war spirit at home and abroad. Against these strutting little men, with their vicarious heroism and their prestige manufactured in enemy lands, the advocates of an honourable peace struggle ineffectually. For these little war-makers, though not intrinsically powerful, represent the vast unreason of the world.

Thus the nations long for a true peace and fight on. Great is the contagion of war, and so near lies the fighting spirit to our primitive instincts, and so easy is the refuge from the task of solving problems to the thoughtless routine of battle, that one nation after another is dragged into the contest. Finally the United States, the last great neutral, was forced into the war.

There was no way out. The struggle was on whether we were in or not, and our participation seemed to promise the end. It was for us, we believed, to resolve the problem, to untie the knot that had resisted Europe's efforts. To this task we brought men, munitions and money, and also a new spirit. We wanted no conquests or indemnities, nothing but an honourable permanent peace. War-weary even before we entered the war, we strove to be disinterested, to fight without hatred and without ambition. We were literally fighting for peace.

Thus America became the chief hope of the world's peace. We were cast for this rôle not because we were better people than Europeans—we

were neither better nor worse—but simply because our safe geographical and economic position not only permitted us to develop ideals of internationalism but also took from us any powerful selfish interest in the conflict. As peace-makers we had an advantage over other great Powers.

We had a corresponding disadvantage. As a nation we were ignorant of those complex historical and political problems of Europe, those intimate repulsions and inherited prejudices out of which wars arise. We knew little about Russia, less about Austria-Hungary, still less about the Balkan situation, and our ignorance concerning the intricate problems of Asia Minor was almost complete. Before the war few Americans had even heard of the Bagdad Railway. Disregarding these problems we believed that peace could be maintained by keeping things as they were and we never asked ourselves whether things *could* be kept as they were. Ignoring their difficulties and their temptations we felt a contempt for nations which sought to fight out problems, not realizing that in like circumstances we too should have fought. We thought of peace as a self-regulating device, as a thing natural and good and easy, and of any people that broke the peace as a self-confessed malefactor.

Since then we have learned much. We have investigated the rotting foundations upon which peace in the past has been built and we have come to rec-

ognize that in some cases the peace-breaker is blessed. We have learned that not every peace will do; that peace is a highly perishable integument, to be adjusted or fitted, so to speak, to the needs of peoples, to the spread of ideas, ideals, interests, antagonisms; that it must grow with the growth of the nations it holds together. It is not a glass case, rigid and fragile, but a living container, a web, of the nature of the things it holds, growing, changing, alive—and mortal. It is a condition, good, bad, improving, degenerating. It is a part of the enveloping atmosphere of the nations, and the nations may grow up healthy in its atmosphere or they may stifle and die.

We have also learned that no nation, nor all nations together, can proclaim "Let there be Peace" and there will be peace. For that peace which the world desires is an organic and vulnerable thing, which must grow out of the ideals and passions of men, which must be better or worse, which must die day by day and be renewed day by day, as our skin dies and is renewed. We have only begun to learn the vast toxicology of peace; the virulent, recondite poisons that destroy it, poisons not placed there by wicked men but, like fatigue germs, generated by the international body itself. We find the enemy of peace to be not Germany alone but also those distractingly difficult questions, which Peace must confront and answer or be herself destroyed. Our own

pat replies of three years ago, as we now realize, were no answers, but mere evasions. We have studied and learned though we are still ignorant. So is the rest of the world. The blind lead the blind; the ignorant teach the ignorant; the passionate preach to the passionate the virtues of peace.

Disheartening? Surely. Yet so the world has always been governed and the race survived. To-day if our difficulties are intricate we have at least a broader basis, in a new world created under our feet, upon which to build for the future. More men and more women than ever before are striving not for any peace but for one that is true and permanent and just. The task of attaining such a peace is paralyzingly difficult, but we hope and believe that it is not impossible.

But to attain it requires a larger spirit than to fight a war. It requires broader sympathies, a clearer vision, a greater faith and a nobler charity. The problem is no less than the planning of the world, the provision of a place in the sun for all the nations (including our enemies), the evening of the path over which all peoples in their daily arduous lives must pass. The peace to be attained must be a peace that lays the foundations upon which a world society may be built. Such a peace does not come automatically, nor is it attained by fighting, which can achieve only the removal of some of the obstacles. The end of the war does not of itself

bring peace, just as the battle won does not bring the victory; all that war assures us is a partial cleaning of the slate upon which a new message may be written. What that message will be depends upon what spirit animates the peoples who are to do the writing.

It is in something of this mood and with the sense that she is a nation chosen by circumstances to lead, that America must approach the problem of world peace. The task comes to us more immediately than ever before. Plunged into the World War to sink or rise with the other nations, we may either fight on to the elusive victory that is defeat, or may strive by intelligence and a true spirit to attain to that moral victory without which this war is an unmeaning curse.

CHAPTER II

PACIFISTS AND PATRIOTS

SUPERFICIALLY there could have been no more startling *volte face* than that of America in April, 1917. We had just re-elected Mr. Wilson, who had "kept us out of war"; immediately afterwards, and under his leadership, we entered the war.

Since then we have quickly learned to despise our former attitude, and men who have recently boasted of their staunch pacifism now hold that point of view to be obnoxious and contemptible. Yet to those who look beneath the surface the basic impulse which caused us to fight was the same that had long kept us from fighting. It was in the main idealism which thrust us in as it had once held us aloof. Beneath our sudden change in policy lay a perfect continuity in sentiment and conviction.

To understand our present attitude and to formulate an American policy, we must understand and emotionally experience that strong sentiment out of which our actions flowed. For we are today and will be tomorrow essentially what we were a year ago. A traditional popular impulse manifests itself differently under varying conditions, but itself does not quickly change. Consequently we approach

the end of the war with much the same instinctive reactions, with much the same tenacious but undirected idealism as in the days in which we held ourselves aloof from the conflict.

It was not to be anticipated that our present Allies¹ should regard our past abstention as heroic or indeed as anything but materialistic and selfish. Themselves bearing the brunt of a desperate struggle, they naturally believed that all neutrals were careless of great moral issues and shortsighted in their national egoism. America especially was denounced, since of all neutrals she was the strongest and most prosperous. It was inevitable that all the ancient accusations against Yankee callousness should be raised against us.

These accusations fitted in with the traditional dispraise of America. We were held to be the most unidealistic of nations—in our land birds had no song, flowers no scent, and men no souls. To myriads of Europeans our life seemed cold, clear, hard, without shade or colour or atmosphere, unromantic, unmysterious. They found in us a narrow and ill-informed rationalism, a grotesque emphasis upon the practical, a materialistic self-seeking. Our cis-Atlantic civilization was styled gaunt, ugly, monotonous, clamorous. Americans were the

¹ Technically America is not an ally of Great Britain, France and Italy, but merely an associate or co-belligerent. For the sake of convenience, however, it is often better to use the word "ally" since it corresponds with general usage.

slaves of a tyrannical money instinct. We had no soul roots in a distant past, no long national continuity. How could one expect idealism from a mere accidental assemblage of transplanted humans?

Doubtless, as our critics allege, we have missed some of the virtues and much of the charm inhering in the more ripely developed nations whose history runs back to an ancient folk childhood. Our people, coming from many sources, have had their dim lights extinguished in the glare of American life. We speak of the American crucible, but, in a true sense, nations are not chemically fused but grow as do the plants, slowly and obscurely. All this makes us different.

Yet it is only the less sympathetic European observer who misses the deep note of idealism in American character. The popular misconception arises because in America so much of our spiritual life seems flat and arid, because we have not been chastened by suffering, but have always been children of plenty and of a strenuous uncomfortable comfort. Our idealism itself bears the traces of its derivation in being cheerful, self-conscious and somewhat pragmatic, worshipping the thing that is to be and ignoring what was. It is, like ourselves, mechanical and rationalistic, holding fast to steam, electricity, power and bigness. It is the idealism of a wealthy society of jostling, unsqueamish men, above all, an idealism of success. It is a vent for all

those impulses which are not used up in our struggle for wealth, and it adopts unconsciously the methods and spirit of that struggle. In this check-book idealism, the widow's mite is less regarded than the millionaire's donation, and the one sheep less than the ninety and nine. It is the idealism of a people satisfied, perhaps over-satisfied with itself, giving of its plenty and determined to raise the world to what it considers its own level. There is in it little humility but much good will, good sense and practical wisdom. Moreover, it is an idealism with its feet on the ground, an idealism which works, which enters into the core of our day-by-day life and powerfully influences our actions and decisions.

It was this unromantic and perhaps unlovely idealism which was enlisted a year ago in the effort to keep America out of the war. It was a powerful ideal motive drawn from the brief traditions of American history, and buttressed by economic, political and geographical considerations. It was a motive that was rooted in a belief that men are inherently good, that the free man is the good man and the good citizen. It believed theoretically in an equality, liberty and fraternity, transcending national boundaries. Intensely democratic, it demanded the equalization of opportunities, though it narrowly conceived of equality as an equal chance to compete under unequal conditions. Its faith was strong in the right of a nation or a people to self-

government. It disbelieved in repression, regimentation, rigid discipline, abject respect for the published law. "Do not obey the law too much," advised the great American prophet, Walt Whitman.

This attitude led, and still leads, to opposition to war. The liberal does not believe in propaganda by force. He distrusts the arbitrament of battle much as he distrusts duelling. To the American, moreover, a belief in the efficacy of peace has been all the more natural since his nation was never called upon to fight a serious foreign war. In a fluid society in which there was elbow-room and the right to use one's elbows, in which a man might easily change his home, city, trade, or wife, it was easier to move than fight. We had no fighting traditions and no specialized fighting class, no *samurai* and no Junkers. Consequently, our patriotism was strongly pacific.

This American pacifism was on the whole condescendingly benevolent. Believing piously in our own wisdom and good fortune, we experienced a missionary desire to spread our virtue to foreign countries. We believed that we were, or were to become, the most inspiring nation in the world, and that we gratefully owed it to Divine Providence to bring to other nations the blessings that were ours. We must spread our civilization by example and free gift. But if there was a touch of Pharisaism in our attitude, there was also a deeply sincere and generous

emotion. We wished unselfishly to create peace for the entire world.

It is easy to ridicule this attitude, to see in it an intellectual unripeness and a blindness to complex facts. We lacked detailed knowledge; we were far too simple in our hypotheses and far too summary in our judgments. We conceived of Europe as merely a more densely populated America, and we failed to grasp the infinitely involved problems of nations living throughout their long history in hostile juxtaposition, with their martial instincts fortified by the constant need of self-defence. We were inclined to pass a hasty equal judgment upon all combatants, as does the lazy police magistrate who is too busy to investigate a petty wrangle. But all this intellectual immaturity was natural. If our people as a whole failed to bring to this problem a full and dispassionate mind, other neutrals and combatants equally failed. As one looks deeper and engages the situation from a moral rather than an intellectual point of view, our attitude, fairly radiating good-will, was far from ridiculous. It was an effort to apply to the relations between nations certain obvious moral formulæ. If the formulæ were too simple, the effort none the less lay in the line of future progress.¹

¹ The state of mind above described was far from being universal. Not a few Americans envisaged the European War from a purely personal, financial point of view and millions of others were indifferent.

Obviously this idealism in the first instance held the United States to non-intervention. Nations and men tend to discover a deep moral justification for whatever lies in their interest, but apart from the obvious benefit to us of non-interference, there was reason to believe that such a do-nothing policy would also inure to the ultimate advantage of Europe. Our underlying thought was that, as a combatant, we should lose not only moral prestige, but also a disinterestedness without which we could never become impartial mediators. The ambition to settle the war obsessed the nation. It was in this hope that President Wilson adjured us to remain neutral even in thought, and in this spirit he made his famous declaration that a nation may be too proud to fight. We did not seem to recognize that in our efforts to preserve a rigidly neutral attitude we were sacrificing our right even to pass a moral judgment. Thus the President refused to state his opinion concerning the morality of the Belgian invasion and made no protest against German atrocities in Belgium or Russian atrocities in Galicia. In this abstention, moreover, he was supported by the general sentiment. "Why protest," asked Americans, "since we do not intend to back up our protests by force? A protest will do no good and will destroy our chance to become the peacemaker."

Naturally our internal racial divisions emphasized the necessity of neutrality and peaceful abstention

from European quarrels. We were no longer required to be neutral because of weakness and we had long ceased to believe that the democratic institutions of the United States needed protection from the "despotic European system." Neutrality had become a policy of convenience; a confirmation of an economic process by which American interests were centered in the home territory. But our attitude towards our immigrants confirmed our unwillingness to interfere as a belligerent in European wars. We were the refuge of the world, the one country in which war-weary citizens of all the nations could drown their ancient embittered animosities in the new and unifying aspirations of American life. To these immigrants from war-threatened nations, moreover, we felt ourselves bound to offer surcease of warfare that they might forget the unhappy days in their native land. Thus and thus only could we create a United States of Europe on American soil. If we waged war against one or another of the European peoples we should only rekindle old hatreds. The bitter feelings aroused in America during the first two years of the European War, the only half-suppressed warfare of invective between American partisans of the Allied and of the German cause, seemed to us a forecast of the much deadlier conflict that was to be feared in the event of any actual participation by the United States. To attack Germany, we believed, would be to de-Americanize the

Germans in our midst. If we adopted a policy adverse to Italy, Austria-Hungary, Sweden or Great Britain, we should stir up new racial antipathies within our borders. Our internal peace, our integrity as a composite nation, depended upon our neutrality. The better part of wisdom was to remain, we thought, a friend to all nations and an ally of none.

It soon became obvious, however, that our policy of non-intervention led to difficulties. The rôle of receptive peacemaker was hardly dignified and we were the alternate victim of all combatants. Our failure to repel the aggression of one group led to attacks by the other, and as the months passed our neutrality evaporated. We were hated, distrusted and coldly despised by both sides. Germany claimed that we were aiding the Allies; British and French publicists intimated that we were subtly pro-German.

To what lengths this suspicion of America went is revealed by the attitude of one of the more violent of British imperialists, Mr. L. J. Maxse. In an article appearing in the *National Review* of February, 1917, entitled, "'Ware Washington," Mr. Maxse claimed that the United States was Germany's secret ally, that a war between those two countries was practically impossible, but that a war with England would be immensely attractive to Americans. "It is common ground," he said, "that had the Pan-

German program materialized and the Mailed Fist been triumphantly installed from Petrograd to Calais the United States would have preserved a scrupulous neutrality based on excess profits. But from the moment failure overtook Germany at Verdun and on the Somme, American action became inevitable, because German failure meant British success, and their ingrained jealousy of this country would preclude 'our American kinsmen' remaining quiet while we 'came into our own.' " "The fall of France," he asserted, "the fall of Russia, the fall of Italy would have found American altruists looking the other way, as did the fate of Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, Roumania, and Poland. Any catastrophe to the British Empire would have aroused unconcealable glee from the Atlantic to the Pacific." ¹ In the same manner and to an even greater extent our quasi-neutrality exposed us to the gibes and the violent abuse of German critics.

It must be conceded that our policy of theoretical neutrality completely failed, and that in our efforts to apply a few moral formulæ to the complex and embittered European situation we barely escaped appearing irresolute and even ridiculous. We followed no one lead and carried out no one consistent policy. Had we really wished to defend the principle of neutrality we should have formed a League of Neutrals, and organized the combined neutral

¹ *The National Review*, Vol. 68, p. 810.

strength to enforce our decisions. Had we desired to exercise a moral influence we should have boldly passed judgment upon such open violations of international law as the invasion of Belgium, and prepared ourselves for an eventual vindication of such judgments. Nor did we, during the first two and a half years, take really effective steps towards bringing about peace upon the basis of a firm internationalism. If after mobilizing our economic and military forces we had put pressure upon both groups of belligerents to force them to state terms, we should perhaps have aided in the clarification of the issues and in progress towards a mutual understanding.

Actually our *laissez-faire* attitude towards the war, our policy of waiting to be called upon as peace-maker, led insensibly to a conservative, tepid and constantly shifting program, and in the end to a seeming pettiness in promoting small commercial interests while ignoring vaster moral interests. We kept silent about Belgium, but protested vehemently in behalf of American lard. The European inference was obvious.

“If the man who turnips cries
Cry not when his father dies
'Tis a proof that he had rather
Have a turnip than his father.”

But the inference was false. We did not care more for American lard than for human rights, al-

though as a matter of tradition we protested about the first, while we were inhibited by our fundamental policy towards the war from saying a word in behalf of the second.

It was not cowardice on our part, nor timidity, nor callousness. Our policy of non-interference, though unintelligent and uninspired, was the result not only of an old tradition coming into conflict with a new state of the world, but of our strong idealistic belief that we could aid internationalism by doing nothing, and our hope that we could gain the friendship of both groups of belligerent nations, and thus gently bring them to a common peace, by studiously refraining from giving offence to either. If we staggered from one error to another and from one program to another, if in the end we entered the conflict abruptly under sudden provocation as though we had stumbled into the war, the cause of our vacillation was in the main a not ungenerous aspiration. We longed for a universal peace, in which men would no longer kill, and though all other swords in the world dripped with blood, ours at least should be clean.

Such was the pacifist patriot attitude of America in November, 1916. Yet in April, 1917, the United States "to make the world safe for democracy" was engaged in a great war with Germany.

CHAPTER III

THE CONVERSION OF AMERICA

THE entrance of America into the war raised in many minds a seeming dilemma. Why did we take part in April, 1917, and not in August, 1914? If it was not a war for democracy, why were we in; if it was, why had we not been in from the beginning?

Though we are now at war, and war inhibits a true freedom of thought, yet as the foundations of our morality are concerned, we must face this problem honestly. What figure have we cut in this titanic shock in which we have allowed France to bleed and Serbia to be crushed, permitted Armenians to be slaughtered and suffered the democratic nations, including Australia and our neighbour Canada, to make supreme sacrifices, while we withheld even our approbation? Why did we not protest even after the fact against the invasion of Belgium? How can we today justify our minatory letters to England concerning our corn and beef and pig-iron? If this was a war for democracy, as the Allies claimed and as we today claim, were we not culpably blind or viciously neutral?—knowing and not caring, like “that caitiff choir who were not rebels, nor were faithful to God, but were for themselves.”

As we look this dilemma over, however, we shall find that there is a wide space between the horns. There were reasons for our participation in 1917 which were absent before. In the early stages of the war we believed that we had no responsibility for wars in Europe, and at all events did not consider this conflict as in any true sense a war for democracy. We were free therefore to go in or stay out. Within three years, however, we had lost this liberty of choice. We no longer could decide whether to take sides but only which of two sides to choose. Moreover, as the issue now presented itself, the problem was not whether the war was already a war for democracy, which we did not believe, but whether by our participation it could be converted into a war for democracy. If by adhering to the Allies we could persuade their governments to recede from their extreme and unjustified demands (of which we knew much and surmised more), we should make success in war a real victory for a democratic internationalism.

Our moral right to remain aloof seemed to us indisputable. All through our history we had sought to remain neutral, even where our sympathies were strongly engaged. We had not interfered in behalf of Greece struggling against Turkish oppression nor in behalf of Hungary fighting against Austrian domination. Our official attitude towards Europe was not Quixotic nor even generous. Ours

was a conservative, non-propagandistic, non-interfering diplomacy. There were cogent reasons for this policy of non-interference. We were weak; we wished Europe not to interfere with us, and we believed, quite properly, that our slack democracy was no match for the subtle European diplomacy, habituated for generations to all the intricacies of the Balance of Power. True, we occasionally failed to observe this rule of non-abstention, as when we made representations to Russia and Roumania in behalf of their Jews. On the whole, however, we sought to adhere to a policy limiting our diplomatic activity to those parts of the world in which that activity could be decisive. We were willing to sympathize with alien causes but not to fight for them.

Nor did this American policy of not taking up cudgels in defence of oppressed nationalities and of broken treaties really differ from that of other nations. Great Britain had been no more willing to fight for the maintenance of the Korean Treaty, which she had guaranteed than was the United States, and what actually forced her to intervene in Belgium was a controlling and decisive interest in that country's neutrality. No mere sentimental regard for Belgians drove England into the war, any more than a sentimental regard for Serbians and Austrians brought Russia and Germany into the conflict. Belgium was Britain's flying buttress, as Austria was the flying buttress of Germany.

That the war did not appeal to all Americans as a war for democracy was due to the duality of its issues. On the one hand was the assertion of a certain internationalism against the exaggerated and febrile nationalism of Germany; a ranging of political democracy, of respect for international law, and of a desire for international government against the enemy's disregard and distrust of these things. On the other hand there was a group of issues consisting of nationalistic demands, which violated the fundamental principle of internationalism. The Allies, as accumulating evidence proved, were at war among themselves; they fought against the things for which they fought. In each of the Allied nations high international ideals were in conflict with selfish nationalistic plans. Which issue overweighed? The answer obviously was quantitative and difficult to make.

To many Americans the preponderance seemed on the side of the nationalistic aims. We found both groups of nations selfish, were irritated at both. Undoubtedly the *Junkertum* was the stronghold of autocracy, and therefore the supreme enemy, but the spectacle of the Czar of Russia leading democracy to a victory over absolutism was ridiculous. We believed that Germany had precipitated the war, but in the long course of events leading up to the inevitable declaration there had been so much aggression and duplicity on both sides that we were forced to reserve judgment. We trusted neither group. The

aggressions against the Transvaal, Korea, Morocco, Persia, Egypt, Tripoli were too recent to allow us to believe that the Allies in the present war were meek nations overrun by arrogant tyrants. In Morocco not all the good faith was on one side; in Persia neither England nor Russia was blameless. The very fact that the war broke out in Serbia clearly revealed that some of its origins lay in gross nationalistic impulses and in a struggle for prestige and power.

While, therefore, we recognized a fundamental democratic purpose in the war, we believed that in no real sense did this ideal unite the Allied nations. The chief cement of the Alliance seemed to lie in fear, greed and nationalistic ambition, not in any conception of a true harmony among the nations of Europe. To militaristic and autocratic Japan, for example, the ideals of democracy meant little. She played her own game, hoping not for a speedy Allied victory but for a protracted struggle. To the Russian autocracy the war reduced itself to specific imperialistic aims. Italy stood on the brink, bargaining with both sides, willing to be neutral or partisan, according to the price. Roumania was in like position. Even in France and England sentiment was divided. Weighing the preponderant elements in the minds of the hundreds of millions opposed to Germany, balancing the democratic, international ideals against the desire for concrete and

sometimes unjustifiable nationalistic gains, we were forced to conclude that the war was not wholly a war for democracy.

Given this state of mind and this judgment of the causes and tendencies of the war, we not unnaturally preferred the maintenance of our technical neutrality. Several factors, however, made this impossible. Forces stronger than our will drove us into the conflict. Indeed we were in the war long before we made our formal declaration.

That we were forced may not at first glance be obvious. We seemed to have had an opportunity to maintain neutrality. As late as April, 1917, we might conceivably have raised the cry "Reparation after the war," pursuing a policy towards Germany like that towards England in the case of the *Alabama* claims. Actually, however, our only choice was either to defeat the Allies or attempt the defeat of Germany.

The resulting declaration of war was merely the culmination in an unavowed participation which had been increasing for over two years. Powerful unconscious forces had been driving us from neutrality to belligerency—a gradual process, divisible into three parts. First we were neutral, favouring the Allies in our hearts, but holding the balance of action even. The illuminating act of this period was the President's plea that we remain neutral in thought. The second stage was one of "benevolent neutral-

ity," of unconscious belligerency. During this period we sent money and munitions to the Allies, resisted the German blockade, but did not effectively oppose the British blockade. The illuminating act of this period was our permission to Allied merchantmen to carry guns. Last stage of all, the declaration of war.

We ourselves did not fully understand this drift of our policy, and throughout this gradual transition we find a curious retardation in the intellectual progress of the nation. Our thought moved slower than our action. While helping the Allies, partly from inclination and partly from necessity, we sincerely protested our neutrality. At one moment Mr. Lansing refused merchantmen permission to arm, although we were already committed to a policy of fighting the submarines. Our leaders vaguely saw the drift to war, but strove against it; Mr. Wilson's peace proposals in December were an attempt to preclude the necessity for a war message in April. We were willing to accept any semi-reasonable settlement in Europe rather than ourselves take part in the contest. And this not from timidity. What restrained us was a deep conservative instinct; a jealous desire to hold America apart from these struggles. We hesitated to commit our bark to untried waters. We wanted to live our old life, develop our democracy at home, protect with the aid of Latin America the isolation and immunity of the two

Americas. Not wishing to coerce other nations nor endure their coercion, preferring our independence narrow and free, to a wider, more exacting and more perilous interdependence, we were as regards Europe separatist. Even as late as March, 1917, we sought to establish an armed neutrality instead of going to war. Anything but war.

That our resistance was vain was through no fault of ours, nor in a larger sense through the specific inclination of any nation. It was the shrinking of the earth that flung us so violently against the European continent. We had little volition in the matter.

What actually ended our neutrality long before we recognized that it had ended, was the supreme fact that the growth of industry, interlacing the nations of the world, had made a complete and real neutrality impossible. The traditional concept of neutrality had been based upon the idea of one independent and self-contained nation fighting another independent and self-contained nation, while the neutrals held the ring, kept the scales even, and did "nothing, neither way." But today there are no economically independent and self-contained nations. The change in the nature of war, with the ultimate dependence of each state upon its neighbours, completely alters the character of neutrality. A nation may be technically neutral and yet trade *ad libitum* with either belligerent. It is, however, this peaceful trading

which today is of enormous and even decisive influence. A war of attrition is in large part economic; each belligerent seeks to secure goods from neutrals in order to save its own labour for war purposes while depriving antagonists of a like advantage. The war becomes a war for the trade, labour, supplies, capital and credit of neutrals.

Here geographical position plays the controlling rôle. Denmark, Sweden, Holland and Switzerland may love Germany or hate her, but cannot in the circumstances be anything but her partial economic allies, except by a policy which would make them actual enemies. Sweden either sends Germany iron or does not; if she does, she aids Germany; if she does not, she injures her disastrously and invites reprisals. A belligerent today may be shattered by a neutral's economic action, which in peace time might be wholly unobjectionable.

Of all neutrals America was incomparably the most important. Indeed, when the war had settled down to a test of endurance, American influence became decisive. The Allies, controlling the sea, could import munitions and food from America, and as a corollary borrow money. In other words, the United States automatically became the economic ally of the nations opposed to Germany. The German-American farmer in Illinois freed a British agricultural labourer for the trenches; the Hungarian labourer at Wilkesbarre or Bridgeport unintentionally fought

against his native country. To Germany, on the other hand, no imports, and therefore no direct economic aid could come from America. Even had our antagonism to Germany been less strong, that country would have borne the brunt of our economic alliance with her enemies.

In this contingency Germany's policy seemed to her obvious. Either she must secure our goods or prevent the Allies from securing them. The former result she could accomplish only if we forced Great Britain to mitigate what we ourselves had declared to be an illegal blockade. She could accomplish the latter either by persuading us not to ship munitions or by means of submarine warfare. She must force us either to put pressure upon her enemies or else to permit her to put pressure upon them.

In both efforts she failed. True, we protested against the British blockade, but as we did nothing but protest, and Great Britain was convinced that we would do nothing, the effect was almost nil. Nor did we stop our shipments of munitions, although a threat to do so might possibly have brought Great Britain to terms. On the other hand, not only did we protest against the submarine blockade, but we threatened war unless Germany desisted. Though technically, we were not really, neutral; ours was a "benevolent neutrality," a limited and unconscious belligerency. We threw our economic weight against Germany because our economic interests lay

with the Allies, and because, for other compelling reasons, we wished the Allies to win or at least not to lose.

Why we wished them to win reveals a force, at first weak but constantly growing, which in the end was to throw us into the battle line and alter our whole relation to the world. That force was a new extension, amplification and self-propagating tendency of American democracy. It was a repercussion of democracy. So long as we *had* to take sides, so long as economically we were forced to throw our weight on one scale or the other, we determined that America's influence should be in favour of what we considered democracy and against autocracy and militarism.

Through all our decisions during the period of technical neutrality this principle may be observed to run. Ours, it is believed, was an excellent legal case. We could cite precedents for what we did and for what we did not do. To threaten Germany with war over the submarine issue was within our rights; it was doing only that which she would have done to us in reversed circumstances. On the other hand, though we had the right to insist that England adhere to the old rules of the blockade, we also had the right not to insist. Actually, what determined those of our actions which were truly decisive was not a desire to defend neutral rights, in which direction we made little progress, but a determination to prevent

our inevitable and rather unwelcome influence from being cast against the Allies. Who was justified in any particular controversy, Germany or the Allies, was not the momentous factor; in the aggregate of her policies and ideals we held Germany to be wrong, or at least opposed to us.

This is the escape from the seeming dilemma confronting our entrance into the war. We had not intended to sacrifice ourselves in order to secure a decision in Europe which in any case we believed would be obscured by the nationalistic aims of the Entente Powers. Only when it became obvious that we were already in the war and that we were forced to choose sides did we issue our declaration. We could either aid the Allies to defeat Germany or, by accepting Germany's ultimatum, withhold the assistance without which the Allies would have been defeated.

There were several reasons which made our choice obvious. In the first place, we had learned much during the past two and a half years, and our early impressions of German policy derived from Liège, Louvain and Rheims had been reinforced by the *Lusitania* and other incidents. We began to dread the power and ulterior ambitions of a greater Germany. More or less vaguely we realized that England stood as a bulwark between us and this great continental military power, as France and Belgium stood between her and England. Our commercial

expansion had more to fear from a successful Germany than from a successful Britain or France. While we discovered imperialistic ambitions on both sides we believed that the preponderance of responsibility, both for the war and for autocracy and militarism, lay with Germany, and if imperialism were to triumph, we preferred a British to a German imperialism. We felt that in taking our stand with the Allies we were contributing upon the whole to the hope of democracy and international peace, and in these we had both a sentimental and a material interest.

There is another theory at variance with that just given concerning the reasons why the United States intervened. According to this theory large financial interests in America discovered that it would be profitable to have the United States enter the war and through their control of the press were able to create so strong a sentiment for belligerency that the government was forced to intervene as soon as Germany gave it an opportunity. On this hypothesis all our desire for internationalism and democracy was merely the sentimental covering for the crude economic interests of our unacknowledged but omnipotent financial rulers.

This theory errs on the side of over-simplicity. It assumes an overwhelming preponderance of power on the part of our financiers. It presupposes a pure passivity on the part of the nation.

It cannot, of course, be denied that the economic forces pushing America towards war were less weak in 1917 than they had been two years before. A stupendous exportation from the United States to the Allied countries had created in this country an economic condition which would have been seriously damaged by a cessation of that trade. Had we accepted the principle of the German blockade, which was our only alternative to war, the prices of food stuffs, cotton, steel and other products would have fallen and the result might have been a disastrous commercial and financial crisis.

It is doubtful whether most of our American farmers, tradesmen and wage-earners ever gave this question of economic advantages an hour's steady thought. Their consciously determining motives were of quite a different sort. The same is equally true of the majority of our financiers, even when they believed, rightly or wrongly, that their interests lay upon the side of war. Yet these economic interests were not, and never are, without their influence. Conditions had changed since the invasion of Belgium, and indeed since the sinking of the *Lusitania*. We had loaned large sums to the belligerent nations; we had accumulated an exportable surplus of capital, and had begun to think in terms of foreign trade and foreign investment.

It does not follow that this is a Wall Street war because many financiers desired it. To jump

from this premise to that conclusion is to ignore manifold non-economic influences, working upon our professional and other classes, the nation's idealism, the pent-up irritation at Germany's brutalities, the sympathies and antagonisms and fears of millions of citizens. Yet the economic interests pushing us towards the struggle have a direct bearing on the future conduct of the war. It would be stupid in us not to recognize that mundane and calculable motives merged with our idealism and still form a part of our war motive. If by victory we are to gain the things that most Americans really desire, if we are to know how to fight and on what terms to stop fighting, if we are to prevent the conduct of the war and the resulting peace negotiations from being wrenched out of our hands by men with special group interests to serve, we must recognize this inmixture of the economic interests of financiers in the general body of motives, for the most part idealistic, with which we entered the fight.

What specifically did our financiers, or at least certain of them, hope to gain from our participation?

In the first place their loans to the Allies had almost reached the maximum. The continuance of our profitable trade with the Allies depended upon England's ability to finance the payments, and as that nation could not continue to export gold, and as Americans would not buy many more European securities, American financiers welcomed any arrange-

ment by which our government would guarantee future obligations. If the United States loaned money to Russia at four per cent. and thereby enabled that country to place profitable orders in America, the operation benefited the vendors. Moreover, the huge military and naval expenditures which the American government would be compelled to make in the event of war would be of benefit directly to certain corporations and indirectly to others.

There were still other interests and still wider plans. To a few far-seeing men a successful participation seemed to offer an opportunity to extend American trade in alliance with England and at the expense of Germany. An even greater opportunity would be afforded for the profitable investment of the new exportable surplus of America, then already amounting to billions, and liable to be vastly increased in the future. If we refrained from participation, the growing enmity and envy toward America, manifested by the rival belligerents, might end in an adverse coalition which would deprive us forcibly of all future investment opportunities. On the other hand, our aid to Great Britain in her extremity might easily lead to a profitable co-operation with that nation, in which our capital and her knowledge, experience and prestige would be united. We could lay the foundations for a vast, overpowering and ostensibly pacific imperialism.

It would be idle to deny that such an imperialism

would benefit our American financiers. The rise in wages, a rise likely to continue as a result of lessened immigration, tends to make future returns on American capital invested at home somewhat smaller than in the past. On the other hand, could the united British and American financiers find a non-competitive field for investment in Russia, South America, Africa and Asia, where wages are low, the advantages would be obvious. Moreover, the mere acquisition of a powerful army and navy would not only render America secure from invasion, but would enable the United States to put pressure upon countries like Japan and thus open up the vast investment field of China. Finally, apart from any direct advantage, many financiers probably desired a large army as a bulwark to property rights in general. An army was necessary for the war, but a war was equally necessary for an army.

That these considerations were the sole determining factor in deciding the belligerent attitude of our financial groups is improbable. Idealistic factors also worked upon them, such as patriotism, the desire for prestige abroad, opposition to the German militaristic system and morality. Nor did the war-like attitude of our financiers determine the Nation's policy. In numerous cases the Administration had clearly demonstrated its unwillingness to permit either its foreign or domestic program to be dictated by financial groups. To cite only a few cases, Presi-

dent Wilson's refusal to endorse the Six-Power agreement with China, his resolutely pacific attitude toward Mexico, his treatment of the Filipinos, his consistent antagonism to Dollar Diplomacy, his attitude towards the LaFollette Shipping Bill, and finally his action in the threatened railway strike of 1916 indicated anything but subservience to Wall Street influences. In the presidential election of 1916 our financial interests were opposed to Mr. Wilson and there was no reason to believe that the action of the American government would be primarily influenced, if at all, by a conscious effort to do what the financiers desired.

Motives and influences of a different sort were decisive. Our declaration of war was due upon the whole to a necessity, imposed upon us by the general situation, to take sides and upon a recognition of the fact that we could not fight with Germany and could not help fighting with the Allies. Whatever Wall Street thought the average American on the farms and in the offices and factories believed that if we entered the conflict we must import into it the firm intention to aid in making our own democracy safe and in adding to the democracy of the world.

This decision was enormously accelerated by an event which took place between the demission of the German Ambassador in February and the Declaration of War in April. The final impelling reason

for this declaration was the Russian Revolution, which cast the influence of a great nation in favour of a true democratization of the war, and against a merely imperialistic use of victory. We could stand shoulder to shoulder with the peasants and workmen of Russia, whereas we could not without blushing have accepted the leadership of Nicholas Romanoff. The change in Russia gave body to our hope that we might succeed in making the conflict a war for democracy and internationalism.

For us today this ambition is still the overriding consideration. We must gain a measure of democracy and internationalism or go down to moral defeat.

Not only is this striving for internationalism necessary to the attainment of a moral victory, but it is actually essential to the winning of the war. We cannot succeed in this struggle without national unity and popular enthusiasm, and we cannot secure this unity and enthusiasm except upon a program of internationalism.

What still holds many Americans from an enthusiastic endorsement of our participation is the belief that no real national issue is involved, that the war is European in its causes, methods and ideals; not American. Had Germany sent an army to Long Island, had she owned Canada or Mexico, countries at which we might have struck, the conflict would have gained in immediacy and proximateness. The

issues could not possibly appeal to the Iowa farmer, for example, as they appealed to the Norman peasant. The latter, born in the shadow of 1870, growing up under a German menace, acutely suffering from each of the calculated atrocities inflicted on men of his blood in Belgium and France, met the German invasion with an instant, because slowly prepared, hatred. But all these interwoven strands of patriotic antagonism, found in the Norman, were necessarily absent from the Iowan. The Iowa farmer was not afraid for himself or his country, and would hardly have believed in a German invasion had it occurred. Though he condemned Emperor William and von Tirpitz as he disapproved of Attila and Apollyon, he rather liked Karl Schmidt, who lived unobtrusively in the neighbouring township.

Because of this obsolescent though still prevalent belief that we have little concern with Europe, it was difficult, even with the frankest discussion, to make the war's issues as clear as were those, for example, of 1861. The Civil War was patently almost tangibly American. Deeply rooted in a complex sectional antagonism, it sprang out of very intimate and vital repulsions. That war was long in preparation and slow in approach. Therefore the cry, "The Union must be preserved," found a quite different audience than does the slogan today that a world democracy is assailed by an East Prussian

group, whose name we have not yet learned to pronounce. We must fight as best we can with this derived and relatively distant impulse.

It is this derived impulse, however, that forms, and must continue to form, our reason for fighting. We cannot secure a real unity by an appeal to hatred. To create a sentiment of hate against the German and Austrian is far more difficult in the United States, and far more ineffective and injurious, than it would be in England or France. There are too many people of these nationalities within the nation, people upon whose assistance or quiescence we depend for victory. Moreover, an attack upon the people of German or Austrian birth or descent extends insensibly to people of Bulgarian, Swedish, Swiss and Dutch origin; it extends to the Jews; it tends to develop a general anti-alien attitude, a contempt for Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks, Italians and others. The appeal to hatred breaks down because it is too generalized and because the assailed groups are able to strike back in the polling booths. Such an appeal destroys instead of creating unity. To maintain a united front in this war we must refrain from race hatred, which does not in any case correspond with our traditions and instincts. We must justify the war by an appeal to American idealism and American traditions.

This President Wilson has sought to do. In his war message he attempted to show that his proposal

to guarantee a European treaty, providing for a new international order, is not "a breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for." The freedom of the nations to be guaranteed is, he asserts, but the promise of the Monroe Doctrine, written large; a concert of democratic nations is no "entangling alliance"; the freedom of the seas has been long the aim of American diplomacy. "These are American principles, American policies." In other words, our support, even by force of arms, of an international order in Europe is but an extended Americanism.

It is in some such spirit, though with some misgivings, that we break with our old tradition of aloofness from Europe to enter upon a new crusade. We stand like the emigrant who casts a last longing glance at the home about which cluster his youthful memories and then faces forward to the inconstant ocean beyond which lies the new hope. But each emigrant no doubt pictures his new home as merely the old home glorified, seeing the familiar and therefore beautiful surroundings with all the old evils gone.

Thus we leave our policy of isolation for a new policy of intervention in Europe. We leave behind our old Americanism to find abroad a new and broader Americanism; an Internationalism. Our most sanguine optimists believe that we are to repro-

duce our Supreme Court in a Supreme Court of the Nations; that we are to introduce our federal system to Europe, establish disarmament among nations as among our States, empty European frontiers of troops as our Canadian frontier is empty. We are to do this for Europe in return for all that Europe has done for us and in obedience to the same spirit that sends out our missionaries to Asia. We are to do it also in self-defence, for if we are to remain disarmed we must disarm Europe. We are going abroad to protect our own American democracy, as an emigrant may fare forth to new lands to earn the wherewithal to protect his own home.

Such is the vision of idealists who have accepted the new doctrine. It is with this ideal that we join hands with our Allies seeking to destroy the hostile spirit of Prussian militarism, and to evoke the new spirit, by which the world is henceforth to be governed.

CHAPTER IV

THE WAR AGAINST MILITARISM

THERE is an apparent confusion in our claim that we are fighting "to make the world safe for democracy."

We do not always mean the same thing by this luminous phrase. At one time we appear to be attacking the principle of autocracy as represented by the Kaiser and the undemocratic Prussian constitution; at another moment we assail Prussia's militarism, her insistence upon force, her policy of terrorization, the irresponsibility of her military organization. From the charge of autocracy and militarism the accusation shifts to a claim that Germany is quarrelsome and unreasonable, demanding vast rearrangements both in the colonial and the European world. We emphasize the *quality* of this danger, the principle of militarism; again we emphasize its *magnitude*, and oppose Germany because of the size and power she seeks to attain. We declare, for example, that the Berlin-Bagdad scheme will destroy Europe's Balance of Power and that Germany's neighbours will dwindle in the shadow of her vast empire and lose their initiative and independence.

To know when we have achieved a real victory

in this war, and how to achieve it, we must define our purpose more clearly. We fight against Prussian autocracy; are we then to continue the war until Germany completely changes her political system? Shall we reject all guarantees from her present government? Will Germany consent to change under pressure or retain an imposed constitution after the pressure has been removed? Will a German democracy refrain from militarism and aggression? What are we attacking, a principle or a power, a political institution or a state of mind, autocracy, militarism or world dominion? And what is our aim? Are we seeking to reform Germany or protect ourselves?

Such a definition of our fundamental policy is peculiarly important because there exists among many Americans a vague, half-formed distrust of the formulæ "to make the world safe for democracy" and "to destroy Prussian militarism." Many ask themselves, "What is German militarism to us? Is there such an institution except as a part of a general European militarism?" Others believe that it is necessary to Germany. In any case are we, with our leaking democracy, fit champions of democracy? They even predict that, in seeking to free our foe, we shall fasten militarism upon ourselves. These doubts are dangerous. They impel us to accept an unripe peace in order to escape from an impossible war. Moreover, similar doubts are

expressed by men of totally different temperament, who wish to continue the war, not for rainbows and iridescent bubbles but in pursuit of concrete, valuable American interests.¹ They are willing to fight for territory, trade, power and the prestige which leads to power, but not for democracy, of which in their opinion we already have too much.

To meet all this criticism, much of it unexpressed, is difficult and tedious, yet it is essential if we are to maintain our war solidarity. We must not only explain, but vivify and dramatize our real conflict with German militarism. Only so can we create a conviction that America has a substantial and permanent interest in overcoming this institution, that it is an interest worth fighting for and not to be attained without fighting; that we are waging war for this purpose and no other, and that we do not intend that the war shall be diverted to any other end.

Our vagueness of attack upon the German system is met by an equal vagueness in the defence. In perfect honesty, though with a misapprehension of the true issue, apologists for Germany insist that

¹ "Without taking too seriously the fascinating program 'of making the world safe for democracy,'" writes Dr. H. H. Powers in an illuminating and candid book, "it is well to remember that the war is to be fought on European soil and in conjunction with nations having possessions in every part of the world. When the peace conference meets we shall hear very little of the sonorous slogans which heralded the war's beginning and much of the concrete problems for which these phrases suggest no very tangible solution." "America Among the Nations," by H. H. Powers, New York, 1917, p. 160.

there is no Prussian militarism, except as there is also a French, Italian and Russian militarism. They prove that in 1913 Germany had fewer soldiers than certain of her opponents, both absolutely and in proportion to population, and that her per capita military and naval expenditures were considerably smaller than those of France or Great Britain. But all this is beyond the point, for militarism does not depend exclusively upon the size, cost, efficiency or readiness of armies. It is a social, not merely a military, phenomenon, a form of social organization and a state of mind.

That Russia in 1914 was more autocratic than Germany and in some respects as militaristic was a telling argument disquieting to liberals in England, France and America. That Japan was militaristic and autocratic was equally evident. If the Allies, therefore, had designed immediately to destroy all militarism they should logically have refused the assistance of Russia and Japan and thus added them to their enemies. Naturally no such suicidal policy was considered. To England and France autocracy and militarism presented themselves not as abstract principles, but as part of a vast complex and menacing system, and the war appeared to them a war of defence. They fought German militarism, not because opposed to its principle but because endangered by its power, just as they would have fought a menacing imperialistic German de-

mocracy. The militaristic nations, Russia and Germany, being mutually antagonistic, the western Allies enlisted the former against the latter. They employed a future against a present foe, following not counsels of perfection but a law of necessity.

In a real sense, however, Germany was a more avowed and logical representative and champion of militarism than was autocratic Russia. Supremely capable she had wedded her efficiency to the militaristic principle. She had harnessed her industry, commerce and educational system to a policy hostile to the democracy of the Western World. With a philosophy justifying warfare and aggression she had indoctrinated her millions. Intellectually and physically she was a gigantic protagonist. On the other hand, Russian militarism was uninspired, inefficient and unoriginal; the sort of thing which had once been and now no longer was in Western Europe. German militarism was based materially on a rapidly growing wealth and intellectually on a neo-Darwinism, which envisaged all history as a biologic struggle between growing and decaying nations, in which the strong destroyed and devoured the weak. It was a very old, very new system, which threatened to subvert Europe.

The German apologists, even when they admit the existence of this system, deny that it was a menace. It was, they claim, a sort of Cinderella militarism, modest, stay-at-home, pacific. "German militar-

ism," says Dr. Bernard Dernburg, "has kept the peace for forty-four years. While Russia went to war with Turkey and China and, after having promoted The Hague Conference, battled with Japan and 'protected' Persia, conquering territory double the size of the United States on the might-is-right principle; while England, the defender of the rights of the small states, smashed the Boer republics, took Egypt, Cyprus and South Persia; while the French Republic conquered the Sudan, Tunis, Madagascar, Indo-China and Morocco; while Italy possessed itself of Tripoli and the islands in the *Ægean* Sea; while Japan fought China, took Formosa, Korea and Southern Manchuria and has now, with the aid of her allies, invaded China, a neutral country; there is not one annexation or increase of territory to the charge of Germany. She has waged no war of any kind and has never acquired a territory in all her existence except by treaty and with the consent of the rest of the world."¹

Disregarding the exaggeration and disingenuousness of this statement, which gives a totally false impression of recent German foreign policy, we might accept it as literally true and still find in German militarism a menace more ominous than the land-greed of Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia. Not for a moment may we compare the grav-

¹ "Germany and England. The Real Issue," by Dr. Bernard Dernburg. Chicago, 1914, page 6.

ity of invoking the present European conflict with that of the conquest of Morocco, the "strangling" of Persia or the assault on the Boer republics. War against semi-civilized, half-organized collections of tribes, or even against the Boers, whether justifiable or not, is on a different plane from an attempt to overturn and subdue long-established, highly organized national states like France and Belgium. And this many Germans believed to be necessary. It had long been an axiom of German policy that colonial possessions could be secured only by direct pressure upon European neighbours. African colonies must be won by invading Belgium and Russia, by bleeding France white, by destroying British sea-power. To secure what she wanted and believed she had a right to possess, Germany conceived that she was forced to strike at the heart of enemies who blocked her colonial development. Her militarism, therefore, presented itself to such enemies as a mortal peril.

It is not a question of morals that is involved but of necessity. Germany insists that even if she began the war (which she denies) she was justified by the selfish policy of enemies seeking to thwart and strangle her. Were this true, however, the mere fact that she could gain what she wanted only by overcoming those established nations would alone render her a menace to the world. But it does not appear that Germany used conciliatory methods to

gain her place in the sun.¹ That she was constricted in her colonial expansion is true, for the Allies were neither generous nor far-seeing. But such halting advances as were made struck against an arrogant and irreconcilable spirit in Germany. Her rulers were victims of their own philosophy, believing in their military invincibility and in the doctrine that only by threats could concessions be enforced. They interpreted peace offers therefore as weakness, and entered so uncomprehendingly into negotiations as to make favourable results impossible. Their manners were, if anything, worse than their morals. They began negotiations by pounding the table, by an imperial visit to Tangier, or a sudden spring of the *Panther* at Agadir. They talked loud, rattled the sabre, appeared in the council chamber "in shining armour." And back of the equivocating diplomats stood the mob of clumsy pan-Germans, shrieking insults at France and England, proposing gross plans of conquest to Germany's rulers, thus reminding the world that whatever was given would be merely an occasion for new demands. The result was a diplomatic failure. If concession was to be interpreted as weakness, the neighbours of Germany would concede nothing. In

¹ On the other hand it must be admitted that in the negotiations leading up to the attempted settlement of the Bagdad Railway question (1914) Germany showed a willingness to meet England halfway. Nor were England, France and Russia always conciliatory.

the years during which France deftly secured large additions to her colonial empire, Germany's blustering gained nothing but disappointments and ill-will.

At bottom, of course, the question whether the one group or the other or both were at fault is quite irrelevant. What was revealed by the impotent deliberations between Germany and her present enemies was the fact that two opposing policies were in conflict and that these policies gained adherents because they represented the antagonistic interests of two groups of nations. Each group believed that to accept its opponent's principle would be fatal. England's international theory was predicated on the assumption that the British Empire must increase or at least maintain itself, while the theory of Germany assumed that the Fatherland must grow. The new German Empire (so, at least, it appeared to Englishmen) must be founded upon the ruins of the British Empire, must live off the lands upon which Britain had lived, must break England's resistance and if necessary destroy England's independence. The two principles had impinged because the two nations had impinged. The menace of militarism became for Great Britain the menace of an expanding Germany.

To understand what this peril really meant to Western Europe we must consider what might have

occurred had Germany succeeded in her first Western drive. Belgium would have gone down and France been crushed. A secure Germany army, occupying Paris, Calais, Havre, Verdun could have kept the dispirited French troops beyond the Loire and intercepted any effective aid from England. A treaty with France might have given Germany large tracts of land, immense mineral resources, a firm footing on the English Channel and a stupendous indemnity, together with the French colonies and perhaps the French navy. It would have been an immense booty. Belgian independence gone, Holland, Denmark and Switzerland would have become vassal states. In the Balkans, on the road to Constantinople and Bagdad, no power could have resisted a future German advance, since Russia, without France's support, would have been impotent. Even Great Britain could have done nothing. "When the mighty German Empire," wrote Mr. Frederic Harrison, "soon to be increased to a population double our own, is master of the whole seaboard of North Europe from Havre to Hamburg—a coast more fitted for navies than is our own coast between Dover and Aberdeen, when their aeroplane and Zeppelin stations look across the Channel from a dozen headlands, and the mouths of great tidal rivers gape upon our shores, and behind these fortresses and docks there lies in wait a mighty nation having a fleet then larger than ours, and armies of three or

four millions of men—would the flag of Britain float quietly at ease?"¹

Such was the menace of German militarism as viewed by British statesmen in August, 1914. England's participation was not decided by the Belgian invasion nor by the Belgian atrocities. These were mere incidents. Had Germany observed all the rules of war, killed with punctilio, conferred warm soup and iron crosses on enemy non-combatants and generally behaved like a twentieth-century Roland, had she invaded France at Verdun and not at Namur, the result of her victory would have meant an equal disaster to England. A crushing of France meant an ultimate crushing of Great Britain.²

While a complete German victory would have destroyed England, even the danger of such a victory would have blasted the hope of a British democracy. Democracy is a luxury. It can be developed and maintained only in a moderately secure and pacific world. This is due to the superior fighting efficiency of militaristic states. In a war between nations of equal resources, population and intelligence, one of which is devoting its energies and thought to social reconstruction and the other primarily interested in

¹ "The Meaning of the War," by Frederic Harrison, London, 1915, p. 2.

² To destroy Britain large armies would not have been necessary; she could have been starved financially and economically by depriving her of markets, raw materials and food. Without a German soldier on British soil, England could have been forced to surrender.

preparing for war, the advantage lies enormously with the latter. The great military superiority of Germany over other nations, the unlimited devotion of her people and the skill and foresight with which her martial operations are conceived and carried out, reveal an alarming military advantage of the autocratic state over the democratic nation. The danger cast its shadow far during the ten years preceding the conflict. The fear of Germany in both England and France was one of the greatest obstacles to democracy and social reform. In England Lord Roberts urged conscription and was opposed by the great masses of the wage-earners. In France the Socialists vigorously combated the reintroduction of the three years' military service. So long as one nation remained supremely efficient in its militarism and ready to attack at any moment, the other nations were hampered in their efforts to achieve progress toward political, industrial or social democracy.

We in America are forced to view the menace of German militarism in the same light as do the democrats of England and France. If we are to achieve democracy, or even to maintain such democracy as we now have, conditions must be established in the rest of the world which will render us safe.

In the past we have tacitly assumed that our safety would be permanent. We were so far removed from Europe that we believed that no great

power could attack us. Isolation, however, is measured not in miles of distance but in the difficulty and delay of transporting troops, and in this respect the technical progress of the last thirty years has vastly diminished our immunity. Our enemy will no longer transport his troops with slow-sailing vessels of small burden as during our wars with England, but will use gigantic and rapid steamships. Our first line of defence is almost gone.

Our second protection from the superior strength of Europe lay in her balance of power. No nation wished to embroil herself with America so long as she feared enemies nearer home. A hostile coalition of states, as was threatened during our war with Spain, would have found us defenceless. But if Germany were to succeed in crushing France and in destroying England, the balance of power would come to an end, and ultimately the victor could combine against us a large proportion of the superior military and economic resources of Europe. In such a case it would have been difficult to defend the integrity of our territory or to find leisure to develop our democracy. We should have had other preoccupations.

This brings us to the point where the questions with which this chapter opened can be answered. We combat German autocracy because it is a principle adverse to the democracy for which we strive. We combat German militarism because it, also, rep-

resents an antagonistic principle. But against neither of these should we have gone to war but for the fact that these principles so present themselves as to menace our democracy and our safety. We are opposed to German autocracy because it aids German militarism; to German militarism because it leads to German aggression; to German aggression because, owing to Germany's strategic position and her immense strength, owing to conditions which in large measure are not Germany's fault, her aggression may overturn the balance of power in Europe, destroy our security, and render it difficult for us to develop a democracy at home, or even to maintain our independence. We are therefore compelled at the worst to fight for a return to the Balance of Power, although theoretically we are opposed to this system, or at the best for an internationalism, in which all peril will disappear. The one thing, however, which we cannot view with equanimity is the marshalling of Europe's strength under the leadership of a single mighty state, autocratic, militaristic and aggressive. We are therefore fighting both a principle and a power; we are opposed to Germany, not only because of the quality but also because of the magnitude of her menace.

For us as for Britain the Marne was a saving victory, at least temporarily. It is true that the danger to us from a defeat at the Marne would have been delayed, for between us and Germany lay

Great Britain, as between her and Germany lay France and Belgium. When we contemplate, however, the ravages of German submarines operating under grave difficulties we gain some conception of what a Germany, possessed of the French fleet and a part of the French coast, could eventually have achieved against the commerce of the British Isles. At best Great Britain could only have maintained her existence; at worst she might have been conquered and her navy and a part of her industrial power annexed. Against such a combination of navies and resources, against even a Franco-German navy (Great Britain remaining neutral) the United States could accomplish little. We should face a hostile combination of the immensely more powerful and better organized resources of Western Europe. By what means could we uphold the Monroe Doctrine or maintain our commerce? Could we even be sure of defending our own soil?

Had Germany won that battle, we should instantly have recognized the sinister menace of her militarism. With her defeat, however, we again breathed lightly, for in due course Britain, France and Russia would break down the Central Empires. We therefore composedly returned to our discussions concerning White Papers, provocations, counter-provocations, the rights of neutrals, the wrongs of combatants. Yet though the danger of a victory for German militarism seemed to have passed, we were

gradually familiarizing ourselves with the quality of that institution.

It was its formidableness that most astounded us. We were outraged by Louvain, Rheims, the Zeppelin raids, the submarine atrocities, the execution of Edith Cavell, the murder of Captain Fryatt, but what brought us definitely into opposition was the sheer power and viability of a principle which we had believed to be half-dead. Militarism had always been associated in our minds with autocracy, and that we had conceived as a weak-minded and hoary immigrant from an outlived age, a sort of political Fafner, surviving through mere inertia. It was preindustrial, which is our modern and secular synonym for pre-Adamitic. It had no more *raison d'être* than the fact that it was still half-alive and not worth killing. We no longer had any quarrel with kings and emperors, who had had their claws cut and had become gracious layers of cornerstones and innocent symbols of democratic power. Autocracy, we believed, would disappear gradually and in fractions, tail, body and head, like the Cheshire cat, until, as with British royalty, nothing remained but the smile.

The war taught us that autocracy was not a thing of kings and crown-princes, but a living principle, an efficient form of social organization. Instead of dying decently at the first whiff of factory smoke, instead of being run over by the new railroads or

crowded to death in our modern cities, it converted industrialism to its own uses and seated itself in the centre of the economic system. It did not die of education, but made of the school-teacher one of its main supports. The university and the newspaper became, not its executioners, but its servile handmaidens. Autocracy was efficient. It persisted in living. It persisted in growing.

Therein lay its menace. It was expansive, necessarily expansive.

It was expansive because of its origin and the law of its being. The autocratic principle persisted in modern intelligent Germany because it grew out of foreign relations, was born of danger and lived on danger. It was her *external menace* that fastened autocracy and militarism on Germany. During two long centuries her invaders (Swedes, French, Croats and others), by keeping the nation divided, had created German autocracy and militarism by giving the people so ardent a desire for security that they welcomed any social organization by which it could be attained. To this day the German lives under the shadow of the Thirty Years' War and remembers Tilly, Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus, as he remembers Louis XIV and Napoleon. Even the liberal German tends to regard an autocratic militarism as an insurance premium. He feels toward it as we toward our police; we may not love the policeman but prefer him to the thief.

The power to defend, however, means the power as well as the temptation to attack, and Germany like other nations is not beyond such temptation. All the European peoples were menaced. We have read recent history wrongly if we conceive of it in terms of an aggressive Germany constantly planning to attack nations wholly devoted to peace. Both groups of allies meditated both aggression and defence. Justified or not, Serbian ambitions in Austria and Russian ambitions in the Balkans were aggressive, as were also Austria's designs on Serbia. Because Germany needed defence, because she wanted to aggress, because she believed that only by military effort could she achieve her ends, and finally because she was in a geographical situation in which a successful war could destroy the security of other great nations, German imperialism became a deadly menace.

Thus the Western World, including America, comes into conflict with a nation, representing power, aggression, and an alien philosophy. Of these opposed philosophies one is based on an autocratic, militaristic foundation, emphasizing the virtues of order, discipline, endurance, subordination, profligacy, stoicism, and laying stress on loyalty and a traditional personal honour. It believes in compulsion, the omnipotence of the state, the emptiness and worthlessness of plans to avert warfare. The other philosophy is more democratic and pacifis-

tic, emphasizing individual freedom, the quest of pleasure, the virtues of prosperity. It is melioristic and legalistic, stressing rights and privileges and underemphasizing duties. It is progressive and confident. It believes in a low birth rate, in ease and protection from danger. It is optimistic and money-making.

Of course not all Germans uphold one philosophy nor all British, French and Americans the other; there are millions of exceptions on both sides. Bernhardt himself is our witness to the demoralizing, by which he means demilitarizing, influence upon Germany of recent wealth. On the other hand, there are always a few American, French and British fire-breathers, with little to learn from their more numerous and loquacious German compeers. Not the exception, however, but the rule determines. For reasons, partly beyond its own control, Germany became the exponent and protagonist of the militarist philosophy, and sought to live up to its doctrines in a war, which had she been victorious would for a time have subverted the democratic civilization of the West.

It is of course not to be assumed that of these opposed philosophies autocracy was aggressive and democracy not; both principles were, and are, aggressive and intensely missionary. The very phrase "Making the world safe for democracy" suggests how encroaching was our own principle.

England, France and the United States had hitherto prospered because of historical and geographical reasons, and had sanctified their gains by a glorifying possession. The course of historic evolution in its larger bearings had worked for them, and they, its beneficiaries and disciples, saw everything that it had made; "and behold, it was very good." On the other hand the German principle was disturbing and revolutionary because Germany had everything to gain from a change.

The indefatigable traveller from Mars, arriving at this green earth in the spring of 1914, might have come to the typically Martian conclusion that the Earth was most unfortunately divided, that an inefficient and garrulous democratic spirit had conquered the greater area while the unique and saving principle, an efficient, industrialized, moral autocracy was dying of inanition within narrow confines. With all of which many Germans would agree. They would proudly admit that militarism is peculiar to Germany, but in the same breath they would insist that it is excellent, the last word in our modern development towards equality, democracy and subordination.

When a new recruit enters the army, says N. Goldmann, a young defender of the principle of militarism,¹ two things occur: he is given a uniform and

¹ Goldmann (N.) "Der Geist des Militarismus." ("Der Deutsche Krieg.") Berlin and Stuttgart, 1915.

is told to do whatever his superiors command. These two acts typify our modern civilization. The uniform is the expression of the democratic idea, the suppression for the time being of all differences among men; "in uniform no one is noble or commoner, millionaire or beggar, artist or philistine, orthodox or atheist," but all are members of the army. By the distinction between those who command and those who obey, on the other hand, the "aristocratic idea" is maintained. Democracy and subordination—the union of these two creates militarism—and civilization.

Therefore, writes Goldmann, "the battle cry of the opponents of Germany is justified. The German spirit may be called the militaristic spirit." But far from being alien to modern development or opposed to West European civilization, militarism is their distinguishing characteristic. The great city, the factory and our whole industrial system are based on its principles of uniformity and subordination, in other words, on regimentation. Therefore we speak of the "barracks" of the working-men and of the industrial "reserve army." The individual workman, technician, engineer, director counts for little; the enterprise is all-important. So in our intellectual life militarism is supreme and "the German spirit rules the world." The opposition to militarism comes not from Western civilization but from the "atomism" of English life, from

the English incapacity to generalize, to sacrifice for the common good, even to recognize the existence of a common good.¹

Germany has become great, continues Goldmann, through her militarism, just as Great Britain became great through "her anti-militaristic, individualistic spirit." In the world struggle between the two principles militarism must be victorious. "Germany will conquer and the world will be ruled by the militaristic spirit." Only such a victory will permit the present age to solve its problems.

Despite Mr. Goldmann's prediction, the world, in the event of an Allied victory, will seek to solve our modern problems without the assistance either of autocracy or of militarism. It will see what it can do with democracy.

But the democracy which can be utilized in such a vast reorganization will of necessity be something different from the lax, inefficient and brutal plutocracies which we find in several of the nations opposed to Germany. It must be a socialized de-

¹ Militarism is not identical with the maintenance of an army, as the Swiss experience proves. In a recent booklet the German Socialist, Karl Kautsky, clearly makes this distinction. "We (the German Socialists) have fought against the military system not to make the land defenceless, but in order to introduce another system in its place, which will give us the necessary guarantees that the army will always be the tool of the civil authorities and never their master. When the latter is the case we call such a condition 'militarism,' and it is against that alone that we fight." "Die Internationalitaet und der Krieg," Berlin, 1915, p. 26, quoted by Thomas F. A. Smith, "What Germany Thinks," New York, 1915, p. 112.

mocracy, not a mere popular government based on money and on the exploitation of the poor.

It is sometimes alleged that, because we in America have not attained to such a socialized democracy, we are not fit to become the champions of the democratic principle. Critics point to our lynchings, our political corruption and ineptitudes and our gross economic inequalities. They point out that it is our own Prussian-blue reactionaries, grown fat and notorious in their warfare against a true American freedom, who are loudest in their defence of our democracy. But what else could be expected? No war was ever won by the virtuous alone, and it is inevitable that tax-dodgers, union-smashers, monopolists, cadets, ward-politicians, sweat-shop proprietors and desultory burners of Negroes, to say nothing of criminals, lunatics and aging keepers of houses of prostitution should be enlisted side by side with other elements in the population. We are a full democracy not in being but in process. It is a war for the *bases* of democracy, for the safety of a capitalistic society developing rapidly towards democracy. Like several of our Allies, we are fighting not only for freedom from alarms over our independence but also for a chance to try out the Great Experiment, to struggle forward towards the ultimate attainment of a great ideal. And in this struggle we can count upon the willing assistance of

men who do not grasp the implications of their adhesion.

America therefore is at war because her growing democracy is in conflict with the militaristic institutions and philosophy of Germany, and because her democracy and her entire national development would be endangered by the German victory, which would have been probable had we not entered. We thus have both a general and a specific interest; a desire to promote a better system in Europe and a wish to maintain our own democracy intact. In a sense we are fighting a preventive war, seeking to destroy the menace of German militarism before it can attack us in our own home. Just as we sink submarines at sight, rather than by "armed neutrality" limiting ourselves to defence, so we assail Germany in concert with her present enemies rather than attend her possible attack after her victory in Europe.

How much further should we go? Have we an interest, and has the world, in proceeding beyond the destruction of German militarism to the permanent building up of a British, French, Italian, Russian or American militarism?

The danger is not fictitious. Germany developed her militarism out of a sense of external peril, and if the war goes against her, and the old European system remains, she will still be menaced and at least potentially militaristic. Furthermore if we en-

courage Serbia and Italy, Greece and France, Britain, Japan and Russia to develop new antagonisms, we shall be planting the seeds of militarism throughout the world. Germany will have been defeated, but German militarism will have triumphed.

CHAPTER V

SPOILING THE ENEMY

SINCE the imperialism of the Allies in the present war is less sweeping and drastic than that of Germany, we are sometimes urged to close an eye or turn our back. When we are trying to capture an armed burglar we do not inquire too curiously into the question whether a few of the *posse comitatus* are modest confidence men. There is a sense of proportion in these things, and there are diplomatic *convenances*.

Even were our co-belligerents twice as imperialistic as they are, we should still be compelled to make common cause with them against the still more menacing German aggression. Our secure loyalty to our Allies is not in question. But to make common cause, to maintain a real concert of action, requires harmony in ideals and unity of aims. It is for this reason that we are forced to review the instincts, motives and demands that lie behind the armies of our Allies. When we are united we shall have a chance to win the war. Until then we shall drag along, working at cross-purposes.

The truth must be faced. The efforts of the Allies to gain a victory for democracy and internationalism have everywhere been impeded by their own na-

tionalistic ambitions. It is trebly unfortunate that this has been the case. Not only have these ambitions vitiated their good faith in their war against German autoocracy, not only have they made the eventual victory far less valuable, but they have delayed and jeopardized that victory. Because of their clashing territorial ambitions our co-belligerents find it difficult even today to achieve unity of purpose or action, and as their plans of aggrandizement become known in Germany and Austria, and are there exaggerated, they tend to unify the entire population of the Central Powers, reactionaries and democrats, conservatives and liberals, Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and even the exploited races of the Dual Monarchy. The secret treaties into which the Allies entered make the whole war for democracy appear to our enemies as a sham and as an excuse for their own imperialism.

To many it will seem *mal-a-propos* and perhaps even unpatriotic to state these facts. Why should we injure our own side even by telling the truth? Will not a revelation of these covert ambitions of our Allies have the effect of demoralizing the Entente Powers and of destroying their solidarity? When our sons and brothers are risking their lives on the battle front is it time for academic discussions of past events, discussions which cannot but give aid and comfort to the enemy?

But what if the enemy already knows? The news-

papers in the hostile countries have printed long accounts, true and false, of the designs of each of the Allied nations. By suppressing such facts we do not prevent Germany's knowing them. Today we of the Allied countries by reason of a supposedly patriotic silence are fighting in the dark and risking lives that might be saved. We are standing in the way of our own solidarity, and are making our task harder and more dangerous than it need be. Because we do not properly consider and duly assess facts which are important elements in our war problem, we weaken our morale and strengthen that of the Imperial German Government. If we face the truth and intelligently guide our action by the conclusions we reach, our enemy will be welcome to any comfort he may derive from the result.

There is an even more important reason for discussing this question. When we entered the war we already had an inkling of the imperialistic aims of several of our Allies. If, notwithstanding this knowledge, we took sides with them, we did so because we vaguely felt that this imperialism was not a necessary and inevitable part of the allied program, that by our concert with these nations we might aid in the democratization of their peace terms, that we might raise a standard about which the more democratic of our Allies and the more democratic classes within these Allied nations could rally. Unless we can do this we can gain no moral victory. And we

can make no progress in this direction so long as we seek to remain silent on this delicate question.

It is not necessary in discussing the territorial ambitions of our Allies to pass a moral judgment or to assume an ethical superiority on our own part. No demand by any of our Allies has been more flagrant a breach of international morality than were the claims which led to our war with Mexico. It is superlatively easy to indict nations for concealing selfish ambitions under protestations of international rectitude. But such an indictment does not help us, for our problem is not to distribute praise or blame but to seek a true basis for an international civilization and thus secure a real victory. It is far more important to understand these nationalistic ambitions, to recognize how deeply they are rooted in the whole history of modern Europe and to acknowledge their inevitableness in the circumstances than to appraise and judge.

What was the diplomatic state of Europe out of which grew these demands of our Allies? What chance was there for any nation following the even path of rectitude and abnegation?

In his defence of Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy, Sir Gilbert Murray deplores the fact that the diplomacy of the nations has been frankly egoistic, cruel and dishonest. "There is," he says, about the ordinary processes of Foreign Policy, "a constant suspicion of intrigue, a constant assertion of 'inter-

ests,' a dangerous familiarity with thoughts of force or fraud, and a habit of using silken phrases as a cover for very brutal facts. . . . Foreign Politics are the relations between so many bands of outlaws." ¹ As a consequence even the nations with high ideals must go into international conferences with a big knife, ready to carve out a slice of territory or carve up the plausible foe.

In 1914 therefore the enemies of Germany, though fighting a war for their very existence, were neither more nor less scrupulous than they had been in former years. These Western and Eastern Allies, defending themselves against Germany, conceived the problem of the division of the world somewhat as did Germany, simply because it was the only conception then admitted in diplomatic Europe. According to this conception each nation was bound to grow, expand, get what it could, make the best bargain with enemy and ally. To take, was not only directly advantageous but also had the merit of preventing the enemy from taking.

Of all the original allies in the struggle against German aggression, Imperial Russia was probably the most avid of territory and the least concerned with the ideals that inspired many Englishmen, Frenchmen and Belgians. From the Czar's point of view the war was not a struggle of democracy

¹ "The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey," by Sir Gilbert Murray, Oxford, 1915, p. 41.

against militarism but a contest for supremacy in the Balkans and for domination of the Straits. The Imperial Russian Government wanted no barren victory but a visible expansion. To meet these large demands France and Great Britain presented counter-demands, and from that moment the war became a feverish scramble for spoils. Arising thus out of national struggles for territory and military prestige, the contest was carried on by the enticement of new Allies through promises of material reward. It was fought not only for democracy but for lands, indemnities and trade privileges. With many people in the Allied nations the purpose of the war was to discredit "the aggressive objects and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers"; with others the purpose was to secure definite material nationalistic aims.

These aims were not new; they have always existed and are indeed inseparable from the long struggle for power in Europe and for dominion beyond Europe. No one can study the devious course of international politics since the Congress of Berlin (and before) without recognizing that European nations have long carried on a ruthless, aggressive policy both within Europe and in Asia and Africa. To take a single example; there was little concern for internationalism in the attitude of any of the European Powers towards Turkey, the Balkan States, Persia, Morocco or China. "The history of

international diplomacy in the Islamic world," writes Professor Gibbons,¹ "is an unbroken record of bullying and blundering on the part of all the Powers. In governmental policies one searches in vain for more than an occasional ray of chivalry, uprightness, altruism, for a consistent line of action in attempting to solve the problems that were leading Europe from one war to another, for constructive statesmanship." "The indictment of European diplomacy in the Near East is terrible."²

It would be profitless to cite further instances of the callousness and blindness of the past foreign policies of all the great European nations. Though in Great Britain, France and several other countries, many high-minded men strove for international concord and not for nationalistic gain, foreign policy was determined not by the ideals of these liberals and democrats, but by necessities imposed by a dangerous and thoroughly anarchic condition of the world. Europe was a trembling balance of hostile powers, and each state stood by its allies, right or wrong, in order that they, in turn, might come

¹ "The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East," by Herbert Adams Gibbons, New York, 1917, pp. 115, 116, 117.

² "The evolution of Serbia, of Roumania, of Bulgaria, of Greece, of Crete; the sufferings of Armenia and Syria; the anarchy of Arabia; the vacillating policy in Egypt and Northern Africa; the intrigues at Constantinople; the handling of Persia and Afghanistan, give us the formula of European diplomacy. It is this: *selfish national interest endeavouring to thwart other selfish national interests.*" Gibbons *op. cit.*, pp. 118, 119. (My italics.)

to its aid in time of trial. From 1870 to 1905 Germany, by means of her alliances, maintained a certain supremacy on the Continent, while Great Britain held first place in colonial development. From 1905 to 1914, however, there was waged an embittered, secret and desperate contest between Germany, seeking to dominate, and France, Russia and Britain determined to break her hegemony. The struggle for control in Europe merged with a conflict of rival imperialisms in which there was little pretence of disinterestedness. Among all these nations there was not much to choose in the matter of comparative international morality. Germany's Chinese policy was brutal and hypocritical, but no worse than the corrupt and ruthless policy of Russia. As for the long struggle between Austria and Russia for domination of the Balkans, neither nation was squeamishly virtuous.¹ Had the Allies in this war abjured all hopes of aggrandizement and limited themselves to an idealistic sacrifice for small nationalities, the step would have marked a complete moral revolution, a religious conversion hitherto unknown in European diplomacy.

They had not abjured such hopes. It is true that progress has been made towards a liberalization of allied war-aims, partly as a result of Russian and

¹ For a partisan history of this conflict, from the Austrian point of view, see "Der Gegensatz zwischen Oesterreich-Ungarn und Russland," by Dr. Alexander Redlich, Stuttgart and Berlin ("Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt") 1915.

American influence and partly because of untoward events upon the battle-field. The January (1918) speech of Lloyd George marks a recession from a former imperialistic position, and a similar attitude is being crystallized all over Europe. Even today, however, the Allies are inspired by motives of national gain as well as by a sincere reprobation of Germany's crimes; the idealistic motive is still weighed to earth by a thousand gross desires and an inveterate predatory habit. A new and better spirit, though seeking expression, fails completely to inspire the vigorous, short-sighted men who conduct national policy. These diplomats of the old school want from this war something concrete and tangible, that they can tack on to their kingdom or empire, and that will show on the map and in the balance sheet. They want all they can get, even if they pay for it by future wars.

Thus in every country, not even excluding the United States, two motives enter into the war spirit. One is the ambition to end war, to promote internationalism, to destroy militarism; the other is a desire for concrete imperialistic gains. Upon the whole, the average soldier and the average citizen are more aware of the first than of the second motive. Of the British volunteers hundreds of thousands would never have enlisted save for Belgium; you could not have bribed these men by any hope of trade advantage or other aggrandizement. In France also, as

in Italy, Belgium and Russia, millions wanted nothing but justice and international peace. Yet, as matters then stood, these millions did not decide the joint policy of the Alliance. That Alliance, growing out of the former European anarchy, was held together by greed, revenge and the lust for conquered territory. From the Allied point of view the war threatened to become, what from the German side it had largely been from the beginning, a war of national aggression, a war for booty.¹

That booty took three forms: money, trade advantages, territory. The money was to be secured by the levy of crushing indemnities; the trade advantages by a commercial war after the war; the territory desired was to be taken from Austria-Hungary and Turkey, from Germany, and possibly Bulgaria.²

A demand for indemnities lay on the surface. It sought justification in the desire to be recompensed for actual losses incurred, in a wish to punish Germany and finally in the theory that a Germany weak-

¹ It may perhaps be urged that not only are many of the territorial demands of the Allies reasonable and just (which claim of course would be readily granted) but that it is better to concede even an unjust and exorbitant demand of a potential ally than, by alienating him, permit the victory of the enemy. There is of course no hard and fast line to be drawn here. What seems actually to have happened, however, is that the Allies have really weakened their *morale*, and with it their military power, with every new engagement, violative of internationalism, into which they have entered.

² To say nothing of Persia, Albania, Abyssinia and China.

ened by such exactions would be unable to renew the attack upon the Allies.

To begin with the more extreme advocates of indemnities, let us quote Mr. L. J. Maxse, editor of the *National Review*. "The main object of peace," he contended, "should be to crush and permanently cripple Prussia. . . . Surely if the Prussians lose it is for them to pay and for the Allies to receive the milliards. If the process of payment reduces German Kultur to be a hewer of wood and drawer of water for the rest of the century for European civilization, so much the better for the world."¹

From France one heard the same cry. Here is how M. Stephen Pichon of the (Paris) *Petit Journal* addressed Germany. "You will have to reimburse the Allies for all the costs of the war, and this will be an enormous sum. But this is not all. You will have to pay for the cathedrals, the museums, the palaces, the huts, you bombarded and burned, the butcheries you committed, for the widows and orphans you have made. That will make billions and billions that you will have to pay us. O no! Not at once, for you could not do that. . . . It will

¹ Cited by Stoddard, *op. cit.* p. 30. Mr. Maxse, who may be presumed to know England, obviously feared, however, that many Englishmen would desire to be lenient towards a defeated Germany. "We know the Rt. Hon. Faintheart and the Rt. Hon. Feebleguts too well to suppose that the (present stern) mood will last and that he will remain robust when the Rhine Whine sets in. Then our bleaters will give tongue and our 'blighters' will chip in. We shall see the old Potsdam Press in full working order, devoted by day and by night to the sacred cause of 'letting off the Boche.'"

take you a long time—ten years, twenty years, thirty years. . . . Until Germany has paid this off, Russian garrisons will occupy Breslau and Dresden, English garrisons Hamburg and Frankfort, a Belgian garrison shall occupy Cologne, a French one Coblenz and Mainz. Only after the last penny has been paid will the Allies withdraw, and even then not until after they have blown up the last German fortress.”¹

In similar vein, M. Onésime Reclus: “The stinking beast is down! We are going to divide up its flesh and its bones. We will make of it (Germany) an insolvent debtor.”² Other writers desire to annex the great coal and iron deposits of Western Germany as part of a readily collected indemnity.

The argument against punitive indemnities levied upon Germany does not rest upon any assumption of her innocence or modesty. Germany has deprived herself of the right to protest. No one can read the terrifying anthology of her imperialistic literature, collected by S. Grumbach,³ without constantly encountering the most brutal plans for muleting her victims. Her record in 1871 and in the illegal and extortionate requisitions upon Belgium since

¹ Stoddard, *op cit.* pp. 51, 52.

² Published in “Le Rhin Français” in the summer of 1915; quoted by Stoddard, *op cit.* pp. 53, 54.

³ *Das annexionistische Deutschland, Eine Sammlung von Dokumenten, die seit dem 4. August, 1914, in Deutschland öffentlich oder geheim verbreitet wurden*, by S. Grumbach, Lausanne, 1917.

1914 is irredeemably bad. Yet a similar attitude on the part of Germany's enemies is irreconcilable with the higher principles they profess. Moreover adequate compensation is utterly impossible. The allied losses incurred in this War will by August, 1918 far exceed a hundred billion dollars, a sum in excess of the total national wealth of the Central Powers. The indemnity is uncollectible. Even an attempt to collect would reduce Germany to starvation by annihilating her industry. Facing such terms any nation would fight until her entire wealth, to be used for an eventual indemnity, was spent in killing her enemies. To occupy Germany until the Allied demands were met would be to occupy her for ever. It cannot be done. "Non-German Europe," says Mr. Bernard Shaw, "is not going to spend the remainder of the duration of this planet sitting on Germany's head. A head with the brains of sixty millions of people in it takes more sitting on than we shall have time for."¹

Even a lesser indemnity, an infliction of a few tens of billions, would meet with insuperable difficulties. Experience teaches that punitive impositions are likely to reach enormous proportions, when each of a group of Powers seeks to secure the largest share. The Boxer indemnities are a case in point. Here exorbitant demands were made on China by six nations, especially by Germany, France and Rus-

¹ The New Republic, Vol. 9; Jan. 6, 1917.

sia. Similarly an attempt by a group of exigent victors to levy indemnities upon a prostrate Germany might cause dangerous dissensions.¹

There remains one form of indemnification which would bring in large sums, what we may perhaps call the indemnity by evacuation. It is a device by which the inhabitants of a conquered territory, such as French Lorraine or Westphalia, are to be driven from the land, and their property seized, with an amiable recommendation to their own government to reimburse them. Such a savage proposal has actually been made by the cartell magnates of Germany. It is difficult to believe, however, that a plan, so abhorrent to our fundamental conceptions of international morality will be adopted by the Allies.

The demand for trade discrimination after the war is in accord with the same principle of seeking to punish the German people. Its central idea is the permanent crushing of Germany. She is to be denied access to foreign markets, refused raw materials, slowly throttled by an economic constriction. If the military war were nothing but an incident in an abiding struggle, such a commercial policy would be a legitimate act of defence and aggression, since a nation may be wounded and destroyed economically

¹ Against an indemnification by Germany of Belgium alone, or of a rebuilding of devastated portions of Europe at the joint expense of all Powers, the same objections do not apply. Such costs could be assessed by a Board of Arbitration working under rules agreed to at the Peace Conference.

as effectively as by arms. If Germany were to remain bellicose and were to continue the contest in the shape of an intensified military preparation, *which is war*, the Allies would be justified in using their deadliest economic weapons. Today this Allied threat of a war after the war merely emphasizes the fact that though Germany holds certain territory of the Allies, they in turn hold the key to her economic life. It is a conclusive answer to her triumphant demand that we look "at the war map." As an enduring institution, however, in a world looking to peace, such a boycotting of the victim is utterly destructive and reactionary. Its adoption would set back the world many decades. It would injure both the boycotted and the boycotters. It would be a continuation of war, a new incentive to war.¹

¹ The economic war after the war is not to be interpreted as a mere continuation of the old protectionist policy of the nations. The primary aim of that policy was to benefit the home industry whereas the avowed object of the economic war is to injure the enemy. What the effect would be upon the home industry has been described by several free traders. "French protectionists demand the repeal of Article II of the Treaty of Frankfort, which assured most favoured-nation treatment to France and the German Empire. Many who are most anxious to annihilate German trade propose to keep out German goods by means of more or less prohibitive customs duties. They forget, in their simplicity, that customs duties are paid by the consumers, not the producers. Suppose they treble the duty on coal coming from Germany. It is the French metallurgical industry which suffers. If they increase the duties on dyes they injure the French textile industries. If they want to make at home the machinery which France imported to the value of £5,000,000 in 1913, they adversely affect all French industries dependent on it." "The Causes and Consequences of the War," by Yves Guyot. Translated by F. Appleby Holt, London, 1916, p. 325.

The demands for new territorial possessions is the greatest obstacle of all, both to a peace based on internationalism and to the winning of the war. Serbia, Roumania, Italy and Russia have staked out claims in Austria-Hungary; Greece, Italy, England, France, and Russia have wished to divide the Turkish Empire, while the former German Colonies were destined to be delivered to various new owners. The demands of the extremists went very far indeed. The imperialists suddenly awakened and demanded that their dreams be realized.

Ignoring all extremists, however, what were the official demands of the Allied governments?

On January 10, 1917, the Allied governments addressed a note to President Wilson in reply to his request that they definitely state terms. It was a cleverly written note, designed to unite all the nations opposed to Germany by giving to each what each demanded. It was a glorified Rivers and Harbours Bill.

Today (February, 1918), this note is out of date and without further sanction. Yet it has not been withdrawn, nor has it been superseded by a subsequent joint statement of Allied terms. For this reason and because of the expression that it gives to the former hopes of Allied imperialists, the note is still worthy of quotation. Their "objects" in this war, the Allies explained, "will not be made known in detail with all the equitable com-

pensation and indemnities for damages suffered until the hour of negotiations. But the civilized world knows that they imply, in all necessity and in the first instance, the restoration of Belgium, of Serbia and of Montenegro, and the indemnities which are due them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia and of Rumania, with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable *régime* and founded as much upon respect of nationalities and full security and liberty of economic development, which all nations, great or small, possess, as upon territorial conventions and international agreements, suitable to guarantee territorial and maritime frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations; the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Rumanians, and of Tcheco-Slovaques from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire. . . . The intentions of His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, regarding Poland have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies."

Upon investigation this Allied statement proved to be intentionally ambiguous. Designed to hold together both liberals and imperialists, it might be interpreted as a minimum and as a maximum pro-

gram. What, however, it was obviously intended to mean to the interested parties, was that their interests would be maintained. All past promises, however dubious, were to be fulfilled. Into the moral system of the Allies, into a demand for "Restitution, Reparation and Guarantee" the rights of small nations and the destruction of Prussian militarism, there was to be woven a fabric of specific national demands, in real opposition to the idealistic program. To defeat Prussian Militarism, Japan was to keep Chinese territory, while Russia was to be given Constantinople, Roumania the sovereignty of territories in which were few of her nationals, and Italy lands to which she had no just claim.

What these dubious statements really meant to the imperialists was later revealed. "The secret agreements entered into by the Allies," says a writer in *The New Europe* in July, 1917, "are not consistent with the ideals of their populations. The secret Convention of April 27, (26), 1915, with Italy, the treaty with Roumania are both based on the principle of grab." "The arrangement concluded with Roumania last year, after much bargaining, assigned to Roumania regions outside her ethnographical limits, to which she has no publicly defensible moral claim. For these arrangements the responsibility belongs chiefly to the pre-Revolutionary Government of Russia and to the Roumanian Pre-

mier, Mr. Bratianu. While upholding to the full the claims of Roumania to national unity, the Allied peoples cannot in conscience sanction the allotment to Roumania of districts in the Banat and the Central Hungarian plain where the Roumanian population is either non-existent or is vastly outnumbered by Serbs and Magyars.”¹

Nor were the Italian and Roumanian agreements unique in violating the spirit of internationalism. On November 22nd, 1914, Russia, England and France offered to Greece the southern portion of Albania, with the exception of Valona, in the event of her immediate entry in aid of Serbia, and on January 12th, 1915, important territorial acquisitions on the coast of Asia Minor.² As a result of negotiations in London and Petrograd in the spring of 1916 the British, French and Russian governments agreed with regard to the future distribution not only of

¹ *The New Europe*, 7/19/17, An interesting revelation of the state of mind produced among the Allied diplomats by all this haggling over territories is revealed by a report of General Polivanoff on November 7-20, 1916, suggesting a revision of the terms of territorial compensations to Roumania. This Russian General seems not at all disconcerted by the Roumanian defeat. "If," he says, "things had developed in such a way that the military and political agreement of 1916 with Roumania had been fully realized, then a very strong State would have arisen in the Balkans . . . with a population of about 13,000,000. In the future this State could hardly have been friendly disposed towards Russia." "Consequently the collapse of Roumania's plans as a Great Power is not particularly opposed to Russia's interests."

² See the confidential memorandum (exact source not indicated) made public by the Bolsheviki at Petrograd and republished with the secret treaties in the *New York Evening Post*.

their territorial acquisitions, but also of their zones of influence in Asiatic Turkey. The agreement, which is detailed, provides that these powers "assume a proportionate share of the Ottoman debt equivalent to their respective acquisitions."¹

These plans of conquest were far-reaching, and no attempt was made to bring them into harmony with the aspirations of the Entente peoples. In a secret telegram to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, dated February 24, 1916, the Russian Foreign Secretary reveals the policy and spirit of these governments and their future attitude toward a defeated Germany. "Political agreements," he says, "entered into among the Allies during the war should remain unalterable and are not subject to revision. This refers to our agreement with France and England about Constantinople and the Straits, Syria and Asia Minor, and also to the London agreement with Italy. All propositions as to future boundaries as to Central Europe are at this moment premature, but at the same time it is to be remembered that we are ready to grant to France and England complete freedom in fixing the limitations of the western German boundary, depending that the Allies in their turn will grant to us freedom in fixing our boundaries with Germany and Austria. It is important to insist on the exclusion of the Polish question as a

¹ Information on the question of Asia Minor February 21, 1918, included in the statements given out by the Bolsheviki.

subject matter for international discussion, and on elimination of all attempts to place the future of Poland under the guarantee and control of the powers.”

Just what territorial claims Russia would have made had Germany been completely defeated cannot yet be known in detail, but the French claims are revealed in a note of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador in Petrograd under date of February 1st, 1917.

“In your note of this date,” writes the Foreign Minister, “your Excellency was good enough to communicate to the Imperial Government, that the Government of the Republic intended to include among the terms of peace which will be offered to Germany the following demands and guarantees of territorial character:

“1. Alsace and Lorraine to be returned to France.

“2. The boundaries will be extended at least to the limits of the former principality of Lorraine, and will be fixed under the direction of the French Government. At the same time strategic demands must be taken into consideration, so as to include within the French territory the whole of the industrial iron basin of Lorraine and the whole of the industrial coal-basin of the Valley of the Saar.

“3. Other territories located on the left bank of the Rhine, and not included in the composition of the German Empire, will be completely separated

from Germany and shall be freed from all political and economic dependence on her.

“4. The territory on the left bank of the Rhine not included in the composition of French territory, shall form an autonomous and neutral government, and shall be occupied by French armies until such time as the enemy governments completely fulfil all the conditions and guarantees mentioned in the treaty of peace.

“Your Excellency stated that the Government of the Republic shall be happy to have the opportunity of counting upon the support of the Imperial Government in order to bring its intentions to accomplishment. In accordance with the order of his Imperial Majesty, my august sovereign, I have the honour to communicate in this note in the name of the Russian Government, to your Excellency that the Government of the Republic may count on the support of the Imperial Government to bring to fulfilment of its aforementioned intentions.”

What is most highly objectionable in all these treaties is that they constitute a program, not dictated by a sense of international justice, nor by a desire to produce a better international order, but by self-interest. Moreover that self-interest is not of the Allies as a whole but of each individual Ally. In this war the aid of nations has been bargained for in much the spirit in which George the Third bargained for his Hessians. Herein lies a manifold

danger. Not only is it likely to prolong the war beyond the time when a real victory for internationalism has been secured, not only may it make the issue itself dubious, but it is exactly the sort of situation out of which arose the Second Balkan War and many other wars in history. Even the presumed beneficiaries of these arrangements may ultimately regret their having been made. A promise to Italy of the East Adriatic might be pleasing to Italians today but in the end might prove a fatal gift.

CHAPTER VI

SACRED EGOISM

IN this war Italy has suffered at the hands of her friends. It is her own statesmen as well as many of her officious apologists in foreign countries who have lauded her policy as one of naked egoism, unashamed and boastful. Yet there is another Italy, fine-spirited and generous, which fights for as high ideals and as noble purposes as in the days of the Risorgimento and is heavens above the chaffering group of politicians and journalists who have actually controlled her policy in this war. When, therefore, in this chapter I speak of Italy I have in mind not the whole population, and not at all her ardent democrats and liberals, but a little band of ultra-nationalists, who at a critical moment caught the common imagination and confidently and ignorantly led the people to disaster.

Italy, declare her apologists, "is waging above all a war of expansion and conquest." The Italian population "set out for this war, for 'its war,' with the most definite idea of its interests. It was informed, and it perfectly understood, that it was not waging a war for the sake of magnificence nor for the sake of principles; that it was fighting for it-

self, but not for its neighbours." Italy "does not care to be generous and to lose thereby. She strongly objects to sacrifice; so that this State, founded on the principle of nationalities, which has benefitted in the past by the enthusiasm aroused by the cause of the peoples, refuses—and quite frankly—to obey this principle blindly, unreservedly to champion this cause."¹ Italy has no patience, with what Benedetto Croce calls, "hollow theories concerning the democratic ideal and the reign of peace and justice."² Italy is no sentimental ideologist, but is realistic, as Germany is. She sees her interests and pursues them, as Germany pursues her interests. She knows what she wants and how to get what she wants. At least she thinks she knows.

From the beginning of the war Italy made her national interest the controlling factor in her policy. Although a member of the Triple Alliance, she promptly—and properly—refused to march with Austria. This decision was of immense value to the Allies, for had she invaded France in August, 1914 the Marne would have been lost and a permanent German victory assured. Many reasons justified Italy's rupture of her union with Austria. She had been ignored by her titular allies; neither her interests nor her ideals had been considered.

¹ "Italy and the War," by Jacques Bainville; translated by Bernard Miall, London, New York and Toronto, 1916, pp. 237-238.

² Benedetto Croce, in the *Critica*; quoted by Bainville, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

Her world position would have been made worse, not better, by a German-Austrian victory.

For nine months thereafter, Italy preserved a neutral attitude. She was internally divided. The majority of Italians, especially the Republicans, Radicals and Syndicalists sympathized with the Allies, while many of her Catholics and Conservatives favoured the Teutonic Powers. As time passed, however, as the early expectations of a rapid German victory were extinguished and as news came of German brutalities, a somewhat inconstant enthusiasm for France, heroically bearing the brunt of invasion, spread through the peninsula.

Nevertheless potent reasons inclined the nation to neutrality. Italy is desperately poor. She has neither the fertile lands nor the rich mineral wealth of her great neighbours, and her increasing population, despite an immense emigration, presses heavily upon her resources. Politically she is unstable. The roseate dreams of a healthy national Italian development, which filled the minds of idealists a generation ago, have not been realized. Until 1913 the government was in the hands of a selfish, narrow group, recruited from the upper and middle classes, and maintained in power by a limited parliamentary franchise. Political corruption flourished under the system of *trasformismo* and a government by "political war-horses" evoked bitter reactionary and revolutionary opposition, and promoted a danger-

ous anti-parliamentarism. Social conditions were bad; illiteracy was common; and enlightened patriotism, rising above factional and personal interests, rare. The need of the nation was peace and a steady economic development.

But peace was impossible for the very reasons which made it imperatively necessary. The fragility and disequilibrium of the social structure created an unrest, which among many Italians found expression in a crude, pretentiously realistic, but, in any true sense, completely unrealistic, Imperialism. Though urged to remain neutral by its unpreparedness, its internal divisions and by the economic advantages of peace the nation was forced, partly by its idealists but chiefly by its vaulting imperialists into a policy of war and conquest.

To analyse the motives of a government with which we are acting in concert is a thankless task. It is impossible, however, properly to prepare for the difficult problem of working out a peace policy without understanding the curiously dual nature of this war, and in no instance is that duality so illuminating as in the Italian intervention. For while not a few Italians urged participation because desirous of ending German militarism, the main current bearing the nation into war was avowedly egoistic, nationalistic and imperialistic. Italy, weak, ignorant, distracted, sought to become a World Power, to revive the glories of Venice, to restore in

some part the vast Mediterranean Empire of Ancient Rome.¹

All through the recent Italian nationalistic literature runs this disconcerting parallel between the new Kingdom and the Ancient Empire. The poet d'Annunzio, to take but a single example, is for ever recalling the glory of Rome, the deeds of Rome, the heritage of Rome. What Rome accomplished in the days of the Cæsars, Italy in her narrow peninsula, surrounded by more powerful nations, must aspire to achieve in these days of steam, electricity and cartells. Admitting the virility and sheer propulsive force of the Italian population, the ambition still remains grotesque. Under the most favourable circumstances, Italy's future rôle in the economic and political world must necessarily be secondary. Compared to Russia, the British Empire, the United States or Germany, Italy is small and will remain

¹ "As in all great moments of national decision, the motives which inspired Italy were mixed; being compounded of every shade of opinion, from the purest Mazzinian idealism to the *sacro egoismo* of certain government circles and the naked and unashamed Jingoism of the so-called Nationalists. While the latter were never tired of pouring ridicule on the assumption that the great struggle is one between Imperialism and Democracy, and insisted on regarding it as an open bid by rival forces for the mastery of Europe, even the *Corriere della Sera*, whose immense influence in Italy is due to the fact that it voices the opinion of the more sober and constructive elements in the country, justified action as follows: 'Politics are the quintessence of egoism, and we are egoists. Let us simply reckon up our rights and our aspirations in relation to our forces.' " Review of *L'Italie et le Conflit Européen (1914-16)*: Jean Alazard, Paris, 1916, by R. W. S. W. *The New Europe*, Vol. IV, September 20, 1917, p. 317.

small. She has no more chance of emulating Rome than has Greece of becoming a second Byzantium or Spain of restoring the empire of Philip the Second. She may possibly succeed in a policy of timid imperialism, in getting and holding the East Adriatic and a part of Asia Minor. To dream of a vast Empire, however, to dissipate her energies in the ambitious project of resurrecting Ancient Rome is not only a perilous task, ludicrously beyond her capacity, but a menace to Italy's neighbours only less serious than to Italy herself.

Today this imperialistic ambition overwhelms millions of Italians. The words *Per la piú grande Italia* are scribbled on blank walls and on infinite reams of patient paper. This conception of a Greater Italy is an ideal of a sort, and, as Mr. Sydney Low approvingly remarks in a fawning book, which one wonders how he could have written, "The ideal is to be attained by the highly practical method of seizing territory, ports, islands, railways, strips of coast-line, naval bases." These imperialists "are dreamers whose heads are not in the clouds, poets who will not be content with a diet of the most inspiring phrases, enthusiasts who mean business."¹

Some of the business, upon which these Italian imperialists are engaged, is legitimate and proper. Italy was not without justification for her hatred of

¹ "Italy in the War," by Sydney Low, New York, 1916, p. 238.

Austria, whose long persecution might in time have been forgotten had not the stupid government of Francis Joseph persisted in petty persecution of the Italians in Trieste, and had not Austria long insisted upon retaining the Trentino, which geographically, ethnologically and economically belongs to Italy. Much of the territory to which Italy has a real right had indeed been promised by Austria as the price of neutrality, but whether Austria could have been trusted to keep her promises, or whether she might not have taken away what she had given under duress, was a serious question.¹

The demands of the extreme Imperialists of Italy, however, went much further. Several of them desired not only the Trentino, Istria and Dalmatia but had lingering hopes of eventually securing Corsica, Savoy, Nice and Tunis from France, Malta from England, and the Ticino from Switzerland. Naturally these latter desires were inopportune, but in their stead, other lands lay at the disposal of the victorious Allies. There was Rhodes lying off the coast of Asia Minor, there were several Ægean islands and there was a large tract of Asiatic Turkey, which might properly fall to Italy. "We trust," said the *Rassegna Nazionale*, in the spring of 1915, "that there will be reserved for us, in the

¹ "Austria had indeed just offered Italy the Trentino, the west bank of the Isonzo, special privileges and full cultural guarantees for all Italians left under Austrian rule, and a free hand for Italy in Albania" Stoddard, p. 168.

Mediterranean, in the *Ægean*, and in Asia Minor, a share proportionate to the requirements of our position.”¹ It was obvious that Italy was still unsatisfied with vast desert Tripoli, which she had recently conquered. She wanted more fertile soils. “There is only one land,” said an Italian writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, “wherein Italy can still hope to found colonies of Italian laborers, and that is Asiatic Turkey.”²

In the end these Italian imperialists captured the government. A protracted bargaining with Austria raised the price which the importunate Allies were willing to pay.³ Finally the terms were accepted and Italy declared war.

Since the bargain was struck, hardly a month has passed that the Allies have not been disagreeably reminded of these pledges.⁴ Uncomfortable indeed

¹ Stoddard, 165.

² Stoddard, 165.

³ “When we review such semi-official press utterances . . . , together with the numberless imperialistic incitements to war . . . , it is difficult not to believe that the Salandra Cabinet had already made up its mind on intervention, and that it was using the negotiations with the Teutonic Powers as part of a clever *combinazione* to extract the largest possible concessions from the Allied Powers, with whom parallel negotiations were going on at the same time.” “Present-Day Europe. Its National States of Mind,” by T. Lathrop Stoddard, New York, 1917, p. 166.

⁴ According to a telegram from Petrograd to the *Manchester Guardian*, December 1, 1917. “A treaty between the Allies and Italy is published today (November 28) according to which Italy receives the Trentino, South Tyrol, Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia, with the neutral zone between the latter region and Serbia. In the south the Adriatic region from the river Planka to the Drina goes to Serbia. Italy receives Vallona and the hinterland. Italy agrees not

are some of the implications of this solemn covenant between the nations fighting for democracy and the Italian Royal Government inspired by sacred egoism. Were Austria willing to make a separate peace, acceptable to England, France and the United States, would Italy consent? Would she not demand a full liquidation of her bond, Istria, Dalmatia and the rest? And if the Allies agree to a partial dismemberment in the interest of Italy, can they refuse the less shadowy claims of Serbia and Roumania? Is any separate peace with Turkey possible which takes from the Turks a part of Asia Minor, and subjects to Italian domination a territory in which there is not even a trace of Italian blood or culture? That way Italy blocks.

Again, take the Balkan situation. Though the question is too complicated to be put into a paragraph, yet according to experts it is believed to have been possible to discover a reasonably satisfactory solution of the problem and to have settled the rival claims of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece along approx-

to oppose England, France, and Russia in the partition of Albania between Montenegro and Serbia, if such be deemed desirable. Italy receives Doddecanese and Adalia in Asiatic Turkey. In the event of British-French colonial expansion in Africa at the expense of Germany, Italy receives compensation in the right to expand the territory of Eritrea, Somaliland, Livia, into the hinterland. England, France, and Russia undertake to support Italy against the Holy See if the latter attempts to take steps toward peace." The full text of this treaty, which was signed on April 26, 1915, by Sir Edward Grey, Cambon, Marquis Imperiali, and Count Benckendorf, is published in full (in English) by the New York *Evening Post*, January 25, 1918.

imately nationalistic lines. Such a settlement would not have been perfect but might at least have promoted peace in that distracted quarter.¹ Had some such arrangement been possible in 1915, the Balkan Confederation might have been restored, the Balkan corridor closed, Turkey isolated, and the war brought a year or more nearer to a conclusion. But against such a solution the claims of the Italian government proved an insuperable obstacle. Italy stood opposed to any solution which would rob her of her desired control of the East Adriatic.²

Among the Allies there are many eloquent and sincere defenders of this narrow policy of Italy. "Egoism," insists M. Bainville, "when it is the egoism of a nation, becomes a duty and a virtue. It becomes purified. Does it not affect the fate of millions of living creatures, millions of millions of men

¹ See for the general outline of such a plan "The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East," by Herbert Adams Gibbons, N. Y., 1917, pp. 194-202.

² "The contemporary school of Italian imperialists have lost their heads entirely. If the statesmen of the Entente Powers had studied closely the literature and the programs of the Dante Alighieri Society and the Dalmatian League, and followed the development of the colonial and irredentist propagandas during the last decade, they would have supported with all their power Signor Giolitti and the non-intervention elements in the spring of 1915." Italy's "active participation in the war on the side of the Entente has been beneficial neither to the Entente nor to Italy. The statesmen of France, Great Britain and Russia have come to realize that Italian irredentists and imperialists are without shame or limit in their ambitions and are incapable of constructive political vision. They have had to yield to Italian demands, though, in order to keep the coalition intact. The result has been the sacrifice of the Serbians and the loss of Greek aid." Gibbons, *op cit.*, pp. 181, 182, 183.

yet to be born? Those Governments which have not this sense of egoism are guilty; they are dangerously mischievous.”

National egoism may be good or bad, wise or foolish, according to the circumstances, though it becomes neither good nor wise by being called sacred. It is, however, an interesting question in international morality at exactly what point the interest of these “millions of living creatures” should be accommodated to the interests of other millions living across the border. To be guided by national egoism alone is to justify the invasion of Belgium, the subjection of minor nationalities, and other acts which nations as egoistic but less frank than Italy have repeatedly committed. It is not for us to pass judgment. We need not answer the question whether Italy was justified in standing upon the side-lines and offering her army and navy at a price. Nor is it our special concern whether in their extremity the Allies, to gain an ally, were justified in making concessions which violated their principles. What does seem evident, however, is that we who were not consulted in all this grandiose huckstering, are not bound by the bargain. We accepted no responsibility. We are fighting for democracy and internationalism and against militarism. We are fighting for the freedom of the Italians of the Trentino and Trieste, as for other oppressed peoples, but we are not fighting for Italian imperialism. We will not

send our young men to die that Italy may rule over the Slavs and Dalmatia.

And this for four reasons. The Italian scheme of conquest is not in the true and permanent interest of Italy herself. A giving to Italy of all that has been promised would mean new wars. The program for which Italy fights is opposed to the ideals for which we fight. Finally to continue the war until Italy gets what she wants is to prolong the contest, to make victory dubious and peace dangerous.

Not that Italy should be content with the ante-bellum conditions. When we consider the magnitude of her emigration we cannot but sympathize with her desire for lands under her own flag to which these emigrants might go. The need of Italy in this respect is far greater than that of Germany. Today there are some six million Italians under foreign flags, or one seventh of the entire Italian people. On the other hand, no one can study contemporary Italian conditions without realizing how immature, politically and economically, the nation is, and therefore how ill-equipped for a stern imperialistic struggle.

The facts, upon which this conclusion is based, lie upon the surface. Italy's excessive death rate, her high, though decreasing, illiteracy rate, the rudimentary character of her national education, the vast amount of her semi-pauperism, her low standards of living, her heavy taxes, her unstable and low-grade

political life, her lack of great resources—all these indicate an internal weakness, as compared with her great imperialistic competitors, a weakness which almost hopelessly handicaps her in her ambitious projects. For Italy to be awarded the East Adriatic might be a curse instead of a blessing. It would create for her what Giolitti called “an inverse irredentism,” forcing her to maintain great armies in order to suppress unruly Slavs. It would mean oppression abroad and reaction at home. It would bring her into eventual conflict with Serbia, with Greece, possibly with greater nations. It might mean defeat, it might even mean catastrophe.

That such a victory would render new wars probable is made evident by present currents of opinion in the peninsula. Italy today hates Serbia more than Germany, and Greece more than Serbia. She distrusts Russia. Her attitude towards the Adriatic Slavs can be read in d’Annunzio’s speeches. Dalmatia, he asserts, “belongs to Italy by human law and divine. Under the Latin rule of Rome, of the Popes and of Venice, as under the barbarian rule of the Goths, the Lombards, the Franks, the Germanic Othos, the Byzantines, the Hungarians, the Austrians, the civil life of yonder shores, like the civil life of our own, has always been Italian in essence and origin. It has been; it is; it will be. Neither the German, coming from the Alps, nor the Slovenian of the Carso, nor the Magyar of La Putza,

nor the Croat, who ignores or falsifies history, nor the Turk, who disguises himself as an Albanian—no one, I say, will succeed in arresting the inevitable rhythm of accomplishment, the Roman rhythm.”¹ Of this Dalmatian population, so confidently annexed, only three per cent is Italian; yet millions of Slavs are to be shut off from the sea in order not to arrest the Roman rhythm. Out of this same fear of a future Slav and Greek opposition, Italy seems to desire that Austria, after being weakened by her, shall be kept strong enough to hold the Balkan peoples in check. She apparently does not desire a dissolution of the Dual Monarchy. She wishes to rest upon the “Austrian cushion” after abstracting as many feathers as she pleases.

The Italian imperialists frankly avow that their demands are opposed to the policies of internationalism, in defence of which we are fighting. Influential elements in the population are strongly in sympathy with German militarism and envy Germany’s army and the power which brought her great plans of expansion within the expectation of success. The Italian program is like the German; it takes no account of the rights of lesser nationalities, or of the economic demands of German and Slavic *Hinterlaender* which it would deprive of their outlet by an occupation of Trieste and the East Adriatic.

¹ Bainville, op. cit., pp. 254–5.

Finally to satisfy Italy's ambitions means to prolong the war. Nothing has so strengthened the resistance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as the unjust and unreasonable Italian demand for the cession to her of territories inhabited by Slavs. "Instead of coming into the war as the open friend of all oppressed Habsburg peoples, Italy allowed it to appear that for some of them her victory would mean not freedom but merely a change of masters; and that others who might escape her rule—a rule as alien to them as that of Austria—would find her opposed to a realization of their national ideal of independence and union with their kith and kin. Every attack in the Italian press upon the Southern Slavs, every allusion to 'the Croats, the Cossacks of Austria,' every denunciation of Southern Slav exiles as 'the paid agents of Austria,' has, under skilful Austrian manipulation, reacted to the military disadvantage of Italy."¹ These ambitions mean a more desperate Austrian resistance, a longer war, and as a consequence greater sacrifices from America and the Allies. But on what principle can Italy appeal to us to make sacrifices for her imperialism? How can she demand from us an ungrudging generosity to further her own sacred egoism?

There are men in Italy of exactly the same opinion. The opposition to imperialism, strong in 1915, still exists. It has even been increased by the events of

¹ *The New Europe*, Vol. IV, July 19, 1917.

the war. There have been no great victories and there have been disastrous defeats. The economic conditions are bad. Food is dear and coal scarce, while the small success of the domestic war loans reveals a disquieting lack of confidence. Imperialism is on trial, as in Germany. Indeed the situation of the government is similar to that of the German government, and in either country a complete victory might prove a menace to a healthy democratic development. To save itself the Government *must* win. Otherwise it goes down in disgrace, and even the Monarchy might not survive. The government is therefore desperate. It opposes any Anglo-French leaning towards a Greater Serbia, which would lessen Italy's gains; it attacks any co-operation with Greece which would give that country lands that Italy covets; it protests; it threatens. It has chosen the imperialistic path and dares not wander from that path. It fears to disappoint the ardent hopes it has itself evoked.

The American people, like all other nations, owe infinitely much to Italy, to her art, her literature, her culture, to the hardiness of her adventurers, from the days of Columbus to the day before yesterday when millions of Italians came to build our railroads, work our mines, and enter and enrich our civilization. We have only admiration and affection for the Italian people, so lately emerged from foreign subjection and political oppression. We sympathize

with Italy's heroic effort to achieve her independence, to educate her people and take her true place among the civilizing peoples. But Italy's imperialism is nothing to us. We do not desire her dominion of the Adriatic or of the Mediterranean.¹ We could not if we wished revive the dominion of Venice which ended when the Byzantine Empire was destroyed and America discovered. The Republic of Venice is dead, and the Italians of the Twentieth Century have quite other tasks than to resurrect it, and should have other preoccupations.

Italy is a case in point. Italian imperialism is much less menacing than is that of Germany, but it is also a menace, and spiritually of the same quality. It is one of the things to which we are, or should be, opposed. To fight for Italian imperialism, or for Russian, French, British or American imperialism, is to fight against internationalism. To fight in order that Italy may obtain Dalmatia and Asia Minor, to rule over Slavs and Austrians, to maintain her *imperium* by means of the sword is no way in which to make the world safe for democracy.

Italy has sought to bargain away her future secur-

¹ It must be admitted, however, that to Italy a domination of the Adriatic by any foreign power would be a menace in exactly the same manner (and to an even great extent) as the control of the Caribbean by Germany would be a menace to the United States. But a domination by Italy of the Adriatic would be equally intolerable to her neighbours. Until some international system can be created that will adequately protect the interests of all adjacent nations no solution of the Adriatic problem is at all possible.

ity for an imperialistic mess, which she cannot hope to digest. It would be better for her and better for the world if she returned to her sanity, if she surrendered her extreme pretensions and made a renunciation, while there is still virtue in it. The true interest of Italy, as of other states, lies in an internationalism which will safeguard her and us and all nations, and not in an imperialism, doomed to exhaust her strength and destroy her idealism and to end in wars in which her feebleness will fare hard in a life and death contest with stronger powers. The earthen pot has no place among these crushing iron vessels.

CHAPTER VII

AMERICA AS ARBITER

IN one of the ablest books that have appeared during the war the English internationalist, Mr. Henry Noel Brailsford, speaks as follows concerning the entrance of the United States into the world conflict: "It may be said that America is no longer the impartial and uncommitted Power, which might, by its balancing weight, render a League of Nations workable during the first difficult years. The loss is only apparent, for the neutrality of America was always differential. On the other hand, though her view on the broad issues of the war is decided and clear, she is not, nor will she become, an interested partisan, enmeshed in the territorial questions and the military issues of the European Balance of Power. Her influence as a moderating force remains uncompromised."¹

Since Mr. Brailsford wrote his book, President Wilson has taken several long steps towards acting as moderator or arbitrator between the more advanced claims of our Allies and our enemies. From the beginning America refrained from entering a formal alliance with our co-belligerents. We were

¹ "The League of Nations," by Henry Noel Brailsford, London, 1917, p. vi.

willing to concert our military efforts and to adjust the distribution of our capital, food and military supplies, but we refused to tie our hands by agreements already made with regard to the individual ambitions of these Powers. We retained our liberty of action. Furthermore, in his Reply to the Pope Mr. Wilson differentiated our American war purposes from those of other enemies of Germany. He declared himself against "political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others." He opposed "vindictive action of any sort or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury," as well as any "reprisal upon the German people." He set his face against "punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive leagues." Speaking for the United States, Mr. Wilson agreed to enter into peace negotiations upon generous terms with a democratized and responsible German government.

The Reply to the Pope was only the beginning of this form of negotiation between the United States and Germany and between the United States and her co-belligerents. In a series of messages the President, despite a few regressions, moved towards an outlining in concrete terms of a moderate and liberal peace, not based upon conquest or even upon the assertion of military superiority, but upon a state of Europe and the world, in which internationalism

and progress towards democracy would be possible. Finally on January 8th, 1918, he outlined the American demands in terms more definite and language more explicit than had yet been used by any responsible head of a government. These terms provided for open diplomacy, the freedom of the seas, the establishment of trade equality, the reduction of armaments, the adjustment of colonial claims with regard to the wishes of the inhabitants, the indemnification of Belgium, a league of nations to enforce specific agreements, autonomy for oppressed nationalities, as well as changes in national frontiers along approximately nationalistic lines. It is true that this public statement of President Wilson, like all statements of terms, retains a certain nimbus of ambiguity, and has been variously interpreted. But no one can escape its conciliatory spirit. A truly democratic Germany might find these terms acceptable or unacceptable, but could not discern in them any desire to crush or humiliate. The note is a test of the repeated protestations of pacific intent of the Imperial German Government.¹

To what extent we have as yet advanced in the several countries toward a composition of differences it is difficult to determine. What informal and unofficial negotiations or interrogatories, if any, are in progress we cannot pretend to know. The casual

¹ See also President Wilson's February note, outlining the four principles of settlement.

colloquies between unacknowledged representatives of the belligerent powers are not made public and we never see the successive steps but only the end. Nor is a real advance towards a mutual understanding always recognized as such, for every statement issued by each belligerent is capable of a wide range of possible interpretation and a promise is often couched in the form of a threat.

It is a rarefied atmosphere in which we here move and one in which it is difficult to measure progress or note direction. Yet the essential fact remains that one nation, the United States, preserves its liberty of negotiation. By this it is not meant that we alone have been the moderators of this war. A far stronger impulse to a liberalization of the war came from Russia, and a statement, quite as clear as any that we have made, and equally liberal in spirit, issued from the British Labour Party. But there is a vast distinction between a Labour Party, however powerful, and the government of a sovereign nation of one hundred millions, and there is an equally wide gulf between the Russian influence, as it was exerted in January, 1918, and that of the United States. To a considerable degree Russia's influence, like ours before we entered the war, was moral, her military weakness robbing her decisions of all physical sanction. On the other hand, America has both a moral and a physical influence, the latter being enforced by economic and military weapons. The nation is un-

bound, disinterested, powerful, and free to deal diplomatically with both sides.¹

Had it been Japan, Roumania or Italy which had preserved such an independence, the influence upon a future peace would have been less potent and less salutary. None of these nations can effect a decision in this war, which would go on despite their defection.² Moreover, none of these Powers would have used its freedom to seek a permanent and universal peace. America is in different case. She can exert a powerful influence upon the whole course of peace negotiations because of her unexcelled strategic position.

That position results from several factors, the greatest of which is our relative security. Of all belligerents we are the most immune from serious German attack, since Germany cannot assail us except after the overthrow of the other Powers. In that sense, though not intentionally, the Allies,

¹ As this book goes to press (March 9, 1918) the strategic position in the war held by the United States from April to October, 1917 (and, in some sense, even up to the beginning of February, 1918), has been temporarily, and, perhaps, permanently destroyed. So long as Russia remained an ally, America occupied a middle ground. She could act with democratic Russia and use the joint influence of the two nations to compel a re-statement of Allied peace terms and a liberalization of the war. She could appeal to democratic sentiment both in Allied and in enemy lands. With the loss of Russia and, as a consequence of Roumania, the German government is strengthened, the German liberal sentiment is weakened, and the former advantageous position of the United States is lost. America is far less able to make up for a possible new defection of an ally than she was during the period in which Russia was in the war.

² See note above.

before the period of our neutrality, were fighting our battle. Nor do we enter into German animosities and plans of conquest to the same degree or with the same immediacy as do England, France and Russia. We still preserve a remnant of our former physical and moral isolation.

Moreover, America is the least exhausted of the belligerent nations. Having just begun to fight, our military strength is on a sharply ascending curve. With our surplus food, war materials and money, we are more indispensable to our Allies than they to us. We could better survive a drawn battle or even a German victory than could France, Great Britain or Italy.

Finally, our strategic position is enhanced by our having no obvious, direct, material interest in the war. We have the freedom of wanting nothing. Undoubtedly certain individuals and groups in America do profit by the conflict, but as affecting the nation's present determination to fight, these profits are incidental and are largely to be diverted to meet war expenses. Our true interests in the war are broader and less tangible than those imputed. We have in internationalism and peace a valuable, substantial and permanent interest, and we cannot afford to have that interest destroyed by a militaristic Germany. But we have no ax to grind, no special national interest to subserve as opposed to the common interest. We are therefore

in a better position to represent and pursue that common interest.

It follows that our American policy should be so to moderate and transform the war aims of our Allies, so to revise the terms upon which they will cease from fighting that we may win over the democratic elements in Germany and thus aid them to overcome their militarist groups. Upon a peace so obtained we may lay the foundations of a new international order. We are seeking the higher path for the nations by attempting to block the lower paths.

But we can accomplish this, as our past efforts have shown, only against the will not only of our enemies but of influential groups among our Allies.

In every alliance, as in each individual nation, we discover a conflict of aims. In England there are democrats and internationalists on one side and imperialists on the other, and France, Italy, Russia, the United States, as well as Germany and Austria, reveal similar cleavages. Within every country the relative strength of the two groups varies. In Japan, for example, the preponderance of power lies in the hands of men who seek purely nationalistic aims, whereas in America the weight of influence lies with the opposite group. The main cleavage in the struggle for internationalism and democracy is not between nations. Men find their natural allies among the populations against whom they fight.

A war policy, inspired by internationalism, there-

fore, should seek to enlist behind its program all the progressive forces on both sides of the fighting line.

It will doubtless be urged against such a policy that it is impossible within the frame-work of an alliance. It will be urged that our concert with our co-belligerents, the very instrument by which we are to accomplish our purpose, will be destroyed if we in America insist upon plans antagonistic to those of our Allies. Without unity of conception and purpose among its members no coalition can endure. Thus in 1914 the union between Austria and Italy broke down utterly because in a matter vital to both the two allies were fundamentally opposed. Therefore caution must be exercised in every league, all useless recriminations avoided, and even fair criticism on points not essential minimized. If Allies are to pull together, good nature, generosity, a willingness to forego minor rights and unimportant precedences, a greater readiness to praise than blame, are indispensable. Each ally must be expected to "swallow" a good deal.

This very care, however, with which we must respect the rights and susceptibilities of our Allies reveals more than do the terms of any treaty the real nature and essential weakness of the bonds that unite. An alliance is a compromise. It is a union of nations with diverse and even opposed interests on the assumption that larger interests will be con-

served or gained by the union than will be lost. The more accurately these rival interests are adjusted the more effective the alliance.

Almost every coalition, however, develops a tendency towards internal strain and fissure. Though in the First Balkan War Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia were able to agree upon a common policy; the real opposition of their ambitions was tragically revealed in the Second Balkan War. Today a similar conflict of interest lies hidden in both alliances. Bulgaria and Austria have interests not identical with those of Germany. France has no interest in Italian claims in Dalmatia, and Serbia is bitterly opposed to them. Russia and Roumania have found it difficult to agree. None of the Allies is over-anxious to keep Japan in Shantung. The whole alliance is an unstable equilibrium, maintained only by fear of a formidable enemy.

When we reflect that almost every coalition is thus a log-rolling arrangement, insecure in direct proportion to its freedom from outside pressure, we are forced to recognize that any reform in an *entente* can be secured only at the cost of internal friction. The cost and danger of this friction must be set against the value of the object sought. We have no right to jeopardize harmony for any trivial gain. We must not use our freedom of action to injure our co-belligerents, to aid the enemy, to disrupt the Alliance. In honour and decency we are bound not

to make sudden and unheralded decisions, but must enforce our policy with forewarning and tact. On the other hand, we dare not surrender the real purposes for which we entered the war in order to maintain the adhesion of nations and groups opposed to those purposes.

What, then, concretely, is the method which America should pursue? How are we to further clear up the issues? How remove or lessen the war's aggressive, imperialistic features and make the conflict in fact a war for democracy, internationalism and peace?

Our first great opportunity to secure an assimilation of the aims of our Allies to our own principles arose before we declared war. If in March, 1917, we had made our entrance into the struggle upon the side of the Allies contingent upon their agreeing with us upon a set of war aims, which would really lead to a peace based upon internationalism, we should have been in a far better position to carry our point than we have been at any subsequent time. The Allies needed our aid far more than we ourselves knew, and doubtless they would have been willing to make terms with us as they made terms (of quite a different character) with Italy and Roumania. Until they agreed to our conditions, at least in principle, we might have armed and prepared for war without any actual declaration. Entering the war on these terms we should have been able to prove to Russia that the

Alliance was not imperialistic and to German democrats that the Alliance had no intention of crushing Germany. The Allies might well have granted to us as the price of our adhesion what they were unwilling to concede once we had declared war without conditions.

Having missed this opportunity we cannot do better than to continue in the path we have already chosen of defining our own national policy in detail and seeking to win over our co-belligerents to the same general program.

We may do this in several ways. A convention of the Allied Powers may be called to revise war aims, or there may be an exchange of notes with those Powers for the elimination of extreme demands. Finally we may publicly set forth our own policy towards the war, a precise, emphatic and unambiguous statement of the things for which America will fight and of the things for which she will not fight, leaving perhaps certain matters to future negotiation.

The first and second plans are more desirable than the third, since they constitute an action within the *cadre* of the Alliance. The third should not be tried if it can be avoided. The more our policy is one of persuasion and not of coercion the better.

Is any coercion, resulting from a limitation of our war aims, moral? And can we carry out such a program? Will the mere attempt split up the

Alliance, assure a German victory, and defeat the purposes for which we entered the war?

Not only is such a policy not immoral, but no other policy is moral. Though the Allies may use our armies and navy and draw upon our food, munitions and credit, they may not control our fundamental purposes. It would be unworthy of us not to take our full share in the struggle, to fight with one hand, to save our own men and let our Allies be killed in their stead. It would be immoral, as well as unwise, to escape our burden or postpone our assistance. But we are neither obliged to fight, nor justified in fighting, for things to which we are actually opposed. Nor is such refusal a disadvantage to our Allies; in the long run it is in their own interest. Peace and security are better for them than an increase of territory or payments of money.

Whether such a policy is in itself dangerous to the Alliance and to our own purposes is a question requiring consideration. Clearly tact, caution and candour are necessary, since any mistake would be exploited by a resourceful enemy. Time and occasion are of the essence of the problem. Much depends upon the forces in control of the Central Alliance and also upon the internal Balance of Power within our own group. Had the Allies in January, 1917, declared that they would not insist upon Russian conquests in the Turkish Empire, the Czar might have concluded a separate peace. At

that time, when the Entente could be maintained only by the assistance of land-hungry Powers, and a triumphant and unregenerate Germany was striving to disintegrate the alliance against her, any revision of terms likely to disappoint any ally might have spelled disruption and defeat. Because it was inopportune, President Wilson's December request that the Allies state their terms resulted in only an exaggeration of their demands. But after the Russian Revolution the situation changed. The New Russia was opposed to conquest, and the adhesion of America to the Alliance tended to make the defection of one or more of the smaller powers less dangerous.

The conditions for an explicit and detailed statement of liberal terms, not only by the United States but by all the Allies jointly, are already present. In the first place, the desire for peace seems to be growing in Germany, and is especially insistent in Austria. The Revolution in Russia has introduced a new factor making for internationalism, and America's entry into the war contributes to the same result. We are today in a position to urge upon the world a peace of internationalism. The Alliance will bear the strain.¹

For the morality of any alliance is that of the least moral (or most necessitous) nation essential to the alliance and capable of deserting. If today Japan could safely and profitably withdraw, and

¹ See, however, note on page 143.

leave her Allies to the certainty of defeat, it might be incumbent upon them to make all possible concessions to her to prevent this catastrophe. If, however, as a result of changed conditions, Japan were no longer indispensable, if she were unable to cause the Allies greater damage by withdrawal than she caused herself, her bargaining power would be less. The importance of this point cannot be over-emphasized; the effective resistance of any one ally to a policy which threatens to deprive it of anticipated war gains is measured exactly by that nation's nuisance value, by the amount of injury it can safely inflict by defection or by an actual union with an enemy bent on conquest. In other words, each nation relies upon its irreplaceability to extort the sort of peace it desires.

It will be urged that it also relies upon solemn agreements entered into by the Allies among themselves. Italy and Roumania have sacrificed much; can England and France treat their promises to these Allies as "scraps of paper"? But if the United States, which was not a party, refuses to fight for the fulfilment of those secret engagements, and if without her assistance England and France cannot bring about conditions under which the promises can be redeemed, what is to be done? They are offers, like Germany's offer of Arizona to Mexico, worthless unless fulfilled. Assuming that Germany does not suddenly collapse, Italy can hardly hope to gain all

that has been promised her without America's aid. We will not accept this burden. We are more likely to end the war when the international purposes for which we entered it are achieved. As far as we are concerned, the general nature of the peace we desire has been outlined by Mr. Wilson in his January and February (1918) notes. Whether in the near future we can impose these general principles upon the Allies will depend, first, upon Germany's attitude, and, secondly, upon the nuisance value of various imperialistic groups controlling national policies within the Alliance itself. Which of these Allies, by making peace with Germany, or even aiding that nation, can prohibit the adoption of such a program?

Clearly Great Britain cannot make a separate peace, and would not if she could. A victory for Germany would mean for her a partial eclipse. France cannot make a separate treaty more valuable to her than the peace that we seek. Belgium has nothing with which to make terms, and in any case would gain all that she wants from a peace for which America is willing to fight. Serbia, Montenegro and Portugal are negligible, as far as discretion in peace making goes. Democratic Russia may make a separate peace, but not because of any refusal on our part to fight for imperialistic aims. There remain Italy and Japan. It is possible that Italian imperialists are already reconciling themselves to a limitation of nationalistic aims (with which Italian

democrats have never been in sympathy), and even if an imperialistic government were tempted to make a separate peace rather than surrender promised territories, it would hesitate. By ceasing hostilities Italy would release hundreds of thousands of Austrian troops. But in the long run she would lose. Better for her to gain little from an Allied victory than eventually to lose all, since if Germany wins Italy becomes little better than a vassal state.¹

The situation of Japan is anomalous. The Island Empire has been taught imperialism in the bitter and unscrupulous conflict of Europe in the Far East, and she has learned not to be too magnanimous. Her own necessities and the aggressions of the European nations have forced her also to be aggressive. She hurriedly entered the war for very concrete national purposes, and in the apparent belief that the contest would be short and that the Central Empires would soon collapse. When Germany proved stronger than

¹ As yet (March 9, 1918) no revision of the Italian treaty has been made. "Lord R. Cecil, speaking on the subject of secret treaties, contended that they were thoroughly justifiable in the circumstances, and that so long as they exist we are bound by them. It seemed to him, when asked to repudiate them, that the pacifists did not understand the elements of their own creed, for how should we make any progress in international affairs unless we regarded such obligations as sacred? (Cheers.) These treaties were entered into for obvious reasons. ("Annexation.") Not at all; they were undertaken as part of the war measures of this country. He knew how much these treaties lent themselves to misrepresentation, and that they were not popular, but a Government which for that reason would not do what they thought right was unfit to hold office." *Manchester Guardian*, February 14, 1918.

had been expected, Japan hesitated. She remained technically an ally but morally she became an interested neutral. Today, having no international purposes to serve in the war, her interest would seem to lie in a long and indecisive conflict, in a permanent balancing of opposed European forces, which would give her a free hand in Asia. Conditions determine her policy. Fortunately for the Allies, however, Japan's power depends upon her commerce and navy, and the vast preponderance of naval power lies with the enemies of Germany. Japan, even though she wished to do so, and that itself is extremely doubtful, would hesitate to change sides, whatever the provocation, so long as Russia held and the Allies maintained control of the sea and of the world's markets. Though a disappointed Japan might damage the Allies, it would be only at an excessive cost to herself. She can gain more from the grudging generosity of the sea powers than from any promise of eventual benefit from the enemy. Even if her defection threw the war to Germany, she herself would suffer too much from the hostility of nearer neighbours to render such a venture wise.¹

¹ Today (March 9, 1918) this situation has largely changed because Russia has not "held." Japan's strategic position, weakened by America's entrance into the war, has been enormously strengthened by the dissolution of Russia. As a consequence we find Japan proposing an invasion of Siberia, and England, France and Italy vociferously applauding. Whether the assent of these Powers to Japan's proposal resulted from fear we are in no position to state. It seems probable, however, that only dire necessity reconciled the

Thus the situation so shapes itself as to open up the possibility of America's further carrying out a policy of destroying the imperialistic character of the war and of converting it into a real war for democracy and internationalism.

West-European Powers to this proposed invasion of Siberia, which is likely to alienate Russia, deflect Japanese shipping from the international trade and, perhaps, in the end, to lead to a community of interests between Japan and Germany.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TRUE ALIGNMENT

“IN the peace to be concluded we demand an international arrangement for general disarmament, as being the chief means of strengthening the debilitated states. General disarmament is the only way to break any militarist supremacy and to secure a lasting and peaceful understanding between the nations.

“We demand the fullest freedom for international trade and intercourse, as well as an unlimited right of migration. We condemn any economic barriers or any economic struggle between states.

“All disputes between states must be settled by compulsory international arbitration.

“Equal rights should be granted for all the inhabitants of any country without regard to tongue, race or religion. This would also mean the securing to national minorities the right to develop their national life.

“With all firmness we object to the violation in any form of any nation.

“The re-establishment of Serbia as a self-governing, independent state is our absolute demand.

“We understand the deep feeling of the Poles

for national unity. To admit the right of Russian Poland to national independence but to deny that same right to Prussian and Austrian Poland is contradictory.

“The full independence and economic self-dependence (i. e., freedom from economic interference) of Belgium is inevitable. In fulfilment of the German government’s promise at the beginning of the war, the Belgian nation has to be compensated for the damage caused by the war, and especially for the economic values that have been taken away. Such a repayment has nothing to do with the various kinds of indemnities, which simply mean the plundering of the vanquished by the victor, and which we therefore reject.”¹

The memorandum from which the above is quoted is not a British, French, Russian or American manifesto, but was written and endorsed by Germans. It is the deliberate statement of principles and aims by the German Minority Socialists, and it represents the views of hundreds of thousands of workers in

¹ Extract from the Memorandum of the German Minority Socialists in reply to the questionnaire of the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee. This memorandum, which was not allowed to be circulated in Germany, can be read in full (in English) in the *New York Tribune*, Aug. 12, 1917. See also the Statement of the Austrian Socialist Delegates, as well as the Statement of the Hungarian Socialist Delegates (to the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee), translated from the *Holland News*, Review of the *Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad* (June 20, 1917) and published in *Approaches to the Great Settlement* by Professor Emily Balch, New York, 1918, pp. 186 to 193 conclusive. Through the courtesy of Professor Balch the present author was permitted to read her book in proof.

Leipzig and Chemnitz, in Berlin and Jena and in all the great industrial centres of the Empire. Demanding that Belgium be evacuated and indemnified, that Prussian Poland be turned over to an independent Polish Commonwealth, that Germany (as well as her allies and enemies) refrain from making conquests and exacting indemnities, insisting, finally, on the establishment of a democratic international system, this memorandum stands on a complete parity with the declarations of the most liberal and progressive elements in the Allied nations. Between the Junkers and the German Minority Socialists there is as wide a gulf as between any two groups in Europe. They are both German, but are at opposite poles.

We are likely to ignore the obvious fact that not all Germans are alike, that a nation is a very composite and heterogeneous thing, a vast agglomeration of unlike and even antagonistic groups.

In war times especially we tend to think of a nation as a unit for the reason that it fights as a unit. A new solidarity springs up. Rich man, poor man, beggar-man, thief; philanthropist and pickpocket, society lady and kitchen maid, banker and janitor, seem to be fused by compulsion, conviction and mob psychology. The nation becomes a regimented thing and the most unlike citizens are apparently reduced to a common denominator. It is a Procrustean process by which those who stand too high above

the crowd have their feet or heads cut off and those who are too small for the general patriotic sentiment are painfully stretched. By one means or another, however, the society achieves, if not an intellectual uniformity, at least a unanimity of response to a few simple appeals.

In countries with astute and powerful autocracies this process of intellectual regimentation usually takes place more completely than in democratic countries. The pacifist, the conscientious objector and the protestants of all sorts disappear beneath the surface of the national consciousness. Rapidly the nation becomes intolerant and united. This more rapid cohesion of divergent groups constitutes a great advantage for a nation like Germany, and, parenthetically, a corresponding menace to neighbouring democracies. For the true progress of democracy depends upon the maintenance of an intellectual independence among its groups, and this becomes an obstacle to the instantaneous mobilization of public opinion, to that concentration and intensification of the general mind, which accompanies every great war, just or unjust. If the democratic nations are to live within the constant menace of sudden war, they must either adapt themselves to the German system or prevent Germany from maintaining conditions which permit so instantaneous a mobilization.

Yet in all countries, democratic and autocratic, we

find dissent, and, as the German Minority Socialist memorandum and many other facts prove, the regimentation of thought turns out to be in part a suppression rather than a destruction of differences. Latent, these differences reappear when a crucial issue is raised. On the question of repelling invaders, all Frenchmen stand united, but on whether France should fight for an indemnity, or even to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine, divergences appear. The same is true of the public opinion of Great Britain, Russia, Italy, the United States, Germany and Austria. All Germans are determined that their country shall not be crushed, but over the issue whether Germany should war for conquests there is the gravest conflict.

The issue of internationalism versus militarism uncovers, therefore, a new cleavage, cutting athwart the alignment between the hostile nations. Upon this issue British Liberals and German Liberals stand closer together than do British Liberals and Conservatives or German Liberals and Conservatives. So long as the war remains a war for national security each nation is compacted and indivisible. As soon, however, as men fight for principles, those of one type, irrespective of nationality, range themselves against those of another, for opinions, beliefs, and traditions are partly independent of frontiers.

This fact influences the relations of American liberals to all the peoples at war. In actual fighting

our Allies are certain nations with definite geographical boundaries. These nations may be democratic, semi-democratic or undemocratic. On the other hand, in our effort to achieve our ultimate purposes in the war, our Allies are found among the democratic elements in all countries.

Not all the tories are in Germany. They abound and multiply in every country where conditions are favourable to their survival, and they are found in democratic nations as well as in those ruled by autocrats. When, for example, in August, 1917, President Wilson demanded democratization in Germany and promised a non-punitive peace, he proposed a general test of liberalism. Immediately the majority of German papers described his message as insolent, stupid, "grotesque nonsense," but the Social-journal *Vorwärts* gave its immediate adhesion. It insisted that "it would be unworthy" of Germany "to refuse to give the guarantees demanded by Mr. Wilson." In other words, certain groups in Germany vaguely recognized that American democrats were fighting for principles by which they themselves had long been inspired. Similarly, a few isolated Hungarian journals praised the note, which also found wide favour with British and French liberal journals. On the other hand, certain Tory papers of London found this democratic message less to their taste. Said the *Saturday Review*: "No punitive damages, no dismemberment of empires, no eco-

conomic boycott, these three negatives are an epitome of what the representative of the United States will say when peace comes to be seriously discussed. But these three negatives bar the war aims of England, France, and Italy, as up to date they have been formulated by their statesmen.”¹

The issue is not yet clearly drawn, but as it becomes sharper it will be obvious that although we are fighting Germany and aiding Great Britain, we are in our final policy in closer union with the *Vorwärts* of Berlin than with the *Saturday Review* of London.

Our policy, therefore, aims at the ultimate union of all the democratic groups. Unfortunately these groups, upon which we must build in formulating a peace based upon internationalism, are not clearly defined. Men are not militarists or pacifists through and through, but in tens of millions of cases the same man is one or the other, according to changing conditions. The ordinary man who has boasted of his pacifism will fight on occasion, and if the fighting goes well may not even be averse to his country's gaining something from the war. On the other hand, in certain circumstances the militarists, the instinctive fighters and the whole little world of “bloody-minded Sir Lucius O'Triggers” are now and again anxious for peace. Millions of men swing from one attitude to the other. Still, certain economic and

¹ *Saturday Review*, Vol. 124, September 8, 1917, p. 177.

intellectual groups in each nation incline to a policy of conquest, imperialism and aggression, while other groups incline to one of internationalism and peace. What is needed for an international policy is the unification and crystallization of a mass of diverse elements in the various countries.

The adhesion of many differing groups in countries at war with each other, however, is not easy to compass. For a policy of conquest nothing is needed but the unity of a single nation, and this can be secured by a stirring appeal to tradition and patriotism. Each nation has long been taught to hold itself intellectually apart from other nations, and the war instinct is not only ancient and powerful, but is cultivated by strong class interests and is stimulated by a government, expressing the national unity and controlling the sources of information upon which public opinion is based. International jealousy, malice, misrepresentation, all of which flourish luxuriantly in wartime, work in favour of a policy of national aggression. On the other hand, a desire for internationalism, a new and weak desire at best, cannot become effective until it brings about a coalition of groups in hostile countries, groups which do not always understand each other, do not speak the same language and are not, in war time, permitted to come together to discuss issues or seek an international solidarity.

Moreover, in very few countries are these groups given as full freedom of expression as are those which are frankly imperialistic. The German Government suppresses the memorandum of the Minority Socialists, censors liberal papers and incarcerates men like Liebknecht, while rabid annexationists are permitted the utmost freedom of speech. Nor have the Allied states always encouraged those of their citizens who seek to meet the enemy and by discussion to arrive at a common basis, whereas they have given full sway to those who threaten and endeavour to terrify the enemy. The *Daily Mail* and the *Morning Post* of London have always been permitted to be sent abroad, although it is by quoting from journals like these that German imperialists attempt to prove to their people that the Allies wish to crush them. On the other hand, liberal papers like *The Nation* (of London) are often considered too dangerous to export. "One might assume," remarks Mr. Norman Angell . . . "that the foreign circulation of this latter group—Socialist papers, or Liberal journals in favor of a moderate settlement—would be encouraged. In every case, however, it is these papers that the various Censorships prevent from going abroad, that they sometimes suppress at home and always discourage. It is the former group," (journals favouring a punitive and severe settlement with Germany), it is these journals that are

“used by the enemy governments, that are immune from such prohibition or embarrassment.”¹

Perhaps we should not blame the poor censor too harshly. After all, he is only expressing the general intolerance and nervous irritability of the war temper. Like the common run of men, the censor, even though he be a mild-mannered man, cannot conceive of a nation at once energized for war and receptive to proposals of peace. To think of peace, to think even of the true objects of the war, seem to him relaxing and weakening. Let jingoes and imperialists, the men who love war or the profits of war, whip us into a frenzy, but let those who think in terms of ultimate reconciliation and world-reorganization be shamed and silenced.

Fortunately, however, the mere instinctive fighting temper is mortal, and as this first mood passes serious men begin to reflect upon the war, and to envisage it in a larger way than is at first possible. The sheer duration of the conflict makes for a revision of judgments. Thus it happens that powerful forces in all belligerent countries tend to create a union of like-minded groups disposed toward the attainment of a permanent international organization. One of these forces is war-weariness. To disgust with the slaughter, waste and brutality of the war, there is added a sense of its

¹ Norman Angell. Introduction to “Approaches to the Great Settlement,” by Emily Greene Balch, New York, 1918, p. 7.

futility, its essential indecisiveness, its moral ineffectiveness. The feeling is gaining ground, moreover, that whatever the war's immediate occasion, its ultimate cause—the outstanding fact which made it sooner or later inevitable—was the international anarchy in which the nations have so long lived. There is no desire among democrats to repeat the ghastly struggle, to begin other wars when this war is ended. And such new conflicts must inevitably occur unless a real solution is found for our international problems. Not alone and not automatically will the war bring internationalism and peace. “War can do many things,” says Bernard Shaw, “but it cannot end war.” Only a peace, informed by a spirit of internationalism, can lead to this result. If we leave the making and keeping of peace to the ultra-nationalists we shall have had the war for our pains.

When we look about the world for the allies of internationalism, therefore, we find them in the democratic, liberal and socialistic groups of all nations. These groups desire a fair peace, though they differ as to what the words mean. In principle and from interest these groups are opposed to the militaristic classes in their own nations. They are interested in economic development, social betterment, progress through free international intercourse, and are of necessity opposed to a destruction of their industrial and social life by war, though

they are not opposed to every war. Politically they are the enemies of those exploitative groups which maintain power by an appeal to the war spirit and to international jealousy. The democratic classes were forced into the present war through the breakdown of the old industrial system under which they lived. That system was excessively nationalistic, was based on an economic competition between nations, which inevitably led to war. So long as there existed a cut-throat competition in trade and armaments, each group of producers, however naturally pacific, was pushed towards war. But even while going to war all these groups vaguely apprehended the possibility of a better system, in which industry could develop, nations expand and democracy live without incessant conflict.

The intellectual chasm between these groups of democrats and the opposed groups of militarists and reactionaries is wide and deep. "The difference between those who believe and those who disbelieve in the Stockholm idea," says a writer in the (London) *Nation Supplement* of October, 1917, "is so tremendous that one fears to appear exaggerated and hysterical by stating it. If one begins by saying that it is the difference between 'open diplomacy' and 'secret diplomacy' one has only touched the fringe of the truth; it is the difference between a secret peace, between an armed peace and a people's peace, between the dry bones of the eighteenth century and

the fresh hopes of a new generation, between 'The Prince' of Machiavelli and the Sermon on the Mount. There are, in fact, two irreconcilable worlds—the world of Willy and Nicky, of the Congress of Vienna, the Congress of Paris, the Congress of Berlin, the Triple Alliance, the Dual Alliance, the Triple Entente, the Congress of Algeciras, and the world still struggling to be born in the Conference which never met at Stockholm. Sweep away all the deadwood of political phrases, and you find that the two worlds are based on two irreconcilable ideals—the ideal of international competition and the ideal of international co-operation. Therefore, the question as to which ideal and which world will issue victorious out of the war depends simply on the question what it is that we believe and what it is that we want.”¹

In Germany we find this cleavage between the groups extremely sharp. On the one hand we have the left wing of the socialists who desire a peace without annexations or indemnities and are striving to attain an international organization. On the other hand, in no other country have we so strong and violent a group of expansionists and imperialists. Between these extremes we find the Majority Socialists, the Radicals and Liberals and a large section of the Catholics, all of which groups united in the adoption of the Reichstag declaration of July 19, 1917. In Austria and even in Hungary, as also

¹ "War and Peace," *The Nation Supplement*, October, 1917.

in France, Italy, England and America, we find the same general cleavage.

In this alignment we often find men of different social classes united and men of the same social class disunited. Of two brothers, both carpenters or peasants, one may be an imperialist and the other an internationalist. Upon the whole, however, the centre and core of the democratic international movement in each country lies in the labour group.

During the last forty years these labour groups have developed a strong interest in internationalism, due in part to economic conditions. Long before Karl Marx urged proletarians of all lands to unite, and ever since, the wage-earners of each country, recognizing their similarity of position with wage-earners in other lands, have developed a certain degree of international consciousness. They have discovered that the workers in one land are affected favourably or unfavourably by the same circumstances that affect their fellows in foreign lands. A rise of wages in Germany accrues indirectly to the benefit of the British workman, and vice versa, and many have been the attempts made to secure a co-operation between British, French and German workmen, in the matter of wages, hours of labour, factory protection, social legislation and other conditions. There has steadily grown up an international labour legislation which has had the indirect effect of increasing the number of those

wage-earners in various countries who perceived that they had interests in common. It is, of course, not to be denied that the wage-earners of one nation may benefit at the expense of those of another, as when by means of a protective tariff a given industry is destroyed in Austria or Switzerland and is re-established in the United States. On the whole, however, the wage-earners have more to gain and less to lose from international peace than have their employers. As a consequence we find in the labour programs of all nations this common ideal of the internationalism of the workers. This is especially true in the socialist movement where, although in recent years there has been a recrudescence of labour nationalism, the international spirit still holds sway.

One of the firmest hopes of a democratic peace, therefore, and of the laying of a solid foundation for internationalism, lies in an increasing influence of the labour element in all countries upon the course of the war. The war has moved in this direction. True, like other conflicts, this war has also led to an initial restriction of individual rights, especially of wage-earners. The trade unions were obliged to surrender many of their old restrictions and privileges and the principle of conscription was applied to a considerable extent to industrial life. But for even these developments there have been offsets. The surrender of trade union privileges has tended

to break down barriers within the labour ranks and thus to unite workers, and the common pressure laid upon all wage-earners by conscription not only increased their solidarity, but also educated them in the facts of the war. The wage-earners are willing to accept sacrifices so long as they believe that they are fighting for a principle. But they will not make them for the sake of conquests or indemnities. They will not sell their lives or their liberties for money or national prestige.

What gives the wage-earners, however, their greatest influence in this war is the old law of supply and demand which, for once, works in their favour. There is a scarcity value, as it was in England after the Black Death. So great is the demand for labourers, not only on the battle line and in the war industries but also for the task of keeping the civil population alive, that there are not enough men and women to go around. The industrial reserve army vanishes; each worker becomes a marginal man, essential to the welfare of society. Their scarcity enables the workers not only to secure better conditions, but also greater political influence. They are far stronger, however, than their votes. Today no nation can win the war unless it has the enthusiastic support of the men indispensable to the maintenance of production.

If, therefore, the wage-earners of all the countries refuse to fight except for terms which come within

the meaning of their principles, the imperialistic elements in the war will be swept away. This process has already begun and is making rapid headway. In England we find the Premier giving heed to the trade unions and assimilating his peace terms to those that they have formulated. In France and Italy the same tendency is at work, though it manifests itself somewhat differently. We know less about Germany and Austria, although there, too, the governments seem increasingly concerned over the wage-earners' reaction towards the war.¹ We are still only in the beginnings of the movement. How far the nations may go in this direction under the impetus of the workers is indicated by the change which has come over Russia since the old bureaucratic government gave way to a democratic government, proletarian and socialistic in character. What has happened in Russia foreshadows changes, not necessarily similar, in other countries, in which, the working classes are forced up to a position of influence and domination.

¹ Since the conclusion of a peace between the Central Powers on the one side and the Ukraine and Russia on the other, the labour unrest in Germany and Austria has probably been lessened, although we have no accurate information on the subject.

CHAPTER IX

THE WAR BENEATH THE WAR

THERE was little chance of any peace based on internationalism so long as Russia was ruled by its old reactionary government. The Czardom was perhaps the lowest form of political organization under which any great people lived, and to the Russian bureaucracy our Western ideals were simply a weapon to be used against the rival bureaucracy of Prussia. The Revolution, however, brought the working classes into control of the Russian government and for the first time we had one of the great belligerents dominated by a proletarian, socialistic group. It was from this group, saturated with Marx and Engels and the whole literature of social revolution, that there issued an appeal for a settlement of the war based not on conquest but on internationalism. The Russian Democracy demanded peace without punitive indemnities or forced annexations.

For this utterance the allies of New Russia were unprepared. Suddenly out came this blunt proposal, and decorous diplomats shuddered at its crudity. In polite circles one does not do such things. Besides, the plan had not been thought out. Indemnities—there are many kinds of indemnities; and as for annexations and quasi-annexations and the innu-

merable adumbrations of annexation, they may be for the lasting good of the people annexed. It was with neat rapier-like thrusts that the spokesmen of the Allies punctured this preposterous pacifism of the Russians, this absurd generosity, which offered to forgo Constantinople and other valuable considerations in return for a just peace. Yet all this criticism fell short in that it failed to grasp the situation emotionally. The arguments were good enough, but more than arguments are needed to sway a big cub of a republic like Russia.

It was a crude republic—in those far-away days of Kerensky—crude, ear-splitting and hobble-de-hoy. It was a pathetic republic, rent by dissensions and lacerated by endless talk. It was a republic conceived in the spiritual and physical hunger of gaunt, big-boned men, a republic born in the mud and blood of the trenches, and reeking of its birth-place. The government of New Russia was too jammed with intellectuals to be superlatively wise, and doubtless it said and did things which to the sophisticated seemed ridiculous. For all that, however, it was a government with a certain half-blind sense of realities, a government that felt with the common people of the world, and, feeling, understood. It was a young, impulsive, aspiring republic, not pretentiously wise, not blasé, not middle-aged. Yet it was wiser than the democratic governments of Britain, France, Italy and America.

Herein lay its wisdom; it dealt with men and not with diplomats; it dealt with hunger, cold, wretchedness, with death on the battle-field and with the aspirations of the unlettered, and not with musty formulas, diplomatic traditions and arid abstractions. It knew that the dull millions of Russia desired peace and it believed that if the Allies could be brought to a renunciation of their own secret imperialistic designs, they could force the German Government to recede from its false position, or failing to do this could incite the German people to revolt. The heady Russian democrats had a supreme faith in revolutions—even in a German revolution.

Whether they were right or wrong, who can tell? For my part I believe that President Wilson was clear-sighted when in December, 1917, he placed himself—perhaps too late—in a sympathetic attitude towards the Russian position.¹ At the time, however, the Russians found scant sympathy in the British, French and Italian Foreign Offices. They were told to hold their tongues and fight. They were willing to fight; this pleading Russian republic was patheti-

¹ "All these things have been true from the very beginning of this stupendous war; and I cannot help thinking that if they had been made plain at the very outset the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once for all enlisted on the side of the Allies, suspicion and distrust swept away, and a real and lasting union of purpose effected. Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution and had they been confirmed in that belief since, the sad reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs toward an ordered and stable government of free men might have been avoided."

cally loyal to the Alliance. Though Russia had lost far more heavily than any other nation, though its unshod half-armed soldiers had been killed by the millions, it was still willing to keep on with the dragging, disastrous battle, if only the Allies would contribute their share towards bringing on a democratic peace. Russia asked for a restatement of terms, eliminating all imperialistic plans. The Allies evaded, delayed, talked. And by evading, delaying and talking they killed or at least helped to kill the Kerensky government. They did what Germany alone could never have accomplished—made way for a Bolshevik government, willing to sign an armistice with Germany, willing, perhaps, even to sign a separate peace.

Russia is utterly weary of war. Not only of this war, but of the war which is to come out of this war, and of wars and wars to follow. She knows in her own person, what we in America do not yet truly know, that war is the negation of civilization. To the Russian, war is a familiar and odious companion. He has seen the death, disease and maiming of millions; the hunger, the sorrow, the weakening dread; the brutalization of soldiers; the bestiality of life and death in the trenches. He knows of the graft of contractors and camp-followers; of the poor, diseased women who accompany the soldiers; of the rape, mutilation, wilful murder, that occur even in the best regulated armies. They are philosophers

in their way, these Russians, university graduates and peasants alike. They believe that under all the rank phrases of humanity and whatnot there lies in the warring nations the serpent of self-justification for brutal instincts, for the raw, blatant desire of national prestige and aggrandizement, for the individual's secret will to hate and slay. They look out upon the carnage, which to them seems avoidable, and sadly repeat, "With how little wisdom is the world governed!" They see through their own pretensions to their own raw appetites and passions beneath.

They see more. The Russian Revolutionists opened not only the prisons but the Imperial archives, wherein political secrets are condemned to lie for a century and more. In cubbyholes in formal offices within the Petrograd palace they found solemn compacts, sealed no doubt with hard red wax, concerning the "equitable indemnities" and "valuable compensations" which were to accrue to Nicholas and his bureaucrats in consideration for the mute mujiks to be butchered on the Vistula. These documents revealed a devious diplomacy. Having seen these papers, though they had already suspected their existence, how could the Russians place faith in their own justification for the war? Who was to blame? Was the militarism of Germany unique in the world? Had Imperial Russia been faultless? Would war be for ever banished when some victori-

ous Russian general rode home triumphantly from Berlin as Bonaparte returned to Paris from Italy? To the Russian the analogy was uncomfortable.

Russia wanted peace. The Revolution was over; the Little Father had crumpled up into a wealthy and innocuous *citoyen* and the whole imperialistic system in all its loud and pretentious emptiness had burst. But everything remained to be done. There were lands to be divided and ploughed; factories to be built, a new government and a new polity to be created. To the peasant a tight little farm seemed more attractive than a damp grave in the marshes, and to Russia as a whole the chance for a peaceful economic development more worth than dominion in Asia Minor. And in choosing the right to develop its own resources rather than secure Constantinople, the nation showed a sure instinct and a sense of its larger national interests. Time works on the side of Russia, and the Revolution gives it time. If Russia could secure a fair peace for herself, her allies and her enemies, a peace without annexations and without indemnities, she could afford to give up her imperialistic dreams. Like the United States, Russia is one of the big, uncrowded, and eventually secure nations.

What Russia offered therefore was a common peace and a mutual forgiveness. To the mujik, with his deep sense of a primitive Christianity, with his good nature and his unwillingness to make fine dis-

tinctions, all nations and peoples were alike sinners, responsible for this war. "We are all so much at fault," he might have said, "that who struck the first blow or struck foul is less important than how we can once more be brothers. We peoples of Europe are not enemies but common victims of a single tragedy. Let there be no punishment or even assessment of blame, for all have been punished enough. Let us not ask what lands belong to what people by evil right and usage, but only 'What sovereignty does each of these free peoples wish to acknowledge?' Let Alsace go wherever Alsatians freely choose. Let there be no compulsion, for compulsion is evil, no revenge, for revenge is evil, and let there be peace."

Considering the nation as a continuous historical entity, the change from Imperial to Democratic Russia was in the nature of a conversion, a deep religious *bouleversement*. And it was with the enthusiasm of a new convert that Russia appealed to the world to end the war. It was at this moment that one of the greatest opportunities presented itself for a truly international peace. Had the United States at that time endorsed the proposals of the Kerensky government, or had she later attempted to come to an understanding with the Bolsheviks, the two nations, Russia and America, might have forced their Allies to agree upon a reasonable peace and have compelled the German ruling classes to come to

terms. Unfortunately, President Wilson did not rise to the unique opportunity, and the Allies presented a solid opposition to Russia's request. "To end the war now," they replied, "is to play into the enemy's hands, to allow her to prepare for a new attack." As for the German Government, it saw in Russia's generous proposals merely a chance for a subtle diplomatic chicanery. It made overtures. It filled the land with its emissaries, to whom Russia, anxious for peace, listened patiently. But it soon appeared that what Germany wanted was not what Russia wanted, a universal peace based on justice, but a separate peace and a free hand against her Western enemies. Germany's ideals and ambitions were those of the parchments in the Russian archives. What Russia had been Germany still was.

Therefore Russia fought on as she was compelled to do. She fought because she desired to retain her democracy and believed that she could not retain it unless Germany secured hers. But her method of fighting was different from any the war had yet seen. She used intellectual and moral rather than physical weapons. Unable to invade Germany, or even to resist invasion, finding it impossible to feed her immense army, she changed her tactics. As she grew weaker she became more assertive. She felt no respect for the Kaiser and his bemedalled Generals and *Geheimräte* and did not pretend to respect them. She treated these worthy dignitaries as

though she and not Germany were the conqueror.

This was a new and maddening diplomacy; a novel defiance in the name not of intrinsic power and formidableness but of the better nature of the very people defied. The Russian democracy had a vast moral asset, a vast moral resource. It knew that it stood for progress, and for enlightened and pacific international relations. It enjoyed the prestige of standing for the democracies of the world, that of Germany included. The Russian delegates at Brest-Litovsk were constantly threatening the dignified German plenipotentiaries with the displeasure of the German working classes; they talked over the heads of these generals to the German people beyond. They made no pretence of military strength, relying not upon their own soldiers but upon the mere physical difficulty of overrunning Russia and the moral reluctance of the German people to attempt the task. Take Petrograd if you wish, they practically said; take Moscow, Irkutsk, Vladivostok. It will merely mean that you have more people to feed and keep in order, more territory to cover. Conquer us by all means. It was passive resistance carried to its logical conclusion.

The real strength of the Bolsheviks, however, lay in the fact that they represented the working classes of the world. The war is approaching a stage where the workers in all the countries are rapidly gaining in power and influence. And what they de-

sire is something deeper than the democracy which prevailed in Europe and America in 1914; they demand economic and social, as well as political democracy. They do not wish the world to be made safe for societies ruled by trust magnates and lesser capitalists, with all their sinuous retainers and wriggling hangers-on. They have nothing to do with a democracy based upon the exploitation of the poor.

Here we have a new variant of the theory of a democratic war. No longer does the issue hinge chiefly upon the relations between states but between social classes. The doctrine is obviously early socialist, before socialism had been toned down by half a century of parliamentarianism and compromise, and before it had become realistic or learned to make distinctions. This proletarian democracy is different, in aspiration at least, from any other that we know. Its temper bears the same relation to that of the channelled democracies of Western Europe as did Primitive Christianity to some of our well-starched faiths of today. It is violent, extreme, vaguely generous, vaguely denunciatory, caring more for the idea than for the narrow reality, preferring a large failure to a little victory. It is a Democracy with more faith than knowledge, bound to be disappointed, and prepared for disappointment.¹ It is a Democracy which opposes not only

¹ Today (March 9, 1918) the Bolsheviks seem to have failed completely either to make a reasonable peace, to offer passive resistance, or to awaken the German proletariat to revolt.

Militarism, Autocracy and Conquest but also such cherished institutions as Private Property and Privilege.

To us this sudden jump of the Bolsheviki into the saddle is not only of intrinsic interest but is of even greater importance as a symptom of a world-wide revelation, and of a coming world-wide revolution. This Democracy of the Proletariat or Dictatorship of the Proletariat—whichever it is—will not guide Russia permanently, for it will either go down or change. Yet it is not only the father to more stable democracies to follow but is above all else the detached interpreter of the war. To these Bolsheviki, this portentous war of ours is not the true war, but a superficial conflict. There is a *war beneath the war*, a war of the poor and exploited of all the world against all exploiters, big and little, respectable and disreputable. The goal to which the Bolsheviki look is a society in which all shall have an equal opportunity to develop latent faculties, where every child born of woman is to have his place in the sun. Compared to this projected revolution of the entire world what matter whether the poor of Trieste are exploited by Austrian or Italian capitalists?

All through the civilized world this conception of the war beneath the war appears in one form or another. In Italy, France, England, Germany, the United States there runs a current, weak or strong, against class domination. The victory is to be

gained by and for the only class that has never been victorious. Already labour has to be placated. What labour thinks, what labour will do in a given contingency, is the overriding problem. This proletarian impulse, which may be traced in its growth and its growing severance from the governments, was obvious even before the war. The Russian *revoltés* welcomed the world conflict because they hoped that it would precipitate the social revolution, as the Crimean War had emancipated the serfs and the Japanese War inaugurated the constitutional system. So, too, in Italy, syndicalists hoped that the war would disrupt their own inefficient capitalistic system. Today similar ideas reveal themselves elsewhere. To what was Lord Lansdowne's appeal attributed, rightly or wrongly, except to the fear that the war, if continued, would bring to the surface the greater war beneath the war, and this social upheaval would consign all lords, spiritual and temporal, as well as lords by the grace of financial accumulation, to one indiscriminate scrap heap? If that were democracy, and it were to leave the masters of the world penniless, might they not fight too long for it?

Such is the meaning of the Russian propaganda as it has culminated in the activities of the Bolsheviks. It is the impulse and sentiment behind this movement, not its specific manifestations, that are significant. Undoubtedly these Russian revolution-

ists have committed absurdities because they are an unbelievably literal folk, taking their religion and economics so textually that we temporizing people, who like even our virtues in decent moderation, are bewildered and repelled. But absurdities, excesses and boundless inefficiencies do not count in the long run, and what remains is an essential truth hidden under grotesque exaggerations, a real fidelity to a crude force working for a true socialized democracy. And all this is not a Russian, but a world phenomenon. The Russian Revolution is merely the visible part of the iceberg.

Some of the actions of these wild Bolsheviki have been wise. We have long talked about open diplomacy but no government ever before picked up an armful of secret treaties and threw them out of the window to the journalists below. By so doing the Russians cleared the atmosphere astonishingly. They were also able to achieve what the Allied diplomats had failed to accomplish—to reveal the German Government's plans of conquest. It would be a world tragedy, however, if the Bolsheviki were to be induced to sign a permanent treaty with Germany. An exploitation of Russian socialism by German imperialists would be a disastrous blow against world democracy.

What eventual success the Bolsheviki will have, even if they secure a long lease of political control, is problematical. They are attempting in the face of

opposition at home and abroad to perform a difficult, perhaps an intrinsically impossible task. They are seeking to erect a full-fledged socialistic state upon a society which has not gone through the long discipline of capitalism. They are dealing with uneducated people, who have not yet made themselves into the acquisitive, short-sighted but clear-viewed men and women who constitute the population of capitalistic countries. They are working with a society in which resources are undeveloped and economic organization is primitive, in competition with highly organized and efficient capitalistic societies. Can they hold together? Can they bind into some sort of union the miscellaneous artisans, peasants and shopkeepers of the vast Russian republic? Can they enthuse with a common inspiration millions of different race and language within their country? Or will they not break down through a lack of internal cohesion and be forced to take up again the long march toward social co-operation through a gradually enfolding capitalistic development?

If they do fail, they will still have succeeded. Though the Russian socialistic democracy prove blind, unripe and incapable of immediate survival, it will have spoken a word that has appealed to millions, not only in Russia but in other lands. What the Bolsheviki do, even though they end ingloriously in some morass, will break the spell of centuries and

give a new hope to men who have always devoutly believed that only those who were born with spurs could ride, and all others must look up to the riders reverently. They have given birth to the hope that the time is not far off when the common people of the world will be wise enough to rule. In the long, slow-moving history of democracy the Bolsheviki, whatever their disasters, will take their place. For to these unlettered workmen the war has become, in a sense which we in America can hardly comprehend, a war for democracy. The War Beneath the War stands revealed.

Yet war is not won by inspiration alone, nor by a vision of a beautiful society to come. It is won in the present against present obdurate enemies, and those who do not see quite so far into the future have often an advantage over those who look a century ahead. Whatever the ultimate hope of the great ascension of the working classes of the world, there lies today athwart the path of these workers a powerful and aggressive nation in which the wage-earners, though class-conscious, are held down by force and prestige. Whether we seek the democracy that Earl Grey and Lloyd George seek or the broader democracy demanded by the Bolsheviki, we must sooner or later obtain the adhesion of our last ally, the democratic masses of Germany.

CHAPTER X

IS GERMANY INCORRIGIBLE?

MUCH ink has been spilled over the question whether the German people—as distinguished from its Government—is responsible for this war. Some writers attach blame to the Emperor alone, to the Crown Prince, to a few military chiefs and Hotspur professors; others accuse the clamorous sect of Pan-Germans; still others widen the charge to include the whole aristocratic brood of Junker landlords and the big, upstart industrialists of the Rhine, with their pliant accomplices in the banks, government offices and newspapers of Berlin. Finally the German people as a whole—the sixty-seven millions of it—is indicted. By sins of commission and omission, by truculence, moral insensibility or sheer lamblike obedience, the whole German population—officials, wage-earners, artists, musicians; the quaint toy-makers of Nürnberg, the half-fed mill-girls of Chemnitz; hotel-keepers, pawnbrokers, insurance agents, hucksters, peasants, philanthropists, prostitutes and poets, all of the vast German people in its complete integrity has, it is claimed, brought upon itself this sin. It has at least a secondary guilt as an accomplice after the fact.

Our official theory absolves the German people.

We, the American nation, are alleged to be fighting against an autocratic government but are on terms of friendship and amity with the excellent German people. "We have no quarrel," said President Wilson in his war message of April 2, 1917, "with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval."

Obviously this theory cannot be carried over into the actual conduct of the war. We speak of "alien enemies" and place moderate restrictions upon the Germans within our midst. It is the German people, not the Kaiser alone, against whom we shoot our guns and whom we seek to starve. We fight not only against Germany's armed forces but as far as necessary against her whole population. Nor can we assume that the German people is out of sympathy with its government. Though there was a German peace party in 1914, it was less strong than similar peace groups in England and America. We cannot honestly claim that in joining the Alliance we are meeting the wishes of the German rank and file. The most we can assert is that this deluded people will eventually recognize that we, its apparent enemies, are forwarding its cause. We are fighting, says Mr. Wilson, for the liberation of the world's peoples, "the German peoples included."

To Germans who are making the last sacrifice for their Government this large assumption of ours seems insolent and hypocritical, a calculated appeal to our own citizens of German birth. Yet in the past similar claims have often been validated. In our Revolutionary War Americans did fight the battle of British Liberals against George the Third, and in the Civil War the victory of the North proved in the end a benefit to the white majority of the South. The very fact that the claim can be honestly advanced is an indictment against a semi-autocratic government. Because the German political system is so largely unrepresentative, the charge that its government may be fought by a nation friendly to its people is likely to be made.

The question whether government or people is our enemy is not purely academic, since upon its answer depend the terms of peace which, in the event of victory, we can safely propose. We are endeavouring to base peace upon a new state of world society, in which all the nations will live together under a common international morality and a common international law. But such a system is impossible if one of the greatest of the world's peoples is hopelessly militaristic and aggressive and cannot be trusted. We are not soon likely to place our faith in the German Government. We fear the over-might and irresponsibility of the ruling class. The militarists are too powerful, and their minds too set

upon adventure and dominion. They can evoke war too suddenly. Under such a government, says Mr. Wilson, "cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light—within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class." With a republic in Germany we should feel more secure if the nation as a whole were fair-minded and pacific.

Since our actual entrance into the war, however, a change in our mood has come about in our attitude towards the German people similar to that which took place in England after 1914. At first the British leaders, hoping for a German revolution, made much of this distinction between government and people, but when the anticipated revolt did not occur, the German people were harshly condemned. They were described as docile, brutal, scientifically-barbarous state-worshippers and self-worshippers. The Germans, wrote Professor Sayce, "are still what they were fifteen centuries ago, the barbarians who raided our ancestors (!) and destroyed the civilization of the Roman Empire." "No terms," wrote Sir Alfred E. Turner, "can safely be made with such a people of outsiders, to whom the quality of mercy is not known, and who, like all other savages, regard generosity and forbearance as signs of weakness."¹

¹ *Saturday Review*, Vol. 120, Sept. 18, 1915.

The German nation, said Major General C. E. Callwell, is "a nation of barbarians, a nation without honour, without chivalry, and without shame," a nation from whom "paper guarantees are worse than worthless,"¹ a nation that must be crushed and permanently held down by force.

Today many Americans think likewise. It is claimed that the whole present generation of Germans is so inoculated with the vices of submissiveness, militarism and regimentation that there remains no hope for them except killing. No one is quite logical enough to advocate the surgical sterilization of sixty-seven millions or their wholesale slaughter in cold blood, but one encounters here and there the more modest program of killing and maiming a dozen million Germans to encourage the others to a peace-loving life.

Without quite this amiable ferocity other Americans permit themselves to be guided by conceptions equally rigid. They despair of Germany ever entering into a better state of mind. They pretend to believe that Germans are universally and ineradicably brutal, aggressive and militaristic, without honour or compunction, the mad dogs of the world, to be shot at sight. They ridicule the clumsy distinction between Prussians and non-Prussians, between militarists and gentle, beer-drinking idealists, since not every one who lives in Prussia is in this

¹ *Blackwood's Magazine*, Vol. 200, Aug., 1916, p. 283.

sense a Prussian and many Saxons, Bavarians and Hessians are more Prussian than the Junker. Some Americans even claim that all Germans are responsible specifically, for all the outrages committed by the German armies, since at no time has an effective protest been levelled despite numberless atrocities. There is unfortunately much truth in this charge. Admitting that Germans receive a false account of all happenings, there still remain a popular insensibility and an unwillingness to express even disapproval, which are discouraging features of a lack of a revolutionary sense.

To some extent, however, war brutalizes all nations. But for the passions evoked by war, the Allied nations could not view with their present peace of mind the tragedy of the slow starvation of the German people, the death of babies and of the aged and the fearful ravages of tuberculosis. I do not claim that this starvation policy is unjustified, but only that it is tragic. Similarly we in the Allied countries have read with pain of Russian atrocities against Polish Jews and did not protest. Instead we passed over hastily to the story of Belgium, where our pity and horror might find free vent. War degrades and solidifies nations. Primitive passions rise to the surface, and remorse and justice are repressed. If in the future all the peoples of the world were to remain what they are in war time, cruel, mendacious and crassly unfair, little hope could be

found for international life. Even though we indict the whole German people of today, we should not carry over our conclusions into the future. Our reliance upon the German people must depend primarily upon what it will prove to be in 1930, not on what it is today under the stress of war.

In seeking to look into this future we are met by the disconcerting fact that in the past Germans, as compared with English, French, Italians and Russians, have been afflicted by an extraordinary subservience and political servility. Though not true of all Germans this quality is characteristic of the traditional and admired type. Such men place an exaggerated value on duty, especially to superiors. They worship law and order, as though these were the supreme good instead of a mere means. Though they possess initiative, it lies too narrowly within prescribed bounds. They live too much by order; accept too willingly their place in a scheme of things, which is not an entirely bad scheme, but which leans to an excess of rigidity. The average German is too philosophical and above all too subjective concerning political arrangements. He believes that freedom lies in one's own soul, that a man is free if his mind travels at ease over all the facts of life, though a police official stand outside his study door. At once constrained and protected, he is not at liberty to indulge wayward impulses though he is safe from the wayward impulses of neighbours. He has grown

to love his neat routine, his clean streets, his Sunday music, his ordered life, in which many things which more restless peoples lose are conserved for him. The vice of the German, in other words, is that he has too many virtues; he is too disciplined, contented, submissive, unrevolutionary. Long and loudly have we praised this modest, dutiful and self-abnegating German, who meddles with no man. Possibly, however, it is this very man who is most to blame for Germany's aggressive policy, if indeed we can speak in terms of praise or blame on this high level, where opposing nations, institutions and principles clash.

Fortunately, however, this docile and dutiful subject does not constitute the whole German population. A new man comes to the fore, more nervous, mobile and discontented. One finds him among the pushing business organizers, among wage-earners, schooled in the trade union and the Socialist party; one finds him even among peasants. This new German holds but weakly to the traditions of subservience and to love of dynasty. He is more likely to fight for democracy and liberty. Such men have not yet been willing to die by thousands for their new ideal, and on the contrary they have died by hundreds of thousands for the things against which they strive. Yet here a leaven works. Here is a growing force, opposed to the prevailing submissiveness.

When, therefore, we inquire whether after the war

the German people will be strongly militaristic we are met by perplexing difficulties. There are three general theories supporting the prophecy of a permanent German militarism. The first is that Germans are by heredity submissive and militaristic; the second, that they are so by reason of a thousand-year-long discipline, during which these qualities have become fixed mental habits, in harmony with their whole body of habits, and, therefore, not to be uprooted in a few generations. The third theory is more optimistic. It asserts that the submissive and militaristic quality of the Germans has been bred by an intensive education lasting forty years, and that at best we must wait for a new generation before we may expect a reassuring change.

All of these theories seem exaggerated. The last thousand years have doubtless tended to produce habits of submissiveness in Germans, and popular education since 1870 has more obviously worked in this direction than in other countries. We have, therefore, to deal not only with conviction but habit. In these days, however, habits are easily broken. Five years of city life so completely transform the young peasant, despite a thousand years of rural habituation, that he can never return to his country life. Ancient loyalties vanish swiftly; Russia changes over-night and China itself accepts new valuations of life. And even as early as 1914 the Germans were not mere tools. They read newspapers,

and even a government-controlled press cannot in peace time keep out all the news. The Germans amused themselves with all sorts of mild insubordinations and gently insurrectionary ideas. There were millions who were not submissive and not militaristic.

So real was this latent refractoriness of certain elements of the German population that the Government was forced to resort to falsehood to secure a united public opinion. It alleged that the Cossacks had already invaded Prussia, that the French had bombarded German cities, that a league of nations had plotted against the Fatherland, and that the Kaiser had done all he could to avert the conflict. Upon this distortion of facts it was difficult for a patriotic German, however democratically and internationally inclined, to refuse to defend his country. Moreover, following the war's outbreak the entire history of forty years was reinterpreted to make Germany appear the attacked party. The theory of encirclement, the theory of Russian ambition, French revenge and British envy, united against a pious and contented German people, the theory of a crafty world-destroyer in the person of Edward the Seventh, were resurrected and revamped. Unfortunately there was just enough in the past actions of Russia, France and England to give a measure of plausibility to these charges. Further, a deep-lying economic unrest and an uncertainty concerning Ger-

many's economic future rendered the Germans more than usually credulous. The Slav invasion seemed a real peril; the attempted forcible dissolution of Austria-Hungary could not but be envisaged as a menace to Germany's safety. Moreover certain groups, far from following a mere instinct of loyalty, confidently expected a concrete economic gain from the war. Not sheer love of dominion reconciled the Germans to this conflict but an intricate complex of ideas and emotions of which greed, fear, and a desire to preserve class prestige and power formed a part. Finally stupidity and bad-faith on the part of Germany's neighbours rendered the growth of a war-spirit, once war began, absolutely certain.

With the early German victories a sinister change came over the population. Even before the war there had been manifested an insolent and pedantic self-exaltation, accompanied by an immoderate depreciation of other nations. German faith, German virtue, *das deutsche Wesen* were fulsomely praised, and the real successes of Germany in science, music, business and government were grossly exaggerated. A febrile chauvinism, due to Germany's rapid progress, was exploited, and plans of conquest were read by millions of once placid people, devoutly believing that Germany should have its wide place in the sun. Finally this self-exaltation became monstrous. Derided by all other cultural nations, Germany fell back

upon herself, appealing from the adverse judgment of the civilized world to fantastic self-laudation. "If God is for us," said Pastor Walter Lehmann, "who can be against us? It is enough for us to be a part of God." "Germany is the centre of God's plans for the world," we are "a nation which is God's seed-corn for the future." "Germany is the future of humanity."¹

To those who wish to observe how abruptly Germany's critical spirit crumbled under the stress of war, hundreds of pamphlets and books are now available.² They show a dismal mental degeneration, an illimitable self-praise bordering on insanity, and towards foreign nations a fury of vindictive hatred which must have left the intellectual gutter-snipes of other lands speechless with envy. This violent self-laudation, moreover, was but the floral decoration for a mania for conquest, which spread like fire over the country. It was held that Germany, having been successful in her defensive war, was justified in utilizing the chance of a thousand years to redress the injustices of geography and history. The wildest programs of annexation were boldly announced.

This is the case against the German people. They are still at a comparatively low stage in democratic

¹ Bang (J. P.) "Hurrah and Hallelujah," p. 75.

² Of these perhaps the best compilation is the heavily documented little book of Dr. J. P. Bang, Professor of Theology at the University of Copenhagen, entitled "Hurrah and Hallelujah, The Teaching of Germany's Poets, Prophets, Professors and Preachers."

evolution, enduring an unrepresentative government and displaying as yet little talent for revolution; they were, before 1914, in a mood of self-exaltation; they made few and weak protests against the barbaric conduct of their war; finally they concurred, to a surprising extent, in plans of aggression and conquest.

The admission of every count of this indictment, however, does not leave us hopeless for the future. These German failures are accounted for by the events of the last half-century. The success of Bismarck's diplomacy, the easy victories over Austria and France, a rapidly growing sea-power, an expanding German industry, the ultra-sudden translation of the peasant to new industrial cities—in short an astounding revolution in German life, both in external and internal aspects, suffices to explain this change in mentality. Yet what has been altered can be altered again, and what destroyed restored. The popular German conceptions of 1914 have been vastly changed. Unless Germany wins this war, as a result of the blunders and short-sightedness of the Allies, the Germans will never again believe that France is decadent, Russia barbarous, Great Britain incapable. Never again will they believe that Germany is the only land of *Kultur*. Nor, barring such a victory, will it longer seem wise to entrust their affairs to a fist-banging *Junkertum*, efficient in warfare but bungling in the large diplomacy without

which war plans are like playing with tin soldiers. The Germans have been on an emotional debauch. They have refused to be sobered. Yet sober, nevertheless, they must inevitably become. As nation after nation enters the war, registering its protest against German polity, as these external admonitions become reinforced by the tedium of a war, which persists tragically despite German conquests, the mood in Germany changes. A spirit of questioning begins to manifest itself.

The beginnings of this change in mood are already discernible although they are obscured by the strict and subtle German censorship which tells the newspapers not only what not to say but also what to say. The courageous action of Karl Liebknecht, the strong protests of the Minority Socialists, to say nothing of the famous Reichstag Majority program, (in which Socialists, Clericals and other parties joined), indicate, as do also the frequent suppressions of the *Vorwärts* and other journals, that there is a real sentiment in Germany for a constructive peace making for internationalism. In Austria this sentiment appears to be even stronger. It is easy to belittle this underground movement and to deride it because it is suppressed. But for twelve years (from 1878 to 1890), the German Socialist Party was itself suppressed, and yet grew rapidly under the clamped lid. When the official pressure relaxes a little we may be surprised at the rapidity with which

liberalism, democracy and revolt against autocracy have been swelling under the heel of the militarists.¹

From the mass of evidence on both sides, therefore, it is safe to conclude that the Germans are not by race or heredity militaristic, and that their traditions and education, which incline them in that direction, are being negated by powerful influences, springing out of new industrial conditions and out of contact with foreign nations. The discipline of the great city, factory, trade union, co-operative society, is relentlessly opposed to submissiveness. This new discipline, although unfavourably influenced by the barracks, tends to become stronger. The will to revolt grows, even though the revolt seems superficially to be a very German, slow and scientifically predetermined and bloodless revolt.²

On the other hand the revolt, when it comes, if it

¹ It is not improbable, however, that this very growth of liberal sentiment, to which President Wilson has repeatedly appealed, will be a factor in postponing the end of the war. The more insecure the German autocracy feels itself the harder and longer will it fight in the hope of a saving victory.

² Even Professor Veblen, who believes that Germany, like Japan, is relatively unchangeable, and must be "eliminated," is not hopeless concerning the ultimate growth of parliamentary discretion in Germany. "It may be true that, for the present, on critical or weighty measures the parliamentary discretion extends no farther than respectfully to say '*Ja wohl*.' But then, *Ja wohl* is also something; and there is no telling where it may all lead to in the long course of years. One has a vague apprehension that this '*Ja wohl*' may some day come to be a customarily necessary form for authentication, so that withholding it (*Behüt es Gott*) may even come to count as an effectual veto on measures so pointedly neglected." *The Nature of Peace*, by Thorstein Veblen, New York, 1917, pp. 191-92.

does come, may not be at all slow or bloodless. It is true that we are here trenching upon the field of speculation, where we must trust to insecure estimates of vague facts. What is clear, however, is that the much derided submissiveness of the Germans finds its cause, not only in an unfortunate historical development, but equally in the fact that the government against which the German people would have to revolt is in the highest degree both capable and ruthless. To overthrow the Russian bureaucracy required many decades of propaganda and preparation, and yet that task was child's play compared to an attempt to destroy the immensely competent, long-headed, and heavy-fisted Prussian oligarchy. Prestige, wealth, science, organizing ability, as well as a remarkable capacity for tempering autocracy to the governed, all work in favour of the German ruling classes and against any overt revolutionary act. To assail with bare hands the efficient German government, propped up by a million loyal civil servants and a million bayonets, is a task likely to appeal to none but a desperate man.

At the end of this war, however, assuming that Germany does not win the war, there are likely to be many such desperate men in Germany. The war has taught the soldier not to over-value life, not to care overmuch whether he is shot in the trenches, starved in his home, or garroted by the public executioner. There will be many who will

not hold their life at a high price. If then, by any chance, a stray shot starts a popular uprising, and if, as is not inconceivable, the army itself proves to be infected with revolutionary ideas, the change that will come over the spirit of German life may be as complete and startling as any in human history. The millions of intelligent German workers, who have so wonderfully managed their trade unions, their co-operative stores and their Socialist Party would be able to organize a revolution quite as thoroughly. Of course they will not rebel while they believe that a collapse of Germany would mean her spoliation by enemies at the frontier. They may not even rebel after the war. And yet they may. Only a rash prophet would predict that German society and the German state of mind will be the same, ten, five or even two years hence as they are today.

Even before the war the prestige of the German ruling classes was gradually sinking, and a few more decades of peace might easily have brought it to an end. Nothing but a complete German victory can now make the war worth its cost, and even a complete victory may fail to do so. Defeated, or merely frustrated, Germany's rulers would have to go back to their people comparatively empty-handed. It would be the beginning of the end of her militarism.

The education of the German people during the war will be continued in peace. They will then have

ample time to count their dead and maimed, cast up their losses, and apportion the blame—and the taxes. They will not be entirely proud of their record. The German commercial traveller in foreign lands will hear many unpleasant truths, and what is told him he will tell again. Credulity, prejudice, passion will in a measure pass. The judgment of the outside world, tempered by the calmness of peace, will have its appeal. The foreign arraignment of their ruling classes will eventually be accepted as true by those Germans who for political reasons desire to attack their government.

A frustration of Germany thus means a growth of democracy, a change in her political balance of power and a revolution in her opinions and prepossessions, which will cause submissiveness to decline and render improbable a new attack.

CHAPTER XI

A CONCLUSIVE PEACE

IN a speech delivered in January, 1918, former President Roosevelt said: "We must accept no peace except the peace of overwhelming victory. To accept an inconclusive peace would mean that the whole war would have to be fought over again by ourselves or our children. To accept an inconclusive peace would really mean to work for a German victory."

According to Mr. Roosevelt there is no "half way ground." "Either we are fighting to give liberty to the subject races in Austria and Turkey, either we are fighting for the complete independence of the Czecho-Slovaks, the Jugo-Slavs, the Poles, the Rumanians, and Italians under the Austro-Hungarian yoke, and the Armenians and Jews and Syrian Christians and Arabs under the Turkish yoke, or else we were guilty of hypocrisy when we announced that our purpose was to make the world safe for democracy. Unless Belgium is restored and indemnified and France restored and indemnified justice will not have prevailed."¹

The fundamental assumptions in this vigorous speech of Mr. Roosevelt's are that no peace can be

¹ *New York Times*, January 13, 1918.

conclusive unless the victory is overwhelming, and that such a conclusive victory can be rendered more secure by the imposition of drastic terms. In making these assumptions, Mr. Roosevelt has gone back to the methods of thought which prevailed on both sides in the early part of the war. First victory, then onerous terms imposed upon the defeated enemy, and finally the furtherance of such aims as the victors consider essential. That some of those aims may be imperialistic, and may have the effect of undermining any international basis for the peace proposed does not seem to enter into his serious consideration. The internationalism which is associated with this method of thought is not in any sense unforced, but rather the imposition upon the law-breaking nations of an international law in the interests of the victors. That in each country the law-breaking nation is assumed to be the enemy goes without saying.

The remainder of Mr. Roosevelt's speech indicates clearly the state of international relations which he anticipates in the event of his overwhelming victory. After, as before, we shall be required to arm to the teeth in order permanently "to guarantee future peaceful and just development at home, and future immunity from attacks by outside nations." Mr. Roosevelt's overwhelming victory does not lead to peace, but merely to a permanent military preparedness and a permanent liability to attack.

Even though we hoped for nothing but this indefinite perpetuation of latent hostilities, it is doubtful whether Mr. Roosevelt's overwhelming victory would be efficacious. Its effect, of course, would be to annihilate the military strength of Germany, which might or might not be a permanent advantage. Assuming a continuance of hostile international relations, it does not follow that our next enemy will surely be Germany. But the chief argument against the presumed necessity of a conclusive victory is that such a victory does not necessarily lead to a conclusive peace, but may have an exactly opposite effect.

In 1866, when Prussia won a decisive victory over Austria, the peace was conclusive not because the victory was overwhelming, but because the natural evolution of the German nation made impossible a leadership by Austria, a preponderatingly non-German state. On the other hand, the German victory over France in 1870 was crushing, but the peace was inconclusive. It was a punitive peace, based on outlived conceptions of international life, and did not, in effect, solve the outstanding problems between the two countries. The result was that for almost half a century the war between France and Germany continued under a different form. Similarly a nonconclusive war may lead to a conclusive peace. In 1812 the United States fought a somewhat inglorious war with Great Britain, which ended in no vic-

tory, but with both countries, and especially the United States, anxious to make peace. The issues which led to the struggle were not even mentioned in the resulting treaty, for during the war the conditions leading to the raising of those issues had ended. The inconclusive war was followed by a hundred years of peace, whereas had a completely victorious England imposed punitive terms, the peace would have been inconclusive.

Nor to be conclusive must a peace be onerous or vindictive. It is a common feeling that no settlement is conclusive unless the enemy is so weakened that he will not again dare to resort to arms. "It is all very well to forgive," say many of our spokesmen, "to look ahead, to seek to promote a distant internationalism, but in the meanwhile we must live, and we cannot live under the menace of a new German attack. With Germany permanently weakened, we are safe for a generation or two, but if remaining strong she returns to her militarism, our last case will be worse than the first."

The argument deserves consideration. However much we desire internationalism, we can accept it only on the condition of security. Safety comes first. Therefore we cannot permit Germany to palm off upon us a false and specious internationalism, and we cannot accept a truce which will give an unregenerate enemy time to recover. All proposals must be examined with care and even a shade of

suspicion and we must insist that the internationalism secured be more than a matter of words.

But the policy of weakening the enemy, which is offered as a real security against the war's renewal is, as has often been proved, no security at all. The difficulty lies not in downing a nation but in keeping it down. The Treaty of Frankfort again illustrates the point. In 1871 the German generals, believing that France would begin a war of revenge at the earliest moment, sought to weaken her by levying a heavy indemnity and annexing territories of economic and strategic value. This, however, far from ending, merely increased the French menace. France became irreconcilable; thenceforth she was the perpetual enemy, the centre of every antagonistic alliance. The resulting fear dictated the entire foreign policy of Bismarck; all his alliances were an attempt to isolate this ancient enemy and keep her helpless. But year by year "the French mortgage," incurred or at least enhanced by the harsh Treaty of Frankfort, weighed heavier. Germany could not compete with Great Britain, could not enter into vast colonial enterprises without recognizing that in whatever war she engaged France, weakened in 1871, would be her powerful enemy. Germany would probably have been stronger during the last forty years had she trusted to a future reconciliation with France, as Prussia trusted Austria in the years following 1866.

Crush Germany today, if that indeed is possible, and one of two things will happen: Either she will recover and fight again, or she will seek safety and power in new and hostile alliances. To place a revengeful, even though a weakened, Germany in the middle of Europe is to lay a train which will blow up the peace of the world. No controversy thereafter can arise between any of the nations now in concert but Germany will seek to fan the flame and offer aid to one or the other of the combatants. A debilitated Germany suffering under a sense of persecution and injustice would be only a little less dangerous than a strong Germany in like mood, and would be far more dangerous than would be a strong nation permitted to develop and interested in maintaining the peace.

Neither by an overwhelming victory, nor by a crushing or weakening of the enemy, nor by any form of negotiated peace which does not recognize new principles of international relationship, can security be maintained. All these suffer from the cardinal defect that they leave nations at enmity and the peoples of the world insecure.

This fact becomes apparent on considering the possible terms of peace between the two coalitions in the conflict that now rages. Theoretically there are five general forms which peace might take. These are, an Overwhelming German Peace, a Partial German Victory, the Peace of the Drawn Game,

a Negotiated Allied Peace, and a Dictated Allied Peace. These five forms run the full gamut from a crushing German victory to a crushing Allied victory.

From every point of view a complete German victory, followed by a dictated German peace, would be the worst conceivable result of the war. A new Roman Empire, more powerful than any that has existed in the world, would be set up in the middle of Europe. It would be for decades a bulwark of autocracy and militarism, and the teacher of these social forms to vassal and outside nations. The world would either be one great empire with dependencies and intimidated outlying states, or it would be an armed camp. Against such a German victory, liberals the world over must fight to the last ditch.

Even a partial German victory would be excessively dangerous. What Germany seeks today is a peace of give and take, of *Verständigung und Ausgleich*, as former Chancellor Michaelis styled it. She seeks a "cashing in" on her "paper profits." So far she has won the war on land but as against her conquests the Allies possess an ultimate superiority in men, money and munitions, a superiority, however, which depends upon their ability to bring America's full force to bear upon the Western front. The joint resources of the Allies are still increasing while those of Germany diminish. Like Japan in

1905, Germany today has won battles but runs the danger of losing if the war continues. Having what she wants she sees no further reason for fighting.

The present conquests of the Central Powers are in the West (Belgium and France), the East (Russia), in the Southeast (Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania) and the Southwest (Italy). They are apparently willing to give up one or two of these conquests to preserve the rest. It is a wise moderation. But for us such a peace is difficult to accept. To allow an unregenerate Germany to emerge from this war with immense visible territorial gains would be not only to give her an enormous overweight in Europe but to strengthen the power of her imperialistic group. The Junker might then abandon his pretence of a defensive war and openly boast of his conquests. The world contest of 1914 might even be proclaimed as a continuation of the succession of "glorious" wars which made Germany a World Power. Renewed in their prestige, the feudal rulers might snap their fingers at radicals, liberals and socialists, repeating what Bismarck wrote to von Bülow: "Germany does not look for her salvation to Prussia's liberalism but to Prussia's power." Therefore any German victory, either partial or complete, is dangerous.¹

¹ "The German sword is our best protection." Telegram of Kaiser Wilhelm II, reproduced in the *New York Evening Post*, March 8, 1918.

It is through fear of this partial German victory that the Allied nations have wisely refused to enter into an unlimited conference with the enemy. To do so without a definite statement in advance of Germany's demands and concessions would be to deliver themselves unreservedly into hostile hands. In such a blind conference Germany might break up the alliance by playing off one Ally against the other. The Allies dare not even consider terms unless in advance Germany contents herself with the *status quo ante*.

Can they, however, accept even these terms?

Quite apart from other objections, the *status quo* is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to establish. It would be a delicate task to return to Germany her colonies without enraging Australians, South Africans and Japanese, though, of course, it would be feasible to give her equivalent rights in other parts of the world. But the main objection to the *status quo ante* is that it is more than a mere territorial arrangement. It is a state of world society and a state of mind. To re-establish it means to return to the execrable conditions existing in Austria-Hungary and Turkey before the war. It means a recrudescence of ancient embittered hostilities in the Balkans and an accentuation of the old colonial strife between imperialistic powers. It would reawaken old jealousies and hatreds and revive the old insecurity.

Moreover, if Germany remains militaristic, im-

perialistic and aggressive, the restoration of the *status quo ante*, without any provision for a system based upon internationalism, would constitute, if not a victory for her, at least a defeat for her enemies. Whatever lands she gave back, she would still hold Austria-Hungary. Her officers now control Austro-Hungarian troops; her railway managers Austro-Hungarian railways; her influence at Vienna and Budapest is overwhelming. The same rule extends to Bulgaria and Turkey, united with Germany, and exultant over their victories. End the war on the basis of the *status quo ante*, and a militaristic autocratic *Mittel-Europa* stretching from Hamburg to Bagdad is a reality, except for a small strip of Serbian territory.

Nor would Serbia again resist. We have read much of the futility of German terrorism and ultimately it was, doubtless, as stupid as brutal. But in its effect upon the populations afflicted it proved a definite asset to the German militarist. If, after the war, Austria and Bulgaria were to make sudden demands upon Serbia, where would that nation find the courage to oppose? She knows the heavy German fist; she knows that she could be destroyed before help came from the Allies, if it came at all. Even more difficult to resist would be a gradual, thumb-screw pressure, by which Austria might make successive inroads upon Serbian independence. Greece too would be quiescent; Roumania also. Hol-

land, Belgium, Scandinavia and Switzerland, while they might preserve their dignity and independence, would never forget Germany's terrible attack upon Belgium and the incompleteness of the reparation. Germany has secured the prestige of terror; in terms of the old diplomacy it is a valuable prestige.

Further, if the *status quo ante* is re-established and the war in peace continues after the war, Germany will have gained relatively by the fact that she has fought her battles upon the soil of her enemies. Who under such an arrangement would rebuild French, Serbian, Roumanian and Russian villages? The losses of the Allies from such depredations are many billions of dollars, and if each nation pays for its own broken windows the Allies suffer far more grievously than does Germany. Because of this smaller loss, because of her prestige of terror in neighbouring countries, and because of the cementing of a stronger union among the four central powers, Germany might claim to have gained something from the war, or at least to have lost less than her opponents. Her Junkers, decimated and impoverished though they might be, would still claim a quasi-victory.

The final objection to the *status quo ante*, however, is that it is utterly impossible. Even though we keep former boundaries, we can no longer place the old Humpty-Dumpty of Russian imperialism back upon his throne, nor can we change back Brit-

ish and American sentiment to what they were before the war.

Had Russia not collapsed, a peace, which though inconclusive, would have at least rendered a new assault by Germany improbable, might have been easily possible, owing to the fact that by its very momentum the war has called into being forces that did not exist in 1914. The very strength of the attack has evoked a defence equally strong. The probability that Germany would not again lightly assail Serbia, Belgium or France, would have lain, even more in the forces called forth in this war than in the specific guarantees which it might be hoped to embody in a treaty of peace.

War today is a deliberate operation, planned, prepared, and at a favourable moment, launched. The determination to wage war is an intellectual process. When on a certain day Germany's leaders agreed on a policy of war, their decision was based upon a multitude of convictions, opinions and guesses, some true, others false. They probably believed, rightly, that their big guns could smash the French fortresses; otherwise they might not have declared for war. They probably believed that an early decision could be obtained against France, and that Russia could be defeated at leisure; had they not thought so they might have hesitated. They seemed to have believed that Belgian resistance would be negligible; that England would be disinclined to intervene, and

would probably hesitate until her intervention was ineffective. If she did intervene, troubles in Ireland and her colonies might hamper her movements. The leaders of Germany apparently counted upon no assistance from Italy but they hardly anticipated an alliance of Italy with France and Britain. Whatever they thought, however, it is clear that considerations of this general nature did enter into their calculations, and these considerations were not absurd and unreal, but were based upon such knowledge as they had and could grasp. Weighing the ponderables and ignoring the imponderables, as militarists are likely to do, the German leaders concluded that a speedy victory was probable. The chances were in their favour.

After this war what would have been the chances in favour of a second attack by Germany had Russia maintained her military strength? Obviously Germany's formidableness would have increased, since from the beginning her leaders could count on the active co-operation of four nations and upon the quiescence of Serbia. But the defensive forces would be seen to have grown even more largely. The war has established the fact that the British Empire (or at least its self-governing colonies) is a unit. The immediate military strength of Great Britain is increased ten to twenty times. No longer would France and Belgium alone be forced to bear the brunt of the attack, since Great Britain and possibly

Italy could immediately range themselves behind France, and behind these would be an American army, and the resources of a country richer than Germany and Austria combined. Moreover the introduction of trench warfare has rendered it more difficult than four years ago to gain, by an initial superiority in numbers, a rapid decisive victory. Germany could no longer overrun France in a month, and almost from the beginning she would fight against superior forces on her Western front.

But the collapse of Russia changes all this. Germany's eastern barriers are now broken down, and if her present ruling classes remain in power she will, in the event of a re-established *status quo*, be able to exert a preponderating military influence on Russia. She can keep her eastern neighbour distracted, intimidated, weak. She can bribe her officials, secure political and economic concessions, perhaps even dictate her form of government. Able to defend herself, at least temporarily, on the west, she will have an almost free hand on the east. It will be extremely difficult for the Allies, even with their control of the sea, to interfere with German plans in Russia.

The inevitable conclusion is that the *status quo ante*, like a German victory, offers no satisfactory solution to internationalists and no security to the nations.¹

¹ Today (March 1918) such a solution seems even more unde-

Nor does a mere victory, either partial or complete, for the Allies necessarily mean a satisfactory state of the world. A victory may lead to a retributive peace, to a vindictive policy, or to a mere bargaining and haggling, out of which the nations may gain territory but no real advantage. Such a victory does not automatically solve the infinitely complex questions of Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Istria, Dalmatia, Asia Minor, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia. Distribution of these by mere force will leave many injustices.

It follows that there can be no conclusive peace that is not based upon internationalism and justice. The peace that democrats should desire is not retributive, but preventive and curative, a peace not productive of future wars; a peace based primarily not on historical precedents, or historical claims, or the *status quo ante*, but on a reorganization and democratization of Europe and the world. It must be a peace that aims at the establishment and steady evolution of a new world allegiance and of a new democratic world society. It must be a constructive peace, a peace based on principle, not a mere patchwork. We should desire a moderate

sirable. Russia has now been divided into a group of new states, most of which, even if unannexed, will be under the influence of whatever groups rule Germany. If we are to have new wars after this war, a Germany, permitted to dismember Russia, would be equipped and fortified for these struggles as never before. The menace of 1914 would be increased ten-fold.

peace permitting the future healthful development of all nations, our enemies included. We must base our peace, not on temporary, but on permanent economic processes.¹

Only so can we hope to gain any measure of security. It is not by victory alone, though a victory may or may not be essential, but by the fixing of just terms, that we make progress. We may drive the Germans back to the Rhine and still not be secure, and we may not completely defeat them and yet gain full security. A revolution in Germany would be more advantageous to our safety and to the progress of the world than a dozen Jenas. We cannot live for another generation under the old tension from which this war came almost as a relief. We cannot for ever remain on our guard against a nervous, frightened and threatening Germany seeking to win away our allies, as we should be seeking to seduce hers. We do not desire an economic war after the war, which will be inevitable if the political tension remains. Finally we do not wish to hand over Russia to the machinations of German imperialists, nor to create in that country a state

¹ What made the victories of the North in the Civil War and of Great Britain in the Boer War conclusive was that the resulting peace and the legislation thereafter furnished a permanent base for the defeated peoples. As Mr. A. F. Whyte says, "Victory to be complete must be more than the defeat of the enemy. It must provide a foundation on which the security and peace of Europe can be built, for only then can we say that our ends have been secured." *La Victoire Intégrale*, *The New Europe*, Vol. IV, September 6, 1917.

of mind which will develop a Muscovite imperialism, determined to destroy the "effete and rotten" civilization of the West. All these possibilities, and many more, lie hidden in the old conceptions of our international life. All these dangers are those which have come again and again in the history of the world, despite overwhelming "victories" and innumerable reversions to the *status quo*.

There can be no conclusive peace following a war based on greed and ending in aggrandizement. The only conclusive peace is a peace that *concludes*, a peace that foreshadows the end of an era, a peace that is in harmony, not only with the coming economic development of the world, but with the political aspirations of millions of men whose allegiance today transcends national boundaries and reaches out feebly towards an international loyalty.

CHAPTER XII

GUARANTEES

ALL the nations now at war protest that they desire peace but all insist upon guarantees against a renewal of the struggle. Germany demands security against any recurrence of what she calls the unprovoked war against her; Great Britain, France and Russia demand like guarantees against Germany. Each group of belligerents wishes to bind over the other to keep the peace.

This demand for specific guarantees appears and reappears in all official utterances. In the German Peace Note of December 12, 1916, neutrals are assured that "the propositions" which the Central Powers will bring forward "have for their object a guarantee of the existence, of the honour and liberty of evolution for their nations." The Allies, insists Lord Curzon, are fighting for "*security* that those [German] crimes shall not be repeated, and that those sacrifices shall not have been made in vain." The peace must "give *guarantees* for the future." "The war would be vain if we had no *guarantees* and securities against a repetition of Germany's offence." "Restitution, reparation, *guarantee* against repetition" is the phrase accepted

by Lloyd George; "reparation for the past and *security* for the future" echoes Mr. Asquith. "We are fighting for peace now," says Mr. Bonar Law, "but we are also fighting for security for peace in the time to come." No peace is possible, says the Reply of the Allied Governments to Germany's Note, which is not calculated in some way to afford "effective *guarantees* for the future security of the world."

Undoubtedly guarantees in some form are necessary. To end the war without security to the belligerent nations is not to end it at all; a peace that fails to give this sense of safety will soon be broken.

There is much virtue, therefore, in this word "guarantee" and like all virtuous things it is dearly loved by diplomatists. But it is an ambiguous word covering not only the most universal and most primitive desire of all nations, that of safety, but very much more. Under the demand for guarantees lurk all sorts of gross, staring, brazen cupidities, the grinning hypocrisy of the predatory state, the sleek rapacity of acquisitive classes, to whom peace and war, international law and international discord are all "business." We must distinguish clearly among all these honest guarantees.

As an illustration, consider again the German formula of December, 1916. This seeming virtuous manifesto demands a guarantee of existence, honour and "liberty of evolution," a perilously elastic

phrase which may mean little or everything. Under this modest title deed Germany might logically claim all Europe, Asia and Africa as well as the Islands of the Sea. A guarantee of "liberty of evolution" is an oceanic phrase, a demand *carte blanche*. Similarly the guarantees demanded by the Allies are susceptible of an interpretation requiring many changes of frontiers and many acts of spoliation.

The basic difficulty with these current demands is that the thing really desired is the relative weakening of the opponent. The nations seem to have lost all faith in treaties, conventions and solemn agreements to keep the peace. Disbelieving in all moral sanctions, they have reverted to the doctrine of self-help. Each believes that it must defend itself by its own strength and that of its allies; it must, therefore, be stronger than its foe. Its security must consist in a condition which renders its antagonist insecure.

All of which doctrine sounds both familiar and plausible.

Yet if the war and the antecedent history of European diplomacy prove anything, they demonstrate that no lasting security lies in this process of debilitating the enemy. If we might follow the ancient policy of completely annihilating the foe, something might possibly be accomplished. Today, however, it would be repugnant to cultivated people to assassinate all men and women and all male and

female children of the hostile population. Yet short of such extermination nothing permanent is attained. The spirit of nationality, crushed to earth, arises with new vigour, and the weakened nation, gaining in resolution what it loses in material strength, becomes the centre of new hostile coalitions. In our unstable and eternally transient European balance there is no such thing as permanent debilitation.

Were the Allies to be completely successful and were they to seek to destroy the Central Powers, it would be possible to crush Germany and dismember Austria. But the national groups represented by these nations would remain and would form a potential centre of resistance. The very superiority in strength of the Allies would develop among them differences of policy on matters of secondary interest, while the insecurity of the Central Powers would lead to an enforced cohesion. The smaller group would create dissension in the larger, and in the end the unsteady balancing of equal coalitions would be restored. The whole principle is vicious. A security gained at the expense of an opponent results in the insecurity of that opponent, which in turn makes the first nation insecure. In such arrangements no guarantee of peace can be found.

In these matters we have been more fortunate in America. After this war Canada will lie exposed to attack by a nation of fully ten times its strength, and

will be unable to resist. She will have no guarantees, in the sense in which that term is used in diplomatic negotiations. Nevertheless Canada will be unafraid, as she would be though our two nations stood alone in the world. She will know that the United States does not wish to attack her. She finds a greater security in our friendliness than in any possible defensive measures.

It is of course not assumed that conditions in Europe are the same as in America or the relations between Bulgaria and Serbia, or France and Germany, identical with those between Canada and the United States. What is clear, however, is that not only does a weakening of one's neighbour not constitute a real guarantee against attack, but that such guarantees may conceivably be found by ways other than those approved upon the balance of power theory.

Apart from the theory of guarantee by debilitation there are two methods by which it is sought to make a nation secure against attack. These are international in scope. They are the method of the covenant and the method of the destruction of motive.

Since the invasion of Belgium we have tended to regard all covenants between nations as of dubious value. If Germany could violate a treaty to which she had attached her signature, what reason have we for supposing that she, or any nation, would scru-

pulously observe future obligations? Today there is no longer any supernatural sanction to the King's oath, and if he swear to his hurt, he will break his word. The history of diplomacy is filled with scraps of paper. Moreover a solemn treaty once broken is worse than if it had never been made. Had there been no guarantee of Belgian neutrality, France could better have defended her own frontier.

Nevertheless, future treaties, agreements and covenants between nations are absolutely essential to the maintenance of a world civilization. If treaties have been broken in the past we must seek to arrange matters so that they shall be less likely to be broken hereafter. We must study the pathology of solemn treaties, discover the diseases of which they died, and seek by all means to prevent these diseases.

That treaties have been violated in the past has been due to two main causes, the insecurity of the nation violating them, and the absence of a real international sanction. No nation can be secure unless all nations are secure. Belgium was invaded and Holland, Switzerland, Denmark and Greece felt insecure, because Germany, France, Russia and England were insecure. Moreover, the treaties which have been violated might have been respected had they been more definite in their terms and more explicit in the penalties for their infraction. Had England and the United States, prior to 1914, def-

initely agreed to declare war against any invader of Belgium, and had they in the past by force of arms maintained similar treaties, Germany might not have dared invade Belgium.

The guarantees that we seek, therefore, must be secured in two ways—by making the cost of aggression greater, and by making the temptation to be aggressive less. We may accomplish this in two ways, by international leagues to prevent aggression, and by a series of economic, political and socio-psychological transformations changing the direction of thought of the nations. If we can secure conditions among nations analogous to those which prevent the United States from attacking Canada we shall have gone far in the direction of providing guarantees for all peoples.

This policy of effecting economic changes making for peace may lead to startling results. It may, in given circumstances, prove desirable actually to recompense the enemy instead of punishing him, just as we find jobs for convicted criminals, not as a reward for their crime but as a means of preventing their again being tempted. This method is not the same as that of buying off an antagonist, which, because it places a premium on lawlessness becomes the worst guarantee of peace. The idea underlying the policy is that those nations are normally aggressive which do not find vent for their activities in peaceful pursuits, and are therefore forced outwards.

The most effective prophylactic against crime, individual or national, is prosperity and content.

We have seen that a crushing of the enemy and still less his humiliation will not have the effect of guaranteeing the security of the victorious nations. In only one way can that security be obtained, by strengthening international law (by providing it with a sanction) and by reversing the current of thought and changing the needs of the German people. If Germany has no more desire to attack her neighbours than the United States has of attacking Canada, France and Belgium need no better guarantee. If, moreover, to this absence of motive there is added a series of treaties, underwritten by a League of Nations pledged to fight for their maintenance, and securing France and Belgium against attack, the guarantee is as strong as it can be made. But this security of France and Belgium presupposes that of all other nations, including Germany. It presupposes a new international organization, new international concepts, a new allegiance and an end to the anarchy between states which has existed for so many centuries.

CHAPTER XIII

THE GRAND ALLIANCE

IF we are to realize the ideal of an international organization, such as that for which the liberals of America and other nations are striving, we may find in the present alliance opposed to Germany and in the economic and political concert which that alliance has been forced to adopt, an embryonic form, which in the years after the war may develop a relatively permanent and more or less complete unity.

There have been other Grand Alliances, pretentious and feeble, but being mere accumulations of soldiers, they have meant nothing. This Alliance is a totally new thing. It is a union, at least in aspiration, of peoples and not of kings. It is a coalition, economic and political, of states that had formerly lived an independent life.

To gauge this Alliance properly we must look at it from a distance. There are innumerable seams and crevices in it and unlike things are joined incontinently instead of being fused. But these shortcomings are inevitable.¹ The marvellous thing is that there should be an alliance at all.

¹ "Napoleon was not so great as we all thought. After all he only fought coalitions." Premier Clemenceau, quoted by Paul U. Kellogg, *The Survey*, New York, March 19, 1918

An Alliance of a billion people—at least of a few hundred millions who rule a billion, extending its sway over twenty million square miles which is many times the maximum extent of the Roman Empire. Look at the map, as our German opponents insist, and we shall see that the territory belonging to it covers three-fourths the earth's land surface. Add to this other nations which are in sympathy and we almost literally have a world in arms, and, what is more important, a world in concert. We are witnessing a spectacle in which the most unlikely human beings are in surprised co-operation.

All this, if impermanent, is highly unimportant; its mere grandiose magnitude will not save the occurrence from being episodic. But what if this gigantic coming together is the sign and seal of a New Order? What if we are witnessing the convocation of a vast kindergarten of Internationalism?

If it is so, will not the event be the greatest in the War, greater even than the stupendous Russian Revolution? The war will then be remembered not by German ambitions nor by Hindenburg or Joffre victories but by the fact of this concert alone. We shall be at the beginning of a New Stage in History.

Let us, however, not be precipitate nor over-optimistic, judging these events in years and imagining that our Grand Alliance will immediately succeed in securing a permanent peace. We dare not expect

a juggler's trick that will bring a newly painted, cast-iron international system out of the bag. What we must strive and hope for is something less palpable, a new allegiance to a slowly forming World Society. This new allegiance, at first unconscious, then conscious, at first unwilling, then willing, will be a continuation and fortification of habits of mind and action that spring out of the temporary needs of the present Alliance. A war that produces this—or even advances it in time—will have more than paid for its tremendous cost.

The great hope then is that the ranging of the world against Germany has made possible a nearer approach to Internationalism. A union caused by temporary opposition may be made permanent. A union for defence and destruction may be used after the war for vast constructive purposes.

The hope of a degree of permanency lies in the nature of the Alliance. It is more than a mere diplomatic union. Money, food and men have been held in common and an international organization, admittedly primitive and very defective, has been created in which all the nations have worked for one common aim.

It is in some respects an astounding union. There has been a unification of classes within each nation as well as a unification of nations. There has been a merging of groups hitherto hostile and an attenuation of separating interests. Nothing before has

ever revealed so great a capacity of the infinitely divided nation to prove its essential unity. We had come to doubt the strength of this unity, cemented, and at the same time sharply limited, by the desire for individual gain. In the economic system of all great industrial nations men worked to feed, clothe and comfort other men they had never seen but each man worked for his own wages and his own profits. We did not recognize how tough and resistant were the loose fibres of this fragile organism, in which, it seemed to us, half the people devoted their sedulous lives to obstructing conscientiously the efforts of the other half. In all countries the Government was over-manned and under-minded. Class distinctions were strong and class prejudices bitter. And here out of this anarchic mass there appeared suddenly in the hour of threatened destruction and at its behest a startling unity. Not that the unity was complete. Very, very far from it. Even during the war countries like England and the United States suffered tremendously from their ingrained economic individualism. Yet there was at least some progress towards unification.

For the first time each nation's full productive capacity stood revealed. It was like the sudden discovery of concealed faculties when other faculties are destroyed; like the delicate sense of touch which comes to the blinded man. There was also revealed

in all the nations the immense increase in power which has been slowly accreted during several generations of popular education.

What was true of the nation was also true, though, of course, to an even less extent, of the larger unit, the group of nations. Almost unconsciously there was formed, or revealed, a vague super-organization, a partial fellowship of nations united by the same sort of compulsions and attractions as those which cement a nation. As a result of new necessities states hitherto seemingly autonomous and self-centred learned to co-ordinate and to sacrifice certain special national interests to the larger group interests of the Alliance.

This co-operation was partly military but above all economic. It was found necessary to apportion the shipping under the control of the Allied Powers to the needs of the several nations. England could not benefit by diverting shipping from Italy to herself if as a result Italy's army was insufficiently supplied or the morale of her population menaced. It was necessary for the United States to export wheat and meat in order that the resistance of her Allies should not break down through actual hunger. In the same way coal was distributed as well as copper, iron, wool and other materials.

All this has not yet been fully developed, and many inequalities remain. Certain of the Allied nations have suffered an excessive strain as the result

of an insufficient supply of commodities, of which in other Allied nations there has been a sufficiency or even an abundance. But the underlying theory is obvious. It was acknowledged in principle that the welfare of the group took precedence over that of any one nation and therefore that it had become essential to pool the supplies of all commodities necessary to the winning of the war. England no longer pursued an industrial or a commercial policy dictated by English needs alone, but subordinated her own interests to the larger economic and military necessities of all the Allies. The same was true in greater or less degree of the United States, France and Italy. Unless all the nations combating Germany could draw upon a common source the danger of defeat was imminent.

This close co-operation of the Allies in times of war sharply accentuates a development which has long been in process, the loss by the several nations of their full economic independence. Before the war a country like Holland or Greece believed that it was self-sufficient, in the sense that it could get what it wanted and sell what it had for sale; its custom was competed for by other nations. So accustomed were the Dutch and Greeks to the sight of foreign vessels thronging their ports and bringing them the produce of the world that they did not recognize the precariousness of this trade. The actual though concealed dependence of the na-

tion, while recognized by economists, was for the mass of the people a vague and unreal thing. It did not affect a man's action today or tomorrow. The cord is now snapped and the economic independence of the nations, and not only of the small nations, is perceived to be gone. We are in an era of obvious and perilous interdependence. Even the strong state, though conscious of a greater strength than ever, has become easily vulnerable. It may die of a mere blockade. As in a military sense, so also economically a state can no longer stand alone. To stand alone is to be a shadow of a nation, an outcast from the close family of nations.

At the present time all this is a curious revelation. For forty years there had been a definite organization of industry along national lines, a promotion of the "national economy" and a rapid nationalization of industry as of other phases of life. On the one hand we had protective tariffs, export bounties and transportation rebates in the interest of the home industry and at the expense of foreigners; on the other a national competition for colonies and exclusive spheres of interest. We had witnessed an intensification of the national interest in industry, similar in kind (though vastly greater in extent) to that adopted in France two hundred years ago. What Colbert and the Mercantilists did in a small way, all nations were now doing on a vast scale. The result was that merchants and manufacturers

of different countries no longer competed as individuals, but the whole industry of one nation combated the whole industry of another. It was the German steel industry as a unit against the French industry, not Schulz & Co. against the firm of Machaud or Le Brun. This nationalism of industry has by no means reached the limits of its development. It is still in its beginnings and in the future we may expect to see business in the various countries organized on a far more closely co-ordinated national basis. The improvement of transportation, the wide extension of advertising, the increasing standardization of industries, the successes of trusts and cartels have put an end to industrial organization on a smaller scale. The increasing interest of states in the promotion of the economic welfare of their citizens renders the success of economic nationalism assured.

While industry, however, has now compassed the nation it begins to stretch forth beyond the frontiers, and the same impulse which made it national is leading it to become supra-national or international. It seems likely therefore that the growing economic nationalism will be infused with a super-nationalism as a result of the growing dependence of the nations and of their industrial systems upon one another. National economic warfare, like military warfare, is too dangerous a conflict to permit of its indefinite continuance.

It may perhaps be urged that with the resumption of peace the economic self-sufficiency of nations will immediately return, and as a consequence the grand economic alliance of the Allied nations will suddenly cease. Actually, however, the conditions created during the war are likely to last at least for several years after the war. The withdrawal of millions of men from industry has caused an enormous reduction in the available stocks of many important commodities. There is not enough food in the world adequately to feed the world population. Nor is there enough copper, steel, coal, cotton and wool. There is a startling lack of essential raw materials. The available supplies can be distributed fairly only by a recognized international organization.

Moreover, the power of any one nation to harm its neighbours economically by the withdrawal of raw materials is likely to be greater after the war than it has ever been before. If the United States and Great Britain refuse to export raw cotton, the textile industries of other countries will break down completely. The same would be true of wool and of several other commodities. For England and the United States, or either of them, however, to adopt such a selfish and monopolistic policy would be to alienate all other nations. In such circumstances there could be no peace. The various Allied nations therefore will be obliged to pool all resources and distribute the product in proportion to

the estimated needs of the nations within the Alliance. For several years after the war Italy, France, England, the United States, as well as other nations, will probably receive such amounts of the food, textiles and minerals of the world, at a fixed price and under agreed conditions, as shall be determined upon in the permanent international economic conference having the disposal of these materials.

The economic co-operation of the present Grand Alliance is likely to become more definite and thorough owing to the fact that it will not only constitute an effective weapon against Germany during the war and, perhaps, a means of securing a just peace, but also, for some time after the war, a regulator of German trade and of German competition. Germany is beginning to recognize the enormous influence of the economic factors in the decision of this war. In the beginning, she hoped for a speedy victory which would lessen the economic strain. When that victory failed and when the British blockade became more effective, the pressure increased painfully. With this increasing pressure came an enormously increased fear of an economic boycott. So long as the United States and Latin America remained out of the war, Germany had comparatively little to fear from such an attack, since she could always play off these great neutrals, with their resources in raw materials and their markets for finished products, against her great European enemies.

With the entrance of the United States, however, followed by that of China and Brazil, the situation changed for her alarmingly. It is this which explains the emphasis which Germany has ever since laid upon the necessity of the Allies not using against her their economic weapons.

The present situation is that if Germany fails to gain a complete military victory she can be compelled to accept reasonable terms by force of the enormous economic superiority of the Allies. The Central Empires have almost completely used up their supplies of raw material. Their factories, railroads and other instruments of production have been injured by the strain of a three-and-a-half years' war. What they require is not alone the repair of the military machine and the storage of a surplus of goods for the future, but also a supply of commodities for the satisfaction of their daily needs. They cannot secure all these goods except by drawing upon the Allies or upon countries completely or partially dominated by the Allies.¹

It is impossible to exaggerate the urgency of this need. Unless Germany can make satisfactory treaty arrangements she cannot buy the goods she requires, and in return for those that she can buy, she must export gold, of which she has not enough today to maintain her paper currency. Failing to solve this

¹ Since the dissolution of Russia and the signing of a separate peace with the Ukraine the situation of Germany in this respect has vastly improved.

problem, her export trade cannot be re-established, her wages will fall while her prices rise, and the resulting unemployment and discontent may bring the nation to the verge of revolution. Not to get raw materials means decivilization. As one writer has said: "The Germans have discovered by painful experience . . . that life in a community without an adequate supply of cotton, wool, silk, leather, and jute, of animal and vegetable fats, of lubricating oil, of tea, coffee, and cocoa, of copper, tin, nickel, and other even more indispensable metals, not to speak of foodstuffs, is so squalid and lowering as to be almost unendurable." To obtain these materials Germany, unless she obtains her decisive military victory, will be obliged to make concessions.

And the chance of a real military decision becomes less every day. Even General von Freytag-Loringhoven admits (in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*) that "the power of a radical decision of a world-war has slipped away from the armies and that the strategical situation is conditioned by the world-economic situation." "It is owing to Germany's unfavourable position in this regard," he continues, that "victories which once would have been absolutely decisive, and the conquest of whole Kingdoms, have not brought us nearer to peace."¹

It is quite possible therefore that the very element

¹ See also "Deductions from the Great War" by Lieutenant-general Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, New York, 1918, p. 10.

which has created a partial economic unity among the Allies will be effective in establishing, at least temporarily, an internationalism broader than the present alliance. In all probability it will be the dread of a throttling by the Allied nations, and this dread alone, which will compel the Central Powers to accede to some measure of joint action with the present Allies. The economic weapon is likely to prove decisive. It is that which, aided by the military weapon, will enable the Allies to put enough pressure upon the German ruling classes and to appeal to the industrial and commercial classes of Germany, as well as to its proletariat, to bring the war to a reasonable end.

That end cannot be a mere resumption of the economic war which preceded the war.

What may eventually result we cannot yet foresee, but for a period of, let us say, at least five years, Germany will be able to receive her raw materials and her full access to foreign markets only on condition that she applies to her own industries the same rules and limitations as do the Allies.

In return for such a reopening of trade, and for the resulting economic security, Germany may well be willing to accept a peace which she might otherwise reject. There is no advantage to her in holding territories if she cannot feed her people and cannot maintain their standard of living.¹

¹ Today (March 9, 1918) Germany's situation in respect to her

It is also quite possible that the economic superiority of the world opposed to Germany will be a factor not only in ending the war, but in creating a new international system.

Into this international system Germany would have to be admitted on equal terms. Not to admit her into the new economic league would be to make her an enemy and to force her again to resort to military action at the earliest advantageous moment. The Allies can afford to be generous even beyond the point of Germany's ability to extort terms. They will be wise if they see in their own temporary economic union the hope of a vast future international system which in the end will determine problems other than economic. For if the nations can learn to agree on the disposition of the available raw materials of the world and on the opening of markets, they should also be able in time to agree upon the question of the distribution of trade and investment opportunities in all colonies old and new. If they can learn to agree on these subjects it should not be impossible for them to find some sort of an approach to an understanding on such intricate international questions as the freedom of the sea and rules for the regulation and limitation of armaments. If they can agree upon so complicated a question as the internationalization of the Straits, will it prove

food and raw material supply has been vastly improved by arrangements with Russia, Rumania and the Ukraine.

impossible to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion concerning the status of the Balkan States? The nations, temporarily at least, are forced to come to an arrangement concerning the distribution of the available raw material in the world. It is a necessity which will be universally acknowledged. Will it be impossible to use this temporary and partial necessity for co-operative effort between the nations to form the beginnings of a new and larger co-ordination, not only specifically economic, but also political?

If this turns out to be the case, not immediately but in the course of years, the present Grand Alliance may be converted into a limited economic union of all the nations, and eventually into a new system of internationalism in which there will be room for the gradual growth of an allegiance wider than the present allegiance to the state.

What the present economic concert among the Allies offers is perhaps only a vague hope, only the beginning of a beginning of a really effective and plenary international system. The Alliance may not even outlast the war. It may show signs of internal strain and its component states may revert to their former cut throat competition. The essential and encouraging element in the situation, however, is that we shall be faced after the war with a strong, though temporary, economic pressure, which is not unlikely to force states, enemy and allied, to act in

concert. Indeed this economic co-operation may be presented as one of the conditions of the treaty of peace. If these specific and transient problems can be solved temporarily, a basis will possibly be laid for a wider and more permanent international co-operation, such as President Wilson has in mind in his prophecies of a concert of the peoples.

CHAPTER XIV

OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONALISM

Nothing is more enticing than a large word which idealizes our ambitions and justifies our hopes. Once we discover this all-solving word we embrace it eagerly and never seek to ask whether to others it means the same wide salvation as to us. If it unlocks our doors, if it opens our windows upon a glorious vista of liberty, we cannot conceive that it may not unlock all other doors and open all other windows. We assume a universal validity for any theory, premise or ideal which suits our circumstances.

In the past the nations have had many of these all-embracing words. Authority, Conformity, Faith, Liberty, Equality, Democracy, Nationalism—one after another these keywords came to the peoples and were adopted and fought for, though to some of the peoples they meant release and to others tears and chains.

It is indeed when a word, phrase or slogan completely epitomizes the desires of a nation or a class and arouses the greatest enthusiasm that it becomes most cruel. The noblest aspirations translate themselves somewhere into misery and pain. There were

no better intentioned men in the world than many who inspired the soul-saving Inquisition. The wars of religion were in part fought for high ideals, which seemed to the fighting nations of universal validity. The democratic crusade of the French Revolution, which sought to make the world ripe for democracy (and in the end contributed to that result), brought to some peoples a useless and heavy burden. So too, the Holy Alliance was animated by a belief which seemed to the believers incontestable and yet met opposition. In the middle of the Nineteenth Century many nations clamoured for an era of peace, but for others peace would have meant disaster, for it would have left their problems unsolved, their democracy depressed, and their people disunited. It was not because these ideals were bad that they bore so hardly upon certain peoples, but usually because they were envisaged too narrowly. Altruistic ideals were tinged with the selfish interests of their protagonists.

Today we are standing behind another world-embracing word, internationalism. In one sense it is a very old conception since its roots run far back into the past. But never before has this ideal seemed so near fruition, never before has it been so rich in content, and never has it stirred so many millions to such depths. It is a noble and a generous ideal, a gracious conception of peoples big and little living together in harmony, each developing its separate

abilities and characteristics, yet all united by a common humanity. Above all, it is an ultimately practicable ideal.

Does this noble idea, however, in its usual interpretation, make for the freedom and full evolution of all nations or does it benefit some and injure others? If it does injure some, can they be reconciled to or dragooned into internationalism? And if they are dragooned, does that fact impair the spirit of internationalism and defeat its purposes?

There are many variants of internationalism. Under this one word are included plans, simple and complex, definite and indefinite, practicable, impracticable, impossible, ranging from the first halting step toward a co-operation between states to wholesale programs for wiping out all nations, and converting humanity into one inseparable people. Yet as we view this theory in the light of its interpretation by the average thinker in Western Europe we find certain rather clearly defined elements. These are disarmament, international arbitration and mediation, the reinforcement of treaties, especially of treaties of neutralization, and finally the granting of the right of self-determination to each conscious nationality. While other elements are sometimes comprised and sometimes excluded, these five constitute the core of international thought as developed in the United States, England and France.

It is essentially this internationalism for which we believe that we are fighting.

Unfortunately it is doubtful whether this form of internationalism is one which will be acceptable to our present enemies or to all of our allies. To our enemies it seems a cramping, one-sided, selfish proposal, not a cure for present-day evils but a sword, the hilt of which lies in the hands of the Allies while the blade points at the heart of the Central Powers. It seems to them a glittering mask, covering the grim reality of a group of prosperous, selfish nations seeking to injure others; a weapon, not a cure.

What truth is there in this point of view? Are there interests in the world worthy of conservation which would be destroyed by any such application of internationalism? Why have Germany and Austria so long antagonized the proposals of the Western democracies to replace an international anarchy with a responsible international government?

The essence of this antagonism is to be seen in the clash between the State Idea (*Staatsidee*), as strikingly represented by Germany, and an Internationalism represented by Germany's enemies. Month by month it becomes more apparent that German policies are closely associated with a new, or at least a newly emphasized conception of an omnipotent state, largely free from international restraints and consideration for subject nationalities, and

with the right to impress into its service the lives, goods and opinions of its subjects. As opposed to this conception stands that of Internationalism, which subordinates state policy to the larger interests of the whole family of nations, which emphasizes the right of nationalistic self-determination, and the desirability of peace.

In democratic countries liberals have long believed that the ultimate triumph of this Internationalism was assured. All considerations of wisdom, justice and moderation, all the common sense and common morality of the world were to lead to an easy, almost automatic, victory for the international principle. As peoples became educated, intelligent and free, they would recognize that the exacerbated nationalism of today was an absurdity. Men would see that they were brothers, that their interests were identical, that they could not strike blows without hitting themselves. Under the banner of Internationalism mankind would move steadily forwards towards civilization, democracy and peace.

For the moment at least the war has stripped us of this smiling illusion. It has revealed to us how for forty years one of the most powerful and intelligent of nations, one which by most criteria must be adjudged highly civilized, has been wedded to an exactly opposite doctrine. Germany has developed an allegiance to the state beyond anything known in modern times. This German state is a

jealous god, visiting the iniquities of the disloyal most heavily, and tolerating no other allegiance. The state is an end in itself, not a means to the happiness of its subjects. Its first law is not service but survival and power.¹ Therefore International Law is valid only in so far as it lies within the interests of the state. Within the state minor nationalities, minor economic groups, minor organizations of all kinds possess only such rights as the state in its own interest chooses to accord, and rights so accorded may be withdrawn. The state is supreme; the individual within the state and the great inchoate world on the outside are subordinate.

It was commonly believed that this formidable doctrine, the outcroppings of which we have discovered in recent grim events, was an anachronism, like the belief in witches, and that it must give way before the more modern conceptions of the democratic nations. Yet this State Idea, or, as we may call it, this Neo-Nationalism, far from dying as a result of external intellectual pressure, has actually grown with the growth in literacy and education. The Germans today read more widely than in the idealistic period of Schiller and Kant, and they discuss political questions, not always wisely perhaps

¹ There is today a new type of German imperialist who would insist that the first law of the state is survival *for* service. German imperialists of this type have absorbed much of the British imperialistic spirit, and men like Rohrbach read occasionally like prosy translations of Kipling.

but interminably. And out of this discussion has come a fortification of Neo-Nationalism. Even the peasant on his five-acre farm, or the hod-carrier on a Berlin tenement is more or less in agreement with the current doctrine of a strong, highly organized, centralized state, for which an almost exclusive allegiance may be demanded. He may perhaps express the doctrine sentimentally; at bottom, however, he vaguely believes in the sort of national and international organization in which his rulers believe.

At first glance the German socialists seem to form an exception. Despite their internationalism, however, their conception of the state bears a certain likeness to that of the professors. Their co-operative commonwealth reproduces much of the method, philosophy and morale of the German state. The Socialist party itself, despite its democratic basis, is unitary, centralized, all-powerful, and toward minorities not a little intolerant. It is regimented and over-disciplined. The trend of the German revolutionary and semi-revolutionary movement is not only national—in its decisive relations—but overwhelmingly political.¹ Her Socialists do not aim at a limitation of the immense authority of the state, let alone at its destruction, but at its conver-

¹ Unlike France, Italy and the United States, Germany has little anti-political or syndicalist sentiment.

sion into a centralized, omnipotent, socialistic organization.

Nor has this weighty emphasis upon the state idea, this subordination of individuals, classes and interests to a unitary and internationally irresponsible state resulted in any decline in national efficiency. Rather it seems to have had the opposite effect. Both in peace and war Germany has been singularly successful. The tight national cohesion has not destroyed private initiative nor prevented a growth of effective group action. The German conception of the state has not been discredited by any marked inefficiency.

What then will be the war's result in destroying or propagating this doctrine of Neo-Nationalism? Will Italy, Japan, Serbia, Roumania, and perhaps England, France and the United States embrace the doctrine which Germany has upheld? Will a feeble and languidly-aspiring Internationalism be worshipped in our studies while in actual life we go over to a strenuous and powerful, if narrow Neo-Nationalism? It is conceivable that the war will end with a stronger assertion of the omnipotence and irresponsibility of the state, with a naked Neo-Nationalism covering itself *pro forma* with a few internationalist phrases. The New Nationalism may triumph even although its titular champions be defeated.

This is one of the deepest issues of the war. The outcome of this contest between the New Nationalism, aggressive, and confident and an Internationalism, as yet unsure of itself or its purpose, will vitally affect the coming generations.

Historically these two opposed doctrines, Neo-Nationalism and Internationalism, are twin daughters of a single development. Whether in any given case the one or the other has taken root has depended upon the conditions surrounding the community during the period in which it attained to nationhood.

Of our present-day nations, England, France, Spain, Portugal and others, reached nationhood centuries ago, while Italy, Germany, Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and Roumania did not become independent full-fledged nations until recently. All these nations desire approximately the same things; a numerous homogeneous population permanently inhabiting a coherent territory; a well-defined and easily defended frontier; a population with a common language, literature and institutions; a unitary government and an organic, intellectual and political solidarity; a population composed, if possible, of only one nationality.¹ If these elements are essential to full nationhood, then France and Spain are nations in a fuller sense than Austria, Hungary or

¹ See definition of nation by F. Lieber, "Fragments of Political Science on Nationalism and Internationalism," New York, 1868; quoted by Krehbiel (Edward), "War and Society," New York, 1916, p. 1.

Russia. The latter are impeded by conflicts between the state and the nationalities within their borders.

What nationalities are is easier to sense than to define. Broadly speaking a nationality is "a race which possesses its own language, customs and culture, and enough self-consciousness to preserve them"¹ even though it does not possess its own government, as does a nation. Serbia is a nation; the Serbs of Austria are only a nationality. Flemings, Walloons, Alsatians, Poles and Italian Swiss all form nationalities. In a nation comprised of various nationalities there is usually, but not always, an antagonism between the state and the nationalistic spirit. The Roumanians of Hungary are not a loyal part of the Magyar state; their sympathies are nationalistic and cross the boundary into Roumania. The same conditions exist everywhere in the more or less coherent states of Central and Eastern Europe. The resulting conflict between state and nationality is a grave danger to the peace of the world.

This antagonism did not always exist. Two centuries ago the various language groups vegetated together harmoniously, because not sharply conscious of their nationality. The state in those days was a loosely-integrated thing, amorphous and comfortably inefficient. Czech and German, Hungarian

¹ "The War and Democracy," by J. Dover Wilson and others, London, 1915, p. 19.

and Slovak lived under one distant Emperor, whom they never saw. There was not much more friction than today between the various national groups comprised within the Roman Catholic Church. But all this comfortable co-habitation of dormant nationalities has been ended by a series of economic, political, social and psychological changes, which have occurred during the last few centuries. A new sense has been given to nationality and a new vigour to the nationalistic principle.

The internal and external difficulties in which this growth of nationalistic ambitions has placed states composed of several nationalities are immensely increased by the fact that these groups are permanent, unabsorbable and almost impenetrable bodies. It is often asked why Germany cannot absorb its few Danes or Poles as we in America our millions of aliens. The answer is that in Europe these nationalities are growing things, whereas what we in America have are but up-rooted fragments of nationalities, that cannot again take root.

It is this conflict of growing nations with minor nationalities, either within or without their borders, that largely inclines such nations either towards the New Nationalism or towards Internationalism. Those nations whose extension strikes against small but stubborn nationalities incline to a policy of Neo-Nationalism, while those whose expansion is free tend on the whole to a policy of Internationalism.

The United States is a case of a nation freely developing without the restraint of hostile nationalities. The same freedom to expand without striking against a nationalistic opposition has also been true, though in a less degree, of Great Britain and of France. The Boer War was an apparent exception to the rule. But the conquered Dutch burghers lay six thousand miles from London; they were not in a vital part of the Empire; and they could be absorbed linguistically if not racially. On the other hand, the expansion of Germany and Austria-Hungary was halted on every side by small nationalities, within and without the Empires. The Dutch and Belgians hemmed in Germany on the west. In the south-east, Serbia stood solidly opposed, while within the Dual Monarchy, the Southern Slavs were large disaffected. The Central Empires could not make gains in Europe without trenching on the spirit of nationality. They could not even maintain their actual frontiers without violating the nationalistic principle.¹

It is self-evident that nations so situated find it difficult under present conceptions of national struggle to subscribe to the doctrine of the self-determination of nationalities.² To them, the principle

¹ The problem for Germany would have been less difficult had she been able to expand colonially as freely as Britain and France. Unfortunately for her she entered too late upon the colonial competition.

² It is obvious that Austria is willing to have the principle of self-determination applied in Russia but not in her own dominions.

seems destructive. If it were to be rigorously applied, Austria-Hungary would break to pieces, Switzerland would disappear, Germany would lose many of her subjects (perhaps advantageously), Britain might lose Ireland, and Ireland Ulster, and Ulster perhaps a part of its territory. Turkey would be pared down to a fragment of its present territory. Self-determination is a principle which we in the United States did not admit in the case of the Southern Confederacy. We insisted that the seceding states should remain within the Union, whatever their desire or interests. So far as inclination went, the Southern States were no more a part of the nation in 1861 than was Canada.

Against this principle of self-determination the Austrians and Germans oppose a rival conception, the State Idea. It is upon this fundamental theory, that the state is a larger concept than nationality, that Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, and Belgium are built.

Which of these two principles is to prevail? If the State Idea, then to a certain extent we suppress nationalities; if the Nationality Idea, then to an equal extent we dissolve states.

The question is not one of mere logic. Behind the State Idea there lies a powerful economic purpose. The tendency of modern times is for the economic unit to grow until it transcends the bounds of nationality.

Herein lies the deep antagonism between the *Mittel-Europa* idea and the unrestricted recognition of the rights of nationalities. *Mittel-Europa* contravenes many of the ideals of internationalism. It is based on the *Staatsidee* and is a political equivalent for a closed economic unity much larger than the nationality. Its principle is not only not international but not even democratic. Actually *Mittel-Europa* would work out along the lines of a decrease in parliamentarism. The greater part of the administration of this vast federation would be in the hands of experts, military, financial and economic, and the control which could be exerted by the legislative bodies of the several states composing the union would be slight indeed. A Bohemian legislature would not be permitted to veto a law, agreed upon by the experts of *Mittel-Europa*. Under such a system the subject nationalities would be still further dwarfed.

Why then does Germany desire *Mittel-Europa* while the Allies want the self-determination of nationalities—or at least of certain nationalities? Fundamentally, the Germans by means of this federation are seeking to secure for themselves what the Allies wish to secure by their internationalism, namely growth, extension and a political and economic security. The creation of a *Mittel-Europa* may or may not be a prelude to new German aggression. It may prove to be merely an effort to de-

velop a state upon so large a basis that it will be economically self-supporting and politically without fear of attack. To the Germans this coalition seems the easiest and perhaps the only path to security. The forces, therefore, which cause men in the Western nations to demand internationalism make Germany and Austria sceptical of it and desirous of *Mittel-Europa*. The same motives work on the two groups of nations variously, because their basic conditions are different.

This different working out of similar motives causes the widest possible divergences and the strongest antagonisms. One of the obvious implications of Neo-Nationalism is militarism. The theory of the subordination of minor racial groups to a theoretically omnipotent state might have something to commend it if the state were always the true and equal representative of the constituent nationalities. As a rule, however, the formula is used as a cover for the suppression of one nationality by another. In Austria-Hungary the state is German-Magyar, and minor nationalities acquire at best a subordinate position or are ruthlessly exploited. To hold these minor nations down military power is necessary.

For the same reasons the Neo-Nationalist states are likely to oppose other parts of a program of internationalism. Being hemmed in by minor nationalities, they can upset the *status quo* with which they

are dissatisfied only by force of arms. Therefore they usually oppose disarmament, which they believe to be to their own disadvantage and to the advantage of the favourably situated states. Similarly they oppose arbitration, since it would apply to problems, which to them are vital, the current public law of nations, which law, they feel, presses unduly hard upon them. They are against any international law, which is based upon the equal right of small nations, hemming in the growing nations. They believe that these small nations must always and inevitably become the allies and bulwarks of the larger homogeneous states.¹

As opposed to these Neo-Nationalist states, the more favourably located states tend to be in favour of internationalism, public law and peace, because of the advantages to them of such a policy.

They can usually afford peace, since they have what is desired and what the war-like, ill-placed nations lack. If these favourably placed nations fight at all, it is in outlying semicivilized districts against unorganized bodies of men, to whom the rules of civilization and internationalism need not apply.

¹ To this Neo-Nationalism, also, there are many minor implications. Because of their careful military organization and their supposed need of repressing minor nationalities, especially if these are fragments or fringes of independent neighbouring states of like nationality, neo-nationalist states are usually ruled by politically conservative governing classes and are ruthless in diplomacy and war. The ruling nationality is as a rule more cohesive than in nations more favourably situated.

They favour arbitration, because, in its usual interpretation, it is based on the principle of the *status quo*. They favour mediation because, being less military than their neighbours, they gain by delay. They favour peace because they (usually) gain in strength with each decade and are frequently, though not always, pre-eminent in the economic competition which goes on in time of peace. They want peace because Time is their ally.

Above all they desire justice for oppressed nationalities. Not all oppressed nationalities but only, or at least chiefly, those in potentially hostile countries. By thus agitating and fighting for the oppressed nationalities under enemy rule they make for themselves new allies not only of these minor nationalistic groups but also of the adjoining nations to which by nationalistic claims these fragments belong. The enemies of Germany and Austria can always win the sympathies of the Poles, Danes, Serbs and Roumanians within those Empires.

Like the well-placed and compactly organized states, so also the neutral and neutralized small states advocate the cause of internationalism. Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia and Switzerland have a vital interest in an internationalism which preserves them from attack. Even where they block the economic and political progress of the large constricted nations, internationalism renders them secure. Their neutralization, and their separate sovereignty,

are based upon international law and upon the support of nations willing to fight for internationalism.

From all of which it appears that internationalism, according to its interpretation, may be a weapon or a cure. It may be used by certain nations to batter down others. It may conceal national greed and national aggression.

To take a hypothetical and exaggerated case, what remedy under existing theories of international relations could a future democratic Germany have against a Belgium which in the fixing of its tariffs, practically shut out German goods from passage through her territory? Against such an injurious action Germany might not be able to reply except by a violation of Belgian neutrality, which would bring on a new war. Actually there is no danger in this specific case, since Belgium is more dependent economically upon Germany than Germany upon her. But the general problem none the less exists. Various nations hold the road to the ocean, control of the seas, access to markets and raw materials, and they are able to exert pressure upon other nations by the threat of withdrawing conceded rights. An Austria at Constantinople could levy tribute as could Greece at Salonica or Italy at Trieste. Under our present static conceptions of internationalism each nation might levy tribute at will.

An internationalism which would permit such conditions is a barren and negative doctrine, holding

forth no hope of justice or peace. It is a purely conservative internationalism, a mere glorification of possession. It has no vitality since it is not flexible and easily adjusted to an ever-changing environment.

To secure a real internationalism we must go further. We must revolutionize conditions and concepts and secure an international machinery for the progressive adjustment of the ever-changing needs of all the nations. The war has again shown, what was manifest before, that the economic interests of the nations transcend boundary lines.

Such a wider internationalism cannot consist of treaties alone. Even though we formulate new rules of international law and give to them a new sanction we shall have gone but part of the way. Nothing less is required than a complete revolution of our international life, a binding together by new bonds of all the peoples. Internationalism, moreover, must be more than a mere legal compact. The crucial defect of such compacts is that they are speedily destroyed by evasion if not by open breach. Back of whatever legal formulation is necessary must lie a support for the new system in the public opinion of the world. The international court may enforce as well as declare the law, but the enforcement must find approval with the vast majority of the peoples. Internationalism will evolve, moreover,

only as it develops side by side with new habits of thought. Its growth is an evolutionary process, reflecting a similar growth in the minds of hundreds of millions of people.

At this stage it is unnecessary to map out a plan for such internationalism. Plans are easy enough; a plan for common action by all nations could be formulated in a month if the will to lead an international life were present. The will, based on a common consciousness, is the important element.

That consciousness will grow as a result of this war. In a very real sense the war has not only negated itself but has irreparably discredited the international anarchy out of which it sprang. It has shown that no hope of an ordered international life is to be found in a balancing of rival Powers. It has proved that no nation is secure without armaments and none is secure with them; that the material weapons, indispensable to safety and yet not providing safety, are themselves automatic, and often actually precipitate the wars they are intended to avert. The old system, it is now seen, is so barren of criteria, of sanctions, of safeguards, that arbitration becomes impossible, except in controversies which do not matter, and even mediation is practically worthless, in an atmosphere of suspicion, especially since every delay in declaring war favours certain nations and handicaps others. There is no

way out except forward to a plenary internationalism, giving security, both political and economic, to all nations.

What exact forms that internationalism may ultimately take is of importance; what matters most, however, is its quality, intent and spirit. We want a true internationalism, adapted to the needs of all the nations, and not a German internationalism, or a British, French, Russian or American internationalism. No pseudo-international system, giving security and growth to one nation and denying them to others, is worth considering. All the nations must be accorded some opportunity to develop, and all must obtain political security and the chance of a free economic life.

Nor may the internationalism which is to be achieved be founded in the main upon compulsion exerted upon the nations. We shall not by means of war be able to force states to enter into a permanent league and we may even discover at the close of the conflict that the forces which are in the end to establish internationalism are totally different from those that have been created by the war. Undoubtedly some power of compelling members of any international league and of defending international rights against outsiders will probably prove necessary especially in the beginning, but in the last analysis, the system must rest upon a willing consent of the peoples. Just as a democratic state, though pro-

protecting itself against anti-social classes, yet depends for its real power upon the voluntary adhesion of its citizens, so must any international organization rest upon a similar acquiescence. But to secure and maintain that consent the international organization dare not be conservative, static, unchanging. If it merely sanctifies the possession by certain nations of special national advantages, it will evoke an internal opposition, by which in the end it will be destroyed. It can hold its own in a constantly changing world society only by a continuous progressive evolution. It must change, as in a municipal society the law changes, moving forward constantly yet preserving continuity.

On the economic side this new international order must grow with the increasing business interrelation of the peoples of the world. The war has shown how complete is the economic interdependence of the nations and how shadowy and incomplete is any political independence where economic independence is lacking. This economic interdependence of nations is rapidly becoming obvious. Despite proposals like that of *Mittel-Europa* and of an Economic Union Against Germany the trend of economic development is strongly towards a closer cohesion, and even these projected economic super-states, although in intent mutually hostile, would be in large measure mutually dependent.

Without such progress towards joint economic ac-

tion and equal economic opportunity among the nations no internationalism is permanently possible. Many plans have been proposed looking towards such an increased community of interest between nations. If instead of returning her colonies to Germany, the Allies would constitute the whole of Central Africa as an international colony, to be ruled by an international body and open on equal terms to Germans as well as to the citizens of other nations, we should have the beginnings of a joint economic action. The same principle might be applied to a part of Asiatic Turkey and to other colonies, old and new. A similar principle might also cover investments in countries like China. Similarly the question of economic rights of way for one nation over the territory of another might be amicably settled either by arrangements between the nations immediately affected or by international agreement. It would not be impossible to devise plans by which certain cities, like Trieste and Salonica, might be made free ports, whatever flag they flew, or by which Serbia could be assured of an access to the sea and Germany of an uninterrupted passage of her merchandise through Belgium and Holland.

More and more the economic needs of the nations will demand the granting of rights which it is in the present power of other nations to refuse. Arrangements, rendered necessary by such demands, would

of course conflict with our present theories of absolute and uncontrolled national sovereignty. But that conception must vanish in any case if we are to secure any effective international organization.

The time for this shrinking of sovereignty, for this creation of a larger loyalty, for the laying of the foundation of a new internationalism is *now*. Without such an end the war will have been a failure. There will be no true victory, for none will have gained anything except a return to the old insecurity, the old injustice, the old fear and cruelty and bloodshed of the past.

Yet we do not know and cannot surely know whether this victory is to be really won and internationalism secured or whether the whole war has been nothing but a laboratory demonstration to prove the evils of the old system. We may discover at the Peace Conference that we are to be permitted only to secure a distant vision of internationalism, are to be permitted only to take a few short steps in that direction. We may even learn that war reveals rather than changes, and that we must look to long years of peace under evil conditions to evolve the forces which in the end are to give us a permanent peace and internationalism. If this proves to be the case we shall have won from the war only the chance to begin the struggle anew. But we should not accept this disheartening conclusion until it is

forced upon us. Until the war ends and the Peace Conference is over we must carry on the conflict for democracy and internationalism with the same high spirit of confidence as that with which we entered the war.

CHAPTER XV

▲T THE PEACE CONERENCE

THE war does not end when the last shot is fired but continues to be fought at the peace table in the same spirit as on the battle-field. Though the tone of the peace conference is different, its spirit is not unlike that of the physical war. There is a clash of interests, a politely embittered conflict. Even the weapons are identical. There is the same cold diplomacy and, although actual violence is barred and the august plenipotentiaries are in no danger of bodily injury, there is the same reliance upon the power of armies and navies to effect a decision as during the actual war.

For those who have the cause of internationalism at heart it is salutary to remember that wars have been won on the battle-field and lost at the peace table. In peace negotiations, as in war, it is the group that is entrenched and prepared that is the more likely to win. Tomorrow the same ambitions, the same points of view, the same inveterate interests that proved obstacles to a democratic settlement during the war will become obstacles to a satisfactory conclusion of the peace negotiations. The same oppositions will arise. Not only will the Central Powers and the Allies be mutually opposed but the na-

tionalistic, imperialistic principle and the principle of internationalism as well. If internationalists are not to lose in the end whatever they may have gained by the war, they must come to the Peace Congress thoroughly prepared.

Tomorrow that Peace Congress will meet. A few months or years will see their various Excellencies travelling by boat and train to some capital of Europe, prepared to settle the acrid controversies of the war and decide in council room and lobby the fate of the world. There may be all sorts and kinds and varieties of Excellencies. For the most part, however, unless the democratic elements in the various nations prevent, these peace representatives are likely to be of the approved diplomatic type, the aged, bemedalled, chilly, narrow and conservative Excellency, very gentlemanly, very astute, fundamentally stupid.

Visualize it. Here again, we may have the Berchtolds, and Tizzas, and Cambons, and Greys, and Goschens, and Sasonofs, and Salandras, and Milners, and Curzons, together with the small fry of Excellencies from little countries, who resemble their big brothers as the stiff little courts of the Eighteenth Century Germany resembled adored Versailles. These nimble intellects, which played and parried and thrust so perfectly and with such punctilio in the year while the Great War was preparing—fiddled while the world was aflame—are to

meet again, and play and parry and thrust over the graves of ten million men. What will they have learned? What will they have forgotten? Whence will come the inspiration to these closed minds? Again we may hear from these lips the same old phrases of vested interests and vital rights and national honour and guarantees and securities. Again they may argue and debate over "equitable considerations" and "proper indemnities." The ten million slain will be a pawn in the game, a something to trade with. It may prove to be the most grandiose huckstering the world has ever seen.

Will these gentlemen and noblemen be guided by the unique desire "to make the world safe for democracy"? They haven't the remotest conception of what the words mean. Will their Excellencies, guided by a common inspiration, unanimously agree to work in harmony for a New Europe and a New World? To attempt this would be beyond their imagination and powers, while to succeed would "spoil their addition." Or will each Excellency be fighting singly for all the possible and impossible interests of his own nation? Will he ask for more than he expects, conceding gracefully that to which he has no right the better to secure that to which he also has no right? Will there be friction and cross lines of interests between allies and a furious scrambling for spoils? Will internationalism be "shelved"?

Surely whatever progress we are to make toward a better Europe and a better world will depend in some measure upon the character of these delegates. If they are to be the same mentally bewigged diplomats with whom the world is so painfully familiar, the course of negotiations will not diverge from what it has been in the past. There will be secret compacts, quiet coalitions between allies and enemies, the playing off of one group against another, a manœuvring for position, an attempt to gain dubious ends by intrigue and manipulation. Let the Peace Congress run along lines parallel to those at Vienna or at Berlin and there will be little chance of a peace in the interests of a broad internationalism.

Of this grave danger many liberals are aware. Consequently there is an insistent demand that the negotiations be public and that the whole world be taken into confidence. Much progress has lately been made toward such a public diplomacy. Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, Czernin, Hertling and Clemenceau, to say nothing of the Bolsheviki, have been shouting their peace terms, or what is often the same, their war threats, at the top of their lungs. It is a democratic diplomacy *par excellence*, a talking to your opponent, not in a quiet room over a cup of black coffee, but openly and publicly through newspapers which reach hundreds of millions.

To some extent similar results will be attained at the Conference. The journalists will outnumber

the diplomats, and their newspapers will carry much of the news and all of the rumours that breed so luxuriantly in such an atmosphere. Doubtless, if negotiations are continued long, popular interest will relax, especially in America. Nevertheless what is said at the public conferences, and much that is whispered in the lobbies, will become the common property of the world. The peoples will have some opportunity of expressing their opinions, although they may not always be able to secure the reliable information upon which a fair judgment must be based.

In the end, however, it will be the plenipotentiaries who count. Once these representatives agree upon a peace, good or bad, it will be difficult for the democrats in the various countries to make their opposition effective, especially since the only alternative to an unsatisfactory settlement will be a resumption of the war. It would therefore be desirable, if possible, that these plenipotentiaries be chosen democratically and be truly representative of the peoples.

It has been proposed that the delegates to the Peace Conference be elected in each country by the most popular branch of the national legislature upon a basis of proportional representation. If, for example, in any parliament two-fifths of the members are liberals, two-fifths conservatives and one-fifth socialists, then the delegates should be ap-

pointed in the same proportion; two conservatives, two liberals and one socialist. These representatives might constitute the Second Chamber of the Peace Conference, with the right to reject any settlement reached by the smaller body of diplomats nominated by the executives. It has been suggested that the members of this Second Chamber might vote as individuals and not as national units, in order that the liberal and democratic elements in the various countries might coalesce, and thus prevent the drafting of a merely imperialistic treaty.

Such a direct representation of the democracy, however, is hardly probable. The proposal that the legislative body elect representatives to a peace conference, is revolutionary, being in obvious conflict with all traditions of treaty-making. It would be urged against such a procedure that it violated national constitutions and precedents, and that it would delay peace and perhaps render it unattainable. Before such a group could be called together, the nations, large and small, powerful and weak, would have to agree upon a just basis of representation, and the controversies over these preliminaries might be protracted for months. Germany and her allies would stubbornly object to any system which would permit the Allies to outvote them. In all likelihood the opposition of conservatives would be sufficient to obstruct and finally to nullify the proposal. The most that could probably be secured

would be the creation of an advisory body elected according to this method, a body with no veto power, but with a right to make representations to the diplomats and publicly to discuss all proposals. Even the election of such an advisory body, though it would meet with strong opposition, would be a long advance towards a democratic diplomacy.

Moreover, the crucial problem is not one of democratic forms but of organized democratic sentiment all over the world. To secure a peace based on internationalism and to prevent the Conference from degenerating into a mere scramble for territories, a supreme vigilance is necessary. If we go into the Congress blindfolded, there will be a grave danger that the essential peace negotiations will be carried on secretly and without due consideration of the wishes of the majority of belligerents or of permanent world interests.

Though it is not wise to borrow trouble, it would be folly to disregard possible and not wholly improbable contingencies, which, if they occur may rob the peoples of all direct benefit from their sacrifices. When we remember how treaties have been made before and when we regard the types of men who are interested in making the same kind of treaty to-day, it ceases to appear impossible that the stately peace congress may prove to be a farce. The representatives of three or four strong nations may meet in secret conference and agree upon the essentials of

peace while the delegates are noisily discussing unimportant questions. At the open sessions we may listen to an interminable wrangling over minor details, such as whether the Italian boundary shall run two miles to the east or west of a certain point, or a certain rocky isle shall belong to Austria or to Greece. We may hear inconsequent discussions, frivolous claims and trivial counterclaims, while the real work of dividing up the world is carried on by unseen gentlemen in a quiet room, with telephonic connections with their capitals. Under such an arrangement the Congress would have the speeches and the fireworks while the manipulators would gain the tangible benefits. Those familiar with the method in which our American presidential nominating conventions were once handled will easily grasp the significance of a like control of the Peace Conference.

The improbability of such a lobby peace is diminished by the fact of the large number of participants at the Congress and the multiplicity and baffling complexity of the problems. Fully twenty-three nations will be represented and many hundreds of claims will demand consideration. The conference will seethe with arguments, economic, political, strategic, ethnological, historical; arguments good, indifferent, utterly bad; arguments backed up not only by logic but by the threat of armies and navies. There will be re-alignments within the alliances. Although

Ruritania is one of the Allies, she is likely, if her interests are opposed by France or Italy to gravitate diplomatically towards Germany. Moreover, no single one of these hundreds of questions is isolated and independent of others. Each, according to the tradition of the Balance of Power, is united with all.¹ If you are to give certain territories to Bulgaria, the cession affects the interests of Greece and Roumania, the relations of Serbia to Italy, the claims of Italy to Turkish territory, and so *ad infinitum*. Each nation, if we assume such a nationalistic trend in the discussions, will demand compensation for any advantage accruing to a rival. How, on what principle, in what manner, by what method, can a few hundred irreconcilable and unreasonable representatives of twenty greedy and antagonistic nations settle hundreds of diverse and bristling problems in open conference? The solu-

¹ In his address to Congress on February 12, 1918, President Wilson strongly opposed any such concatenation or kiting of issues. He insists "that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case," and that "every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival States." But in actual practice these claims cannot be settled even to the approximate satisfaction of the nations, if each part of the settlement is based upon "the essential justice of that particular case." Forty years of discussion over the question of Alsace-Lorraine have brought Germans and Frenchmen not a step nearer to agreement. What new argument will carry conviction today? Similarly a freely negotiating Roumania will never admit that she ought to give up the Dobrudja, unless Bessarabia is offered as an argument.

tion that will appeal to diplomats of the old type is obvious and it is the same solution that has always appealed. The conference will be the grand performance which will attract all eyes; the actual *business* will be off-stage.

Even were this form of negotiations to be adopted it is not utterly impossible that the resulting peace might be dictated by a desire to end the old international anarchy and to advance toward internationalism. More probably, however, the resulting peace would in the main be imperialistic. It would be a peace worked out by men who had laid aside all recent prejudices. Englishmen, Frenchmen and Germans would meet on friendly terms and discuss problems of *Realpolitik* most concretely. They would not dilate upon Belgian atrocities nor declaim about democracy. They would deal with such questions as, What is there to divide? What shares must we give to what powerful nations? Which of our enemies or allies must be sacrificed? How can we coat the pill?

In such a conference the cards would lie on the table and there would be little necessity for pretence. These *Realpolitiker* would recognize strength where they see it, and would know how to treat strong states and how to treat weak states. Of course, an imperialistic or semi-imperialistic peace would be carefully veiled. To the internationalist at least a sop would be given. It would, however, be quite

possible to accept "in principle" a program of disarmament without putting it into practice, and to make apparent concessions to arbitration and mediation while really strengthening imperialistic precedents and creating a territorial status which would make all the specious approaches to internationalism a mere diplomatic camouflage, the old, old window-dressing in which simple souls delight. At bottom, however, there would under such an arrangement be small regard for sentimental considerations. A *Realpolitiker* can no more afford sentiment than a burglar or railroad wrecker.

All this is speculation or at best a forecast of possibilities, not prophecy. What we are dealing with is not an inevitable happening, but a possible contingency, against which we must, if we can, protect ourselves. Another danger, moreover, lies even nearer. Instead of the Peace Conference ending with a quiet little group of diplomatic surgeons cutting up the world carcase, this work may actually be completed before the Congress meets. A few diplomats may come together at some neutral capital and agree in advance upon the bases of peace. England and France went to Algeiras with a secret agreement in their pockets (an agreement violating the principles of the public treaty which they subsequently signed). Is it inadmissible to fear that, unless precautions are taken, certain great states may come to the coming conference with a like equip-

ment? The rulers of these states may believe that they represent valuable interests which they will fear to place in hazard through the free play of idealistic impulses, which in any case they consider impracticable and noxious.

In the present state of the world and of the world alliances this danger of a secret peace prior to the meeting of the Congress is sufficiently imminent to warrant the utmost efforts at frustration. England, France and Italy will quite naturally fear to enter into a blind conference with the Central Alliance, the internal cohesion of which is greater than their own. If at the Peace Congress Germany could detach Italy, France, or any other powerful opponent, she might, by a threat to throw over the whole proceedings and return to a war status, force great concessions from all her former antagonists. She could play off one against the other. The Allies, therefore, may well hesitate to enter upon negotiations unless the general boundaries of all discussions and decisions are determined in advance. But if this must be done what is more tempting than to go further and agree in common, prior to the conference, concerning the actual detailed terms of peace. Such a treaty, even if in part secret, would be sufficiently binding. It would be a treaty based not upon generalities and aspirations, but upon territorial changes, trade rights, economic privileges, and other concrete advantages. It would tend to be a

peace of give and take, a giving to the strong and a taking from the weak.

If such an imperialistic peace is made it will take place not because of the wickedness of individual men, but because, given the old standards, the line of least resistance runs in this direction. The fundamental result of this war, the one over-riding event, has been the temporary dissolution of Russia. Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Courland and the Ukraine are falling away from the government at Petrograd, and the Ukrainians have gone so far as to declare their independence and sign a separate treaty with Germany. What was once the powerful unitary state, Russia, has now become a series of separate states, no one of which is strong enough to deal on equal terms with Germany, or resist her economic, financial, intellectual, political or military penetration. The situation thus created is in one respect similar to that established in the Eighteenth Century by the gradual paralysis of Poland. It was not alone the greed of Prussia, Russia and Austria that caused the successful partition of that unhappy land, but the fact that here in the east of Europe lay a great hulk of a state, ready to be seized. Russia today is in much the same situation; for the time being she is a derelict. The essential fact of the present problem, moreover, is that because of geographical reasons the chief beneficiary of the Russian collapse is likely to be Germany. In no way

can England or France secure a share, (even if they wish) of this vast territory. While Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Turkey and Japan may gain certain advantages, territorial or other, the bulk of the gain seems likely to go to Germany.

To secure the benefits from this dissolution of Russia no crude annexation is necessary. Germany by reason of her power and proximity should be able to penetrate Russia, secure a dominant economic position and a preponderatingly political influence, and these, once secure, might gradually be strengthened. All rights necessary to assure this special position could be obtained under the guise of a pious adherence to the canons of democracy and internationalism. The full right of self-determination might be granted to Poland, Lithuania and Courland and yet result in the establishment of German dominance, or even of patent German sovereignty. Under a hundred smiling disguises Russia might be turned over to German exploitation. In the same manner England might secure rights in Mesopotamia, Central Persia or Arabia (as a counterweight to German claims) without apparently violating the principles for which British and American liberals are fighting. True, British imperialists might not relish this hard bargain, any more than would French and Italian imperialists. If, however, they found German imperialism unconquerable, they might conclude that it would be safer to permit Ger-

many to expand in a quarter where it would mean the least danger to them rather than to fight longer for an internationalism which they do not wish. Moreover, to many imperialists in all countries the fear of revolution, which has been brought to the surface by this war, seems more menacing than that of a German imperialism with its eyes set towards the east.

If such an imperialistic settlement were to be sprung suddenly upon the Peace Conference, or be revealed gradually during the negotiations, American representatives, or indeed the United States as a nation, would be practically impotent to remedy the evil. It would be too late to interfere. So long as the two groups of nations stand opposed, whether at war or in a Peace Conference, the American influence, because of our middle position and our relative disinterestedness, is powerful. By granting or withholding our aid we can influence each group. If, however, the major nations agree upon a peace, however unworthy, there is nothing for us to do except to pack our trunks and return to our homes. Our interposition in Europe is only necessary or possible when an irreconcilable conflict arises between embittered and approximately equal coalitions; when, on the other hand, these groups are of one mind they will naturally consider the making of any treaty as their business, not ours. We cannot force them to return to the struggle nor compel them to remain at enmity. If prior to the Peace Conference we have

allowed such an agreement, secret or open, to be made, we shall be helpless before an imperialistic impulse backed up by the overwhelming force of the world.

It would be almost equally difficult for the liberal elements of the Entente nations effectively to oppose such a *fait accompli*. Once the diplomats have agreed upon a peace, whatever its terms, a reversal of their action becomes almost impossible. Democrats in the several nations can make protests, can even ultimately punish their representatives. Assuming, however, that the imperialistic features of the treaty are not too flagrant, and that the nation's obvious material interests are not sacrificed, the resistance to the treaty is not likely to be formidable. While the war lasts democrats and liberals are in an excellent strategic position, since inclining to a moderate peace they must be won over to a vigorous conduct of the war. If, at the close of the war, however, these democrats can offer no substitute for an unsatisfactory treaty except an indefinite continuance of the conflict under adverse conditions, is it not probable that their opposition will be overborne?

In favour of such an imperialistic peace many persuasive appeals would be made. The peace would be described as the best attainable, as a real triumph for internationalism, or, at worst, as a necessary preliminary to an ultimate triumph. It would be argued that a peace of this nature is the best that wo

may hope for in the present generation, since we are not yet ripe for a full internationalism.

The argument might run somewhat as follows: Seventy years ago socialists in England, France and Germany were appealing to proletarians to unite in a struggle which would bring about the co-operative commonwealth. The great revolution was at hand. Yet we know now that the world was not ripe for socialism, and that an attempt to introduce the system prematurely would not only have ended in failure but would have delayed its ultimate advent. The factories of the world were then too small, the wage-earners too few and undisciplined; the capitalistic development was only at its beginning and not, as was assumed, at its height. The world needed many decades of capitalism.

Today, it will be argued, the task of creating at once a full international organization presents equal and similar difficulties. There are too many small states, too many unbridled nationalistic ambitions, too much economic and political backwardness. International co-ordination and co-operation are in their infancy. We have hardly begun to solve the problems of international economic adjustment. We have not yet learned how to create a larger economic unit without destroying political autonomy. Internationalism cannot be made; it must grow. We have not yet even assembled all the elements out of which it must grow.

It might further be argued that just as socialism required decades of capitalism to bring it to fruition, so internationalism may require that slow integration of the world which we call imperialism. The unattached and unorganized raw material of the political world must first be grouped and crystallized about a few centres. It would be difficult to base internationalism upon the assent of a large and motley group of independent nations, some great and others small, some progressive and others reactionary, some advancing and some hopelessly backward, some well-ordered and others in a state of chronic revolution for profits. It would, on the other hand, be easy to base internationalism upon a few large federal units, the British Commonwealth, the American Commonwealth, a German Commonwealth, a Russian Commonwealth, each of which would act in concert with a number of nations, peoples or states, with which it had a more or less voluntary union, and the interests of which it would be obliged to represent. Once the present nations of the world were united in a few large groups, internationalism would grow automatically, not only from self-interest but also out of mutual relations of fear and respect between these well co-ordinated federal bodies, each of which represented a merging and compromising of divergent interests. The analogy with the development of a socialized democracy is obvious. It would be far easier to create

a socialist industry by the merger of a dozen cartells than to create it out of innumerable small businesses operated by tens of thousands of short-sighted men.

If this be true then the path of internationalism, according to this hypothetical argument, might run parallel for a part of the way with the gradual development of a higher form of imperialism. Accepting this premise, what valid objection could be urged against a German organization of the Ukraine and the Baltic Provinces or a British administration of Mesopotamia? Might not such an imperialistic peace lead to the gradual creation of a group of large federated world commonwealths, upon which internationalism would finally be built?

Undoubtedly the world is not to go over immediately to a full international system. But no serious thinker ever conceived of that possibility; we shall be satisfied with a far more tentative approach to that goal. It may also be admitted that a coalescence of the present nations into large freely organized groups might render peace and an eventual international world-system more probable. The real objection to an imperialistic settlement, however, is that the resulting coalescence is not free, but forced. It does not represent the will and probably would not protect the interests of the peoples annexed or incorporated. Such an imperialistic peace would destroy the Russian Revolution, intensify the enmity between Teuton and Slav and in the end create

new wars. The defect of such a peace lies in its essential spirit. Fundamentally that spirit is the old inveterate desire for nationalistic gain, for national prestige, for strategic advantage. It is the same old preference of the nation's interests to the interest of the world. It might be admitted that it would be better for Mesopotamia to be British than to remain Turkish, and for the Ukraine to be dominated by Germany than be ruled by the Czar. But that argument might equally well be made for most of the imperialistic extensions of the last fifty years.

A far wiser solution presents itself for both these problems. We are approaching the time when the backward countries may be ruled, not in the interest of a single nation but in the common interest of all. It would be extremely bad if an extension of German rule in Russia meant a new suppression of vital nationalistic interests; it would be almost equally bad if Mesopotamia were made a private reserve for British capitalists. Even though we are not ready for a full internationalism, we may make rapid and above all steady progress in that direction. We shall not immediately after this war end all insecurity and all causes of friction between nations, but we may mitigate the evil and can at least lay the bases of internationalism. A peace that fails to make whatever progress is possible in this direction is no peace; a settlement that goes back to old precedents of conquest, of needless sup-

pression of nationalities, of a bartering over territories, is a retrograde step, an incitement to new wars and a reversion to international anarchy.

The time to prevent the danger, however, remote, of such an imperialistic peace is *now*. We can gain our ends only by uniting the liberal elements in all countries. If we wish to influence the action of British imperialists we must reinforce the great mass of British democratic sentiment, while that sentiment is at its strongest. If we are to prevent the dismemberment of Russia we must act by an appeal to British, French, Italian, and even German liberals, and by a generous recognition of the dejected and seemingly abandoned democracy of Russia.

Already there are evidences of American action in this direction. The speech of Mr. Lloyd George in January, 1918, was interpreted by certain critics as indicating an eventual willingness to consider the making of a treaty of peace with Germany at the expense of Russia. Although this policy would meet with the determined opposition of all liberal elements in Great Britain, it would not be deemed unworthy of consideration by British imperialists. The reference by President Wilson to Russia reveals a position which is not capable of the same equivocal interpretation. Among other things Mr. Wilson demands "The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affect-

ing Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.”¹

I have emphasized the danger of a possible imperialistic peace somewhat strongly, and have run the risk of appearing to scent peril where there may be none, because it would seem that our only chance of making the Peace Conference worthy of the immense sacrifices of this war, and of the splendid idealism with which it has been fought, lies in a union of all liberal elements in all nations *prior* to the meeting of the conference. The imperialists plan ahead; their “hole in the corner” treaties are prepared well in advance. They come to the table with the cards stacked against their opponents. Those who desire

¹ In his handling of the problem of a Japanese intervention in Siberia and in his telegram to the Soviet (March 12, 1918) President Wilson made his position even clearer.

a democratic peace must also prepare. The Peace Conference, if it is not to be a mere repetition of the chicaneries of the past, must meet in an atmosphere of public discussion and of intolerance for all secrecy and deviousness. Important as is the form or structure of the Peace Congress, important as is the method by which the delegates are to be elected, the crucial factor is the state of mind of the world when the Congress meets. In turn this depends upon the possibility of bringing intellectual and moral pressure to bear upon the several governments before the war comes to an end.

CHAPTER XVI

AFTER THE PEACE CONFERENCE

AFTER the Peace Conference there will remain a sense of frustration. However intelligent or well-intentioned the delegates, they cannot, from the nature of the case, find solutions for all the intricate economic, nationalistic and territorial problems which led to this war. The most that can be accomplished will be the creation of a machinery of international government. How that machinery will work will depend upon the spirit governing the nations after the war.

The problem of attaining internationalism is not one of form but of substance and intent. Even should we secure general promises of disarmament, mediation, arbitration, and of a freedom of the seas in war, even should we begin to construct a league to enforce peace, the machinery would break down unless upheld by the pacific intentions of the nations. If several members of the League believed that their interests were being sacrificed, they would openly or covertly seek to ruin the international machinery. It is easy to destroy, to take advantage of technical points, to promise and not fulfil, to be unfair and allege unfairness in others. For any fundamental

and permanent success of internationalism we must rely upon the good intentions of states, which perceive that their true interest no longer lies in a resumption of the old strife.

Whether an effective internationalism is possible at all under the present economic and political *régime* in Western lands is doubtful. It is true that even the greatest financiers find war and provocations to war on the whole unprofitable. Even were all profit-seeking activities of a nation organized nationally, and were the interest of each nation in any specific quarrel intensified by the fact that the beneficiary was a small social class, there would still remain an advantage in the maintenance of peace. But the temptation to war in such circumstances is enormous. If conditions within a country are such that the nation is forced to seek its advantage in foreign economic adventures, and if the profits from those adventures accrue to a small cohesive group, with vast political influence, the temptation to seek undue advantage over rivals is likely to lead the nation to the brink of war. Were each Frenchman or German to gain or lose only a few dollars as the result of an international decision, compromise would be more profitable than war. When, however, as in the past, the rights or privileges contended for mean not a dollar or two to each citizen but hundreds of millions to either a French or a German syndicate, then patriotism

flares up menacingly. The masses in each community have a smaller economic interest in the controversies leading to war, and have more to lose from war, than do the special economic groups which now control national decisions.

This disequilibrium of our modern economic system constitutes the gravest menace to peace and will continue to be dangerous, whatever the machinery for international government. The fact that small economic groups possessing vast influence find their interest in striving for special advantages in backward countries, even at the risk of war, makes any progress toward internationalism under the existing system extremely difficult. Under any system, of course, many differences between nations can be obviated. Profit-sharing privileges can be pooled, and states can be prevented from taking toll upon the international highways. But at best the resulting internationalism is insecure. If after the war each nation is to be controlled by the same groups and ideas as in July 1914, the divisive and war provoking economic interests will remain strong, and peace will be unstable. Imperialism will be in full tide.

Moreover, and this is an important fact to Americans, the United States, which in the present war has been a champion of internationalism, is as likely to become imperialistic as are the other nations. After the war we too have a victory to win, over

ourselves. Unless we achieve that victory, here, at home, we may become an aggressive and imperialistic power, a menace to the nations, a foe to internationalism, a nation against which other nations may league in order "to make the world safe for democracy."

It is difficult for Americans, with our subjective attitude toward ourselves, to realize that any such menace exists. We have always had the effortless virtue that inheres in a comfortable competence. Our foreign policy has been "a diplomacy *de luxe*," and we were not obliged, as were other nations, to fight hard for what we needed. We therefore came to believe, that by reason of our peculiarly pacific nature we were immune from imperialism.

It was sheer self-delusion. Undoubtedly we have usually had what we wanted and our sense of national security has made it seem unnecessary for us to fight for strategic positions. Nevertheless we have been gradually strengthening our strategic positions in the approved English, Russian and German manner. We have acquired Hawaii to protect our Western shores, the Canal Zone to permit the passage of our warships from Atlantic to Pacific, and finally, in order to maintain our supremacy in the Caribbean and to guard the Canal Zone, we have taken over Porto Rico, a few naval stations in Cuba, and the Danish West Indies, and have acquired a quasi-protectorate over Nicaragua, Hayti and Santo

Domingo. We seem to be moving toward some form of domination, open or concealed, partial or complete, over all Caribbean countries. Moreover, while strengthening our defences, we have also begun to enter upon the phase of financial imperialism. We long refrained from this policy because we had no large surplus capital to export. We did not need to invest money in Brazil or China so long as there were opportunities in Oklahoma and New York. Our abstention, therefore, was the result of mere convenience, and represented a stage in our economic development in which our home industry absorbed our capital. Today we are coming into a new phase in which, unless we change conditions, we shall desire to take our part in a furious international struggle for spoils.

The war has immensely increased this danger of an eventual American imperialism. We have acquired the military means, and are becoming one of the strongest and certainly the least assailable of countries. We have acquired a "stake" in the outside world, for over-night we have become a capital-exporting country. The initiative and the main profits of this capital export fall to a relatively small class, largely controlling our economic, political and intellectual life. Will these men be less concerned with profitable chances in Russia, China and Latin America than in plans of internationalism? However unimpeachable their intentions, will they recog-

nize a clear mandate for internationalism if it runs counter to anticipated gains?

We must face this issue honestly. Never before have we been so likely to become a danger to ourselves and to the world. It is no man's fault nor even the nation's, but the inevitable result of our own economic development. Doubtless the process has been hastened by our entrance into the war, but had the change not come now it would have come in another ten or twenty years.

If we become imperialistic we shall act much as do other imperialistic nations. Our financiers are essentially like those of Britain or Germany. True, Americans as a whole do not as yet desire the annexation of other lands (although not a few would like to "take" Mexico) but there are other ways of being imperialistic. There is a financial imperialism, which retains, after eviscerating, the native political government, and which buys control of foreign nations as it buys lands, mines or railroads. Our future imperialists (and it is only their actions which are in the future) may give rein to all their ambitions without hoisting the flag over a single islet. They can get what they want in ways seemingly innocuous. And in getting what they want they will be bolstered up by the arguments that have aided imperialism since the beginning. All the shining moral panoply that has once been used can be used again.

This means tension—and war.

The point of conflict between the rival imperialists, of which we may be one, may be anywhere. A long slow conflict, for example, may break out ten years hence in Russia, Latin America, Africa or China. Such a struggle would not confine itself to economic weapons. If British, German, American and French capitalists are competing for strategic investments, a financial coalition is likely to lead to political coalitions in case these prospective investors are able to involve their states. Naturally the issue will never appear as a naked struggle for economic advantage. When the financial dispute is brought to a head, the resulting war will be evoked upon high moral grounds.

Such an American imperialism, though possible, and, perhaps, even probable, is not predestined. It will almost surely come to pass if we permit an increasing proportion of our national surplus to pass into the control of a few politically powerful men, and allow this surplus to fight its way into backward countries. But these conditions are not inevitable. It is possible on the contrary to accelerate the movement toward a greater social control of the national surplus and toward a deflection of that surplus into channels where there will be the least danger of precipitating international conflicts.

We cannot do this, however, without revolutionary changes in our whole economic system.

The war has revealed the feebleness of that system. At the outbreak of the war not only did we not possess economic democracy but we lacked even an economic unity. Industrially we were working at cross purposes and with only a small fraction of our real power. We were wasting energy in internal friction. Conditions tolerable in peace became unendurable in a war against a resourceful enemy.

Because of the proved defects of our system of production there is a greater likelihood of our attaining an industrial reorganization tending to prevent our launching into a financial imperialism. The breakdown of the old system has been astonishingly rapid. First went the old unregulated play of supply and demand. We began to fear the vagaries of the market and were forced to regulate prices. Our system of private railroad management under conditions of forced competition proved utterly inadequate and we were obliged to pool our several railway systems and make a common use of our whole transportation machinery. By nationalizing the railroads we probably added billions to the country's real wealth and hundreds of millions to its future annual product.

What we have learned in war we shall hardly forget in peace. We shall no longer be content with an industrial machine which is so ill-regulated that it loses its force in waste heat and develops little drive. We shall be obliged to retain conceptions and prac-

tices acquired during the war. The new economic solidarity, once gained, can never again be surrendered.

For however the war ends we shall require the full use of our productive machinery. If no international system is developed we shall be involved in new conflicts in which economic capacity and the possibility of immediate economic mobilization will be decisive factors. On the other hand, if we are fortunate enough to secure a stable international system guaranteeing peace, the economic competition between nations will for a time at least remain. For our own progress and influence the best possible utilization of our resources will be essential.

The chief obstacle in the way of such improvement is the multiplicity of our conflicting economic interests due to our extreme solicitude for special privilege. We still hold sacred all rights to exploit and monopolize and we divert an immense share of the wealth and income of the nation to a small social class. Our trust movement, though it has proved itself superior to industrial anarchy, has led to a further accentuation of inequality and to a further increase in the power of financially privileged classes. Everywhere we find a stark insistence on special rights not only by the very wealthy but by men of moderate and even of small means. As a consequence, although our industrial plants are individually effective, they are collectively ineffective.

There is no unifying concept to our economic system.

More important, however, even than the question of our economic efficiency is that of regulating the flow of profits both within the nation and outward to foreign countries. If we permit an enormous accumulation of wealth and profits to be deflected, as in the past, to a few small groups, we shall find that these groups, in control of billions of dollars, will force the country to undertake imperialistic projects. Our financiers will discover that there is a much greater profit in foreign than in home investments. The rise in our wages, the slackening of our immigration and the general movement toward a betterment of working conditions tend generally to reduce the rate of returns upon new home ventures, and therefore increase the tendency toward a forced export of capital, irrespective of the political consequences of such export. We are approaching a stage in our economic evolution similar to that which England reached some sixty years ago. And the impulse with us is likely to be equally strong and even more dangerous, for in the early days England stood alone as the purveyor of capital, whereas to-day we enter the imperialistic competition at a time when many nations strive desperately for their shares of the profits.

It would not, of course, be wise, even were it possible, to prohibit the export of capital. It is eminently proper that a certain portion of the surplus

income of America and of Western Europe should go to backward countries where capital is more necessary. It should be the endeavour of the great industrial nations, however, to regulate this outflow and seek to convert the present imperialistic scramble into an international imperialism, in which all investment in backward countries would be made on joint international account and under joint management, with full consideration given to the needs, both economic and political, of the indigenous races. Though we must export a certain portion of our surplus capital, it will be disastrous if the expulsive force of our economic system should be so great as to cause an exaggeration of this tendency, an increase in its violence, and an enhanced liability to drive us into war.

Our policy, therefore, should be in the direction of a deflection of wealth and income from special groups to the general community, an increase in the expenditure of national income upon the general welfare, and finally an extension of democratic control over industry and other phases of national life. The first object can be attained partly by taxation and partly by nationalization. By means of steeply graduated income, inheritance and excess profit taxes we may largely prevent the present perilous concentration of our national surplus. We should hesitate to reduce to any great extent the present high income and excess profit taxes and we should supplement them

with heavy and sharply graduated inheritance taxes. Every form of unearned increment, whether from lands, mines or public service corporations, should be carefully scrutinized and as far as possible turned to public account.

An equally effective method of diverting wealth and income to the general community is by means of the nationalization of industries. Not only should our railroads become national property, but also our coal, iron, gold, silver, copper and zinc mines. The government should progressively extend its power over all basic industries with the double intention of effecting unity and of securing profits. Under such a system of nationalization it would be possible to make vast expenditures upon purposes which do not now pay the financier, but which would be of incalculable advantage to the community. We should act upon the principle that large quantities of capital should not be exported until we can properly feed, clothe and house all our citizens and can give them education, recreation and all other essentials of a full and healthful life. In other words, we should take from the small ruling groups the control which they now possess over our national revenue. Without destroying all private property and incentive to gain, without undermining individual initiative but by canalizing it, we should conduct our national business as though all this wealth belonged to the nation as a whole, as though all income were primarily for

the common benefit. In other words, we should move toward an industrial and social democracy.

No such democracy will, of course, be possible without at the same time furthering, and being furthered by, a political democracy. The entire program depends upon the ability of the masses of the community politically to control the social machinery and thus secure the national product. Such a democracy cannot be attained in our country by a mere struggle between the wage-earning proletariat and all who possess capital, since the latter constitute the majority of the people and the overwhelmingly preponderant group. It can be achieved only by the alignment of the great mass of non-favoured Americans against those who are the signal beneficiaries of our present industrial process.

It is upon such a democracy, not only in America but in all countries possessing potential military power, that the hope of a true and permanent internationalism must primarily rest. If we can divorce the economic advantages accruing to each nation from the special privileged groups who now chiefly monopolize them, we shall have at least a basis for an international concert. Doubtless many differences in interest will continue to exist. The German people as a whole will be benefited or hindered by the same sort of international decisions as now benefit or hinder their capitalist classes. But the gain or loss will then be less and will be more equally

divided, and there will be more possibility of compromise and of adjustment when the new spirit, which we seek to incorporate in the relations between nations, will already be represented within the nations themselves. It will then be seen that while the economic interests of the peoples still diverge, these differences are not sufficiently great to warrant the costly and dangerous expedient of war. There will be no special group financially interested, as at present, in stirring up national animosity, and there will be no groups at all who will gain by war although their country loses. The problem of securing internationalism is not one of intelligence alone but also of good-will; it is not a problem of discovering intricate devices but of eliminating real differences of interest. Since these conflicts of interest lie largely within the nations themselves in the form of internal mal-adjustments, the progress toward a democracy will of necessity be a progress toward internationalism.

The war has proved that the present control of the great industrial nations by militaristic, bureaucratic and financial groups is a complete and tragic failure. It has shown that in these classes the group interest so overweighs the national interest and so destroys any international interest as to preclude all far-sightedness and to make a true concert among the nations almost impossible. It was recently predicted by Count Okuma, the experienced and far-

sighted Japanese statesman, that the war would lead to the death of European civilization. According to the British Labour Party, "we can so far agree in this estimate as to recognize, in the present world catastrophe, if not the death, in Europe, of civilization itself, at any rate the culmination and collapse of a distinctive industrial civilization."¹ The reign of profiteering must cease; otherwise Western civilization itself will come to an end.

In the Reconstruction program, proposed for adoption by the British Labour Party, a document which has been described as "probably the most mature and carefully formulated program ever put forth by a responsible political party," the issue between a full democracy on the one hand and national imperialism and war on the other is trenchantly stated. "If," it says, "we in Britain are to escape from the decay of civilization itself, which the Japanese statesman foresees, we must ensure that what is presently to be built up is a new social order, based not on fighting but on fraternity—not on the competitive struggle for the means of bare life, but on a deliberately planned co-operation in production and distribution for the benefit of all who participate by hand or by brain—not on the utmost possible inequality of riches, but on a systematic approach

¹ Labor and the New Social Order. A Report on Reconstruction by the Sub-Committee of the British Labor Party. Published by the New Republic as a supplement, Vol. XIV, No. 172, February 16, 1918.

towards a healthy equality of material circumstances for every person born into the world—not on an enforced dominion over subject nations, subject races, subject colonies, subject classes, or a subject sex, but, in industry as well as in government, on that equal freedom, that general consciousness of consent, and that widest possible participation in power, both economic and political, which is characteristic of democracy.’’

The final war for democracy will begin after the war. It will be a wider conflict than that which now rages and the alignment will be by classes and interests rather than by nations. It will be a war which will be waged until separate interests within each nation are completely extinguished.

THE END

INDEX

Allies, diplomatic errors and apparently imperialistic purposes of, 2-3; opposition of President Wilson to aims of, 3-4; course that might have been taken with, by America, 4-6; hesitating diplomacy of America concerning secret treaties of, 6-7; dangers of a victory to, 25-26; a real moral victory endangered by war aims of, 26-27; reasons for desire of America for victory of, 60; confessed nationalistic ambitions of, 98-99; both *morale* and military power of, weakened by engagements among themselves violative of internationalism, 107 n; disposition of conquered territories among, by terms of secret treaties, 115-120; specially objectionable character of secret treaties among, 119-120; bargain made by Italy with, 127-128; course pursued by, regarding New Russia's appeal for peace without indemnities and annexations, 176-177.

America, lost opportunities of, for declaration of principles in world conflict, 1-7; reasons to be found for course of, 7-8; diminution of moral value of participation of, in war, 8; false position occupied by, 8-9; discouraging effects of lack of courage of convictions by, 9-10; chief hope of the world's

peace found in, 33-34; lessons concerning peace learned by, 34-36; mood in which problem of world peace must be approached by, 37; ideals of people of, before and after entering war, 38; pacifists, patriots, and the policy of neutrality in, 38-49; reasons for conversion of, to war, 50 ff; effect of modern growth of industry upon entrance into war, 57-62; theory of responsibility of financial interests for war, 62-66; idealistic factors influencing decision, 66-67; influence of Russian Revolution, 67-68; obsolescent belief still prevalent that America has little concern with Europe, 68-70; war justified by appeal to old ideals of, 70-71; forced to admit menace of German militarism, 84-85; democratic ideal of, menaced by German autocracy and militarism, 85-90; not bound by Italy's bargain with the Allies, 131-138; position of, as arbitrator between claims of her Allies and of her enemies, 139 ff; President Wilson's statement of peace terms, 139-141; difference between position of, and that of Russia and British Labour Party, 142; strategic position of, 143-145; necessity of going against will both of enemies and of

- influential groups among Allies, 145; concrete policy to be followed by, 148-156; failure of, to respond to appeal of New Russia for a common peace and mutual forgiveness, 180-181; the present the time for preventing an imperialistic settlement, 287-288; likely to become as imperialistic as other nations, 298-299; steps taken by, on road to imperialism, 299-300; phase of financial imperialism entered upon by, 300; danger of imperialism in, increased by the war, 300-301; revolutionary changes in whole economic system demanded, 302-304; solicitude for special privilege in, 304-305; importance of regulation of flow of profits within the nation and outward to foreign countries, 305-308; the kind of democracy in, upon which hope of a true internationalism rests, 308.
- Angell, Norman, quoted on curbing of foreign circulation of Liberal journals, 165-166.
- Arbitration and mediation, international, an element of internationalism, 250.
- Asia Minor, proposed disposition of, among Allies, 116-117; Italian aspirations for colonies in, 127-128; disposition of, under program of internationalism, 270.
- Autocracy, principle of, ranged against democratic principle in present war, 13; significance to, of victory for Germany, 14; special reasons for America's combating German, 85-90; surprising power and vitality of, revealed by the war, 88-89; expansiveness of, 89.
- Bainville, Jacques, "Italy and the War," quoted, 122; defence of narrow Italian policy by, 130-131.
- Balkans, character of struggle between Austria and Russia for domination of, 105; Italian claims as an obstacle to peace arrangement on nationalistic lines in, 129-130.
- Bang, Dr. J. P. "Hurrah and Hallelujah" by, 200 n.
- Benevolent neutrality, America's period of, 55-56.
- Bitter-enders, efforts for an ideal peace frustrated by, 27; present attitude of, 29-30.
- Bolshevik government, responsibility of Allies for rise of, 176-177; source of strength of, found in fact that it represents working classes of the world, 182-183; significance of rise of, as a symptom of a world-wide revelation and a coming revolution, 184; meaning of Russian propaganda which has culminated in activities of, 184-185; mingled absurdities, excesses, and wisdom of, 185-186; question of eventual success of, 186-188.
- Brailsford, H. N., quoted on effect on America's position, of her entrance into the war, 139.
- British Labour Party, statement of liberal peace terms issued by, 142; culmination and collapse of European industrial civilization recognized by, 310; Reconstruction program proposed for adoption by, 310-311.

- Callwell, Gen. C. E., on the Germans, 193.
- Classes, struggle between, seen as the war beneath the war, 184-185.
- Colonial possessions, disposition of, under program of internationalism, 270.
- Convention of April 27, 1915, disposing of territory among Allied powers, 115.
- Croce, Benedetto, quoted on Italy's attitude in the war, 122.
- Democracy, diminishing chances of settling war on basis of, 2-3; attempt of America to fight for, while countenancing imperialistic aims, 8-9; only course open to, to break down German militarism, 11-13; principle of autocracy ranged against, in the war, 13; what victory by Germany would mean to, 14; victory for internationalism and, the goal to be achieved, 15; recognized by America as a fundamental purpose in the war, 54; the force that caused America to take sides with the Allies, 60; how German autocracy and militarism are a menace to American principle of, 85-90; like autocracy, is aggressive and intensely missionary, 91; distinction between a socialized, and an inefficient and brutalized plutocracy, 94-95; the war beneath the war a war for, 188; final war for, to begin after the war, 311.
- Democratic groups, common ground of feeling among, in different countries, 159-162; true American policy aims at union of all the, 163-164; difficulty of uniting those of warring countries, 164-166; points that help in uniting, 166-167; sharp cleavage between militarists and, found in all countries, 168-170; danger of too long delay by, in exercising influence against an imperialistic peace, 288.
- Dernburg, Dr. Bernard, defence of German militarism by, 77-78.
- Disarmament, an element of internationalism, 250.
- Economic interdependence of nations, 235-238.
- Economic system, menace to peace found in disequilibrium of modern, 298.
- Economic war after the war, unadvisability of, 111-112.
- Election of delegates to future Peace Conference proposed, 277-279.
- England, Dr. Dernburg's comparison of Germany and, 77-78; meaning to, of a complete German victory, 82-83; influence of trade unions felt in, 173. *See* Great Britain.
- Europeans, misconceptions of, concerning Americans and the American mind, 39-41.
- Excess profits taxes, maintenance of, after the war, 306-307.
- Exploiters and exploited, Bolshevik conception of war between, 184-185.
- Financial imperialism in America, 300-301.

- Financial interests, theory of responsibility of, for America's entrance into the war, 62-67.
- Foreign policies of European powers in modern times, 101-105.
- France, nationalistic aims and demands of, early in war, 103; agreement between Great Britain and Russia and, as to territorial acquisitions, 116-119; influence of labour groups felt in, 173.
- Freytag-Loringhoven, General von, "Deductions from the Great War" by, 243.
- German Minority Socialists, statement of principles and aims by, 157-158; hope for future found in protests of, 202.
- Germany, causes leading to overruling of liberalism in, 11; militarism of, to be conquered only by creation of secure international system, 11-13; victory by, would re-establish prestige of autocracy, 14; early hopes in, of a speedy victory, 18-19; not the sole enemy of peace, 35; America's reasons for taking sides against, 60-62; discussion of the militarism of, against which war is being waged, 74 ff.; results to Western Europe in case of victory of, in first Western drive, 81-83; foreign policy of, compared with that of other powers, 104-105; impossibility of collecting indemnities from, 110; policy of trade discrimination against, ill advised, 111-112; resemblance of Italian program to that of, 134; sharp cleavage between democratic group and militarists in, 169; question of possibility of distinguishing between people and government, 189 ff.; submissive and militaristic character of people, 197; sinister change in population with early victories, 199-200; wherein hope lies for people of, 201-202; signs of beginning of change of mood in, 202-203; possibilities for development of democracy in, 203-206; power of Grand Alliance over, through economic co-operation, 241-244; should be admitted to new international system in which the war may result, 245; the State Idea in, 251, 252-254; probable domination of, in Russia, under an imperialistic peace, 286-287.
- Gibbons, H. A., quoted on bullying and blundering record of European diplomacy, 103-104; quoted concerning Italian imperialists, 130 n.
- Goldmann, N., defender of militarism, quoted, 92-94.
- Grand Alliance, the, 232 ff.; economic co-operation of, 234-241.
- Great Britain, material nationalistic aims of, in the war, 103; agreement between France and Russia and, as to disposition of territorial acquisitions, 116-119.
- Greece, offer of conquered territory to (November, 1914), 116.
- Grumbach, S., anthology of German imperialistic literature by, 109.
- Guarantees, demand for, by the warring powers, 224-225;

necessity for, 225; distinguishing between honest and questionable, 225-226; method of securing, by debilitating the enemy, 226-227; the method of the covenant and the method of destruction of motive, 228-230; should be secured by making cost of aggression greater and the temptation to be aggressive less, 230; new international organization and international spirit essential for enduring, 231.

Harrison, Frederic, "The Meaning of War," quoted, 82-83.

Idealism, American, before and after entering war, 38-49.

Imperialism, stamp of, upon Allied cause, 2-3; ideal victory imperilled by element of, among Allies, 26-27; discussion of aims of Allies based on ideas of, 98 ff.; the demand for indemnities, 107-111; trade discrimination against Germany, 111-112; demands for new territorial possessions, 113-120; of the Italian program, 121-138; possible effect of labour groups upon, 172-173; menace of, seen in America, 298-300.

Imperialistic peace, the danger of an, 282-287; possible arguments in favour of, by opponents of internationalism, 288-291; disastrous consequences of, 291-292; danger of, to be averted only by union of liberal elements in all nations prior to Peace Conference, 294-295.

Income taxes, continuation of, after the war, 306-307.

Indemnities, the Allied demand for, 107-109; argument against, 109-111; impossibility of collecting, from Germany, 110-111.

Industry, neutrality impossible under modern conditions of, 57-58.

Internationalism, lost opportunities for settling war on basis of, 2-3; necessary characteristics of a policy aiming at, 7-8; the lessening chances of a peace based on, 9-10; the only means of ending menace of German militarism, 11-13; victory for, should be the goal to be achieved in the war, 15; question of the achievement of, by fighting, 22-24; danger of fighting war for, by expedients opposed to, 26-27; doctrine of, viewed as a new and broader Americanism, 71-72; little attention paid to, in modern European politics, 103-104; *morale* and military power of Allies weakened by engagements violative of, 107 n.; Italian imperialistic designs opposed to policies of, 134; America's war aims inspired by, 139 ff.; true alignment in the war found in militarism versus, 157-173; centre and core of, located in labour groups of different countries, 170-171; shown to be the only basis for a conclusive peace, 212-222; a nearer approach to, made possible by the grand alliance against Germany, 234; analysis of principal obstacles to, 248 ff.; question of acceptabil-

- ity of, to our enemies or all of our allies, 251; antagonism to, in clash between the State Idea and an internationalism represented by Germany's enemies, 251; contest between State Idea or New Nationalism and, one of the deepest issues of the war, 256; conditions inclining nations toward New Nationalism or, 257-258; ideals of, contravened by *Mittel-Europa* idea, 261; narrow type of, favoured by favourably located states, 263-266; steps for securing a real, 266 ff.; program of, 268-269; the present the time for laying foundation of the new, 271; fate of, at the future Peace Conference, 275; supreme vigilance necessary to secure peace based on, 279; possible persuasive arguments against, at Peace Conference, 288-291; peace which makes no progress in direction of, a failure, 292-293; possibility of, doubtful under present economic and political régime, 297; basis for firm foundation for, in America and other countries, 308-309.
- Italy, events leading to defeat of, in 1917, 3; bargaining attitude of, in the war, 54; selfish aims and motives of, 121 ff.; national interest the controlling factor in policy of, 122-123; egoistic, nationalistic, and imperialistic motives of, 124-128; bargain made by, with Allies, 128; defence and criticism of national egoism of, 130-131; reasons why America should not lend aid to encouraging imperialistic aims of, 131-138; question of America's course in regard to, 152-154; weight of influence of labour groups in, 173.
- Japan, significance of invasion of Siberia by, to cause of Allies, 3; necessity for stopping plans for conquest in Siberia, to secure lasting peace, 13; slight significance of democratic ideals to, 54; militaristic and autocratic character of, 76; Chinese territory accorded to, by secret treaties, 115; position of, as affecting America's policy and war aims, 154-155; President Wilson and the problem of intervention by, in Siberia, 294 n.
- Junkers*, present ascendancy of, 11; course to be followed to break down prestige of, 11-13.
- Kautsky, Karl, quoted on Socialist attitude toward military system, 94 n.
- Labour, the necessity for placating, 185.
- Labour groups, hope of internationalism placed in, 170-172; reason for great influence of, in the war 172-173; possibility of sweeping away imperialistic elements by 173.
- League of Nations, for strengthening guarantees, 231.
- League to Enforce Peace, pacific intentions of nations necessary to machinery of, 296.
- Lehmann, Pastor Walter, laudation of Germany by, 200.
- Lieber, F., cited on definition of "nation," 256.

Liberalism *See* Democratic groups.

Maxse, L. J., attack on America's neutral policy by, 46-47; quoted as an advocate of indemnities, 108.

Militarism, destruction of all kinds of, one chief aim in the war, 15; what is meant by the war against, 73 ff.; defence of German system, 77-78; particular reasons why America combats German, 85-90; arguments in defence of German, 92-94; not identical with maintenance of an army, 94 n.; internationalism versus, the true alignment in the war, 157-173; an obvious implication of Neo-Nationalism, 262.

Militarists, as a chief obstacle to an ideal peace, 27, 29-30; intellectual chasm between democratic groups and, in all countries, 168-170.

Mittel-Europa, antagonistic to doctrine of unrestricted rights of nationalities, 261; why Germany desires a, 261-262.

Money power, extent of responsibility of the, for America's entrance into the war, 62-67.

Monroe Doctrine, to carry out promise of the, one object of America in entering the war, 71.

Murray, Sir Gilbert, "The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey," quoted, 101-102.

Nationalistic ambitions of Allies, 98-106; internationalistic motive opposed to, 106-107; the demand for indemnities, 107-111; the demand for trade

discrimination against Germany, 111-112; the demand for new territorial possessions, 113-120.

Nationality, definition of a, 257. *See* Self-determination of nationalities.

Nationalization of industries, desirability of, in America, 307-308.

Neo-Nationalism doctrine of, 253-254; question of effect of war on, 255; conditions inclining nations toward internationalism or, 257-258; militarism an obvious implication of, 262; minor implications of, 263 n.

Neutrality, causes leading to American, early in war, 38-44; necessity of, emphasized by internal racial divisions in America, 44-46; difficulties of policy of, 46-47; failure of policy, 47-49; the period of "benevolent neutrality," 55-56; impossibility of a real, under modern industrial conditions, 57-58.

Non-intervention. *See* Neutrality.

Okuma, Count, death of European civilization predicted by, 309-310.

Pacifists, as obstacles to an ideal peace, 27; the present condition of, 27-29; reasons for existence of, in America, 38-42; condescendingly benevolent character of American type, 42-43.

Patriotism, pacific character of American, 42

Peace, the search for, and ob-

- stacles to, 27-32; need of a constructive, 32-33; position of America as the chief hope of, 33-34; lessons learned by America concerning a real, 34-36; not brought by the end of the war alone, 36-37; mood in which America must approach problem of, 37; terms of, as outlined by President Wilson, 140-141; the means of attaining a conclusive, 207-223. *See also* Imperialistic peace.
- Peace Conference, supposititious activities of diplomats at future meeting of, 273 ff.; will internationalism be shelved at? 275; importance of character of delegates to, 276; demand for public and not secret diplomacy at, 276-277; election of delegates to, proposed, 277-279; supreme vigilance necessary to secure peace based on internationalism, 279; contingencies which may rob people of benefit of their sacrifices, 279-282; the danger of an imperialistic peace, 282-287; America's present opportunity to prevent an imperialistic settlement, 287-288; possible appeals in favour of an imperialistic peace, 288-291; importance of union of liberal elements in all nations, prior to, 294-295.
- Pichon, Stephen, a French advocate of indemnities, 108-109.
- Powers, H. H., "America among the Nations," quoted, 75 n.
- Punitive indemnities, the proposed policy of, to be adopted by Allies, 107-109; the argument against, 109-111.
- Railroads, benefits from nationalizing of, 303.
- Reclus, Onésime, policy of indemnities advocated by, 109.
- Reichstag Majority program, 202.
- Reinforcement of treaties, an element of internationalism, 250.
- Reply to the Pope, President Wilson's, 140.
- Roosevelt, Theodore, criticism of views of, expressed in speech calling for a peace of overwhelming victory, 207-208.
- Roumania, a bargainer in the war, 54; territories to be accorded to, 115-116.
- Russia, course of Allies toward, 2-3; conditions resulting in handing over of, to Germany, 9; autocratic and militaristic character of, in 1914, 76; militarism of, compared with that of Germany, 77; nationalistic aims of Imperial, at beginning of war, 102-103; territory accorded to, by terms of secret treaties, 115; territorial acquisitions of, under agreement with Great Britain and France, 116-119; impulse toward liberal peace terms from Republic of, 142; appeal issued by Republic of, for peace without punitive indemnities or forced annexations, 174; effects of utterance on allies of New Russia, 174-175; wisdom of new-born Republic shown by statement, 175; President Wilson's sympathetic attitude, 176; procrastinating course of Allies, resulting in rise of Bolshevik government, 176-177; war-weariness and clear-sight-

- edness of, 177-179; steps leading to the appeal by, for a common peace and mutual forgiveness, 179-180; disposition of, under an imperialistic peace, 285-287; President Wilson's announcement concerning treatment of, by sister nations, 293-294.
- Russian Republic, right spirit shown in declaration by, for "no annexations and no indemnities," 5, 174-175; attitude of, toward secret compacts of Allies, 6-7
- Russian Revolution, effect of, on deciding America to enter the war, 67-68; destruction of, by an imperialistic peace, 291.
- Saturday Review*, reception by, of President Wilson's demand for democratization in Germany and promise of a non-punitive peace, 162-163.
- Sayce, Professor, quoted on the Germans, 192.
- Secret treaties of Allies, to be disapproved by America, 4-5; hesitating diplomacy of America in regard to, 6-7; effect of, upon the enemy, 99; disposition of territorial possessions under terms of, 113-120; specially objectionable features of, 119-120.
- Self-determination, granting of right of, to each conscious nationality, an element of internationalism, 250.
- Self-determination of nationalities, nations which find it difficult to subscribe to doctrine of, 259-260; effect upon Austria Hungary, Switzerland, Great Britain, and other countries, 260; the State Idea opposed as a rival conception, 260.
- Shaw, Bernard, quoted on impossibility of collecting damages from Germany, 110.
- Socialized democracy, the brand of democracy for reorganizing the world after the war, 94-95.
- State Idea, the, as represented by Germany, 251, 252-254; relation of German socialism to, 254-255; question whether war will result in destroying or propagating the, 255; contest between internationalism and, one of the deep issues of the war, 256; opposed as a rival conception to doctrine of self-determination of nationalities, 260.
- Status quo ante*, impossibility of ending war on basis of, 215-220.
- Stockholm Conference, a lost opportunity for America, 5-6.
- Stoddard, T. Lathrop, "Present-Day Europe," quoted, 128.
- Taxes on incomes, inheritances, and excess profits, as a means of deflecting wealth to general community, 306-307.
- Territorial possessions, Allied demands for, as an obstacle to peace, 113-120
- Threats, Germany's use of, to secure concessions, 80.
- Trade discrimination, discussion of the Allied demand for, after the war, 111-112.
- Trade unions. *See* Labour groups.
- Treaties, reinforcement of, an

- element of internationalism, 250. *See* Secret treaties.
- Turner, Sir Alfred E., quoted on the Germans, 192.
- Veblen, Thorstein, "The Nature of Peace," quoted, 203.
- Victory, present elusiveness of, 17-19; in what it will really consist, 20-22; elusiveness even of a real moral, 22-24; dangers lurking in a merely material, 24-26; reasons for elusiveness of a real, found in war aims of Allies, 26-27; obstacles to an ideal, found in both pacifists and militarists, 27-30; the need for a constructive peace to follow, 32-33; criticism of Mr. Roosevelt's call for an overwhelming, 207-208; a conclusive peace not necessarily the result of a conclusive victory, 209-212.
- Vorwärts*, reception by, of President Wilson's demand for democratization in Germany and promise of a non-punitive peace, 162.
- Wage-earners, promotion of internationalism by, 170-172; great influence of, in the war, due to law of supply and demand, 172-173; imperialistic elements may be swept away by, 173; strength of Bolsheviki found in fact that they represent the, 182-183.
- Wallas, Graham, early forecast of present situation by, 17-18.
- Wall Street and the war, 62-67.
- War against militarism, meaning of the, 73-97.
- War beneath the war, meaning of phrase, 14, 184.
- Whyte, A. F., quoted on the basis of a complete victory, 222 n.
- Wilson, President, efforts of, to secure for America position of arbiter in settlement of war, 1-2; opposition of, to imperialistic designs of Allies, 3; reasons for failure of, to hit his mark, 3-4; course that might have been followed by, 4-5; lost opportunities of, for declaration of principles, 5-7; possible explanations of policy and apparent errors of, 7-8; the thought behind the "too proud to fight" speech, 44; the plea by, that Americans remain neutral in thought, 55; demonstrated unwillingness of, to permit financial groups to dictate national policy, 66-67; significance of war message of, in relation to upholding of America's traditions, 70-71; steps taken by, toward acting as arbitrator between claims of Allies and of enemies, 139-140; principles enunciated in his Reply to the Pope, 140; terms of peace as further outlined by, 140-141; reception in Germany and in England of demand for democratization and promise of non-punitive peace, 162-163; sympathetic attitude of, toward Russian Republican appeal for peace without indemnities or annexations, 176; failure of, to meet promptly the Russian appeal for a common peace and mutual forgiveness, 180-181; statement by, as to basis of settlement of disputed issues, 281 n.; an-

- nouncement by, in regard to
treatment to be accorded Rus-
sia by sister nations, 293-294.
- World society, the hope of a new,
21-22.

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
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